Ashvin Gandhi conducts his research predominantly at the intersection of industrial organization and health economics. He is particularly interested in how firm strategy interacts with health care policy and regulation.
One of his recent projects investigates whether health care providers pick their patients. He uses patient-level administrative data on skilled nursing facilities in California to identify and analyze discriminatory admission practices in the nursing home industry. Gandhi finds evidence of selective admission practices that disproportionately harm Medicaid-eligible patients with lengthy anticipated stays, in spite of anti-discrimination laws. He explores the potential effects of proposed policies intended to mitigate these discriminatory practices.
His current work with Shoshana Vasserman and Pierre Dubois asks what would happen if the United States were to regulate pharmaceutical prices to be lower than in other countries. They find that the dominant effect of such a reference pricing policy could influence pharmaceutical companies to raise prices in other countries rather than substantially lower their U.S. prices. They also find that the structure of such a policy plays an important role in its potential effects.
Ph.D. Economics, 2019, Harvard University
B.A. Mathematics and Economics, 2013, Pomona College
“Picking Your Patients: Selective Admissions in the Nursing Home Industry”
“Bargaining and International Reference Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry” (with Pierre Dubois and Shoshana Vasserman)
“New Data on Private Rates in the Nursing Home Industry” (with Lacey Loomer, Fangli Geng, and David Grabowski), R&R Medical Care Research and Review
“Private Equity, Competition, and Quality in the Nursing Home Industry” (with YoungJun Song and Prabhava Upadrashta)
“Vacancy Chains and Real Estate Passthrough” (with Nathan Hipsman and Prabhava Upadrashta)
“Preferences for Suspense and Surprise in a Massive Online Computer Game” (with Paola Giuliano, Quinn Keefer, Michaela Pagel, and Joshua Tasoff)