Strategic Management Journal
In “First-Mover Advantages,” Marvin Lieberman – together with co-author David Montgomery – explores the theoretical and empirical literature on mechanisms that confer advantages and disadvantages on first-mover terms. In addressing what makes a first-mover advantage, Lieberman and Montgomery also delve into the conditions that create them, the mechanisms that support them, and the circumstances under which firms should pursue these opportunities. The two address major conceptual issues while giving recommendations for future research, and discuss managerial implications. The paper was published in Strategic Management Journal in 1998.
When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data
Lee G. Branstetter and Mariko Sakakibara
The American Economic Review
Lee G. Branstetter and Mariko Sakakibara examined the impact of a large number of Japanese government-sponsored research consortia on the research productivity of participating firms by measuring their patenting in the targeted technologies before, during, and after participation. Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature on research consortia, they found consortium outcomes were positively associated with the level of potential R&D spillovers within the consortium and (weakly) negatively associated with the degree of product market competition among consortium members. Their evidence suggested that consortia are most effective when they focus on basic research. The American Economic Review published their findings in 2002.
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch
Journal of Political Economy
In this paper, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch explored how an informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual having observed the actions of those ahead of him to follow the behavior of the preceeding individual without regard to his own information. The trio argued that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades. Their findings were published by the Journal of Political Economy.
Motivational Spillovers from Awards: Crowding Out in a Multitasking Environment
Timothy Gubler, Ian Larkin, and Lamar Pierce
Timothy Gubler, Ian Larkin, and Lamar Pierce used data from an attendance award program implemented at one of five industrial laundry plants to show the complex costs of corporate awards. They showed that although the attendance award had direct, positive effects on employees who previously had punctuality problems, it also led to strategic gaming behavior centered on the specific eligibility criteria for the award. The award program temporarily changed behavior in award-eligible workers but did not habituate improved attendance. They also showed that the attendance award program crowded out internal motivation and performance in tasks not included in the award program. Their paper suggested that even purely symbolic awards can generate gaming and crowding out costs that may spill over to other important tasks.