Political Institutions and Economic Policy Conference

Political Institutions and Economic Policy (PIEP) Conference

About the Conference


The goal of PIEP (Political Institutions and Economic Policy) conferences is to bring together scholars whose work examines political institutions with those who focus on the analysis of economic policymaking. The conferences encourage research approaches that are theoretically rigorous and empirically systematic with regard to both institutional factors and economic conditions.

Upcoming Conference:

December 7, 2024

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Details are forthcoming.

The PIEP conference will involve the presentation of three papers, each with two discussants.

Submit a Paper


You may submit a preliminary version of a paper. Abstracts or extended abstracts will not be considered.

Nominate a Paper


Alternatively, you may nominate a working paper that you believe will make a major impact in the PIEP research area. It must be accompanied by a link to the paper and a brief (maximum of 150 words) statement.

Please submit your paper by August 15, 2024



The agenda for the conference will be announced by August 31, 2024.

Paper submissions and nominations are open until August 15, 2024.



Accommodation and Travel

Our budget will cover travel and up to two nights of local accommodations for all presenters and discussants. We will also contribute to the expenses of participating junior faculty to the extent possible.

Administrative Contact

For questions about logistics and reimbursement, please contact


Hotel Accommodations

UCLA Meyer and Renee Luskin Conference Center
425 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095

Selected Previous Papers
  • Austen-Smith, David (2000). Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation. Journal of Political Economy 108(6): 1235-1269.
  • Cox, Gary (2000). The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes. Chapter in Presidents, Parliaments and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Matthew D. McCubbins. Cambridge University Press.
  • Kroszner, Randall S., & Strahan, Philip E. (1999). What drives deregulation? Economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1437-1467.
  • Moene, Karl Ove, & Wallerstein, Michael. (2001). Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution. American Political Science Review, 95(4), 859-874.
  • Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. Journal of public Economics89(5-6), 897-931.
  • Diermeier, Daniel, Eraslan, Hülya, & Merlo, Antonio. (2003). A structural model of government formation. Econometrica, 71(1), 27-70.
  • Alesina, Alberto, Glaeser, Edward L., & Sacerdote, Bruce. (2001). Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2001(2), 187-278. 
  • Hoff, Karla, & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2004). After the big bang? Obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post-communist societies. American Economic Review, 94(3), 753-763. 
  • Acemoglu, Daron. (2008). The form of property rights: Oligarchic versus democratic societies. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(1), 1-44. 
  • Banerjee, Abhijit, & Somanathan, Rohini. (2007). The political economy of public goods allocation in India. Journal of Development Economics, 82(2), 287-314. 
  • Fiorina, Morris P., & Abrams, Samuel J. (2008). Political polarization in the American public. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 563-588. 
  • Nunn, Nathan, & Puga, Diego. (2012). Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in Africa. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), 20-36. 
  • Galenianos, Manolis, Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo, & Persico, Nicola. (2012). A search-theoretic model of the retail market for illicit drugs. The Review of Economic Studies, 79(3), 1239-1269. 
  • Glennerster, Rachel, Miguel, Edward, & Rothenberg, Alexander D. (2013). Collective action in diverse Sierra Leone communities. The Economic Journal, 123(568), 285-316. 
  • Hainmueller, Jens, Hiscox, Michael J., & Sequeira, Sandra. (2015). Consumer demand for the Fair Trade label: Evidence from a field experiment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(2), 242-256.
  • Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, & Roland, Gérard. (2021). Culture, institutions, and democratization. Public Choice, 187, 165-195. 
  • Angelucci, Charles, Meraglia, Simone, & Voigtländer, Nico. (2022). Medieval origins of inclusive institutions. American Economic Review, 112(10), 3441-3487. 
  • Bertrand, Marianne, Bombardini, Matilde, Fisman, Raymond, & Trebbi, Francesco. (2020). Tax-exempt lobbying: Corporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence. American Economic Review, 110(7), 2065-2102.
  • Dziuda, Wioletta, & Howell, William G. (2021). Political scandal: A theory. American Journal of Political Science, 65(1), 197-209.