We connect students, alumni, faculty and the investment community to transform fundamental knowledge into applicable practices that benefit the finance and investment industries.
The Fink Center sponsors a variety of activities that make students the focus and spread influence to our faculty, industry connections and alumni.
The Fink Center sponsors and hosts numerous other talks and conferences throughout the year.
If you would like to partner with the Fink Center on an event, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org.
A Panel Featuring Distinguished Female CEO’s in Institutional InvestmentsLearn More
Keynote: Rob Arnott
Chairman and CEO,
Fireside Chat: David Booth
Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer,
Dimensional Fund Advisors
Keynote: J. Christopher Lewis
Managing Partner & Co-Founder,
Riordan, Lewis & Haden
Laurence D. Fink, a UCLA alumnus and the chairman and CEO of BlackRock, will be the keynote speaker for the UCLA College commencement on Friday, June 10. He will speak at both commencement ceremonies, scheduled for 2 p.m. and 7 p.m., in Pauley Pavilion.
Laurence D. Fink, chairman and CEO of BlackRock and Founder of the Laurence and Lori Fink Center for Finance and Investments, was awarded the UCLA Medal, the campus’s highest honor, in recognition of his service to the community and his legendary career in business and finance.
On January 22nd, select students from Anderson, including myself, were invited to attend a Q&A with Warren Buffett in Omaha, Nebraska. This was a once in a lifetime opportunity to meet with the Oracle of Omaha, and he did not disappoint; he answered all the questions with such immense intelligence, wit, and charm, it was sometimes hard to believe his 85 years, but easy to understand how he has become one of the most successful investors of all time.
In Buffett’s view, the luckiest person in the world is the baby being born today. He compared the real GDP per capita of when he was born in 1930 to today, which has increased six-fold in that time. Therefore, each person living today has a better standard of living than John D. Rockefeller, when you factor in access to medicine, technology, etc.
Buffett also imparted his view that it is best to invest money over the long-run, buying good businesses, rather than worrying about what will happen to the stock market in two years, and then donate most of it at the end – in order to maximize wealth and then distribute it. Considering that Buffett is well known for his philanthropy, this was hardly surprising that he would advise this.
However the most surprising and resonating comment from the Oracle was that, in his opinion, the best decision he every made was when he married his wife. He spoke in length about the importance of personal happiness and well-being, and nostalgically quoted “Success is getting what you want. Happiness is wanting what you get.”
That being said, as our lunch concluded, photos were taken, and Buffett prepared himself to leave the room he left us with these words “Buy low. Sell high”, and with a cheeky grin, he waved goodbye.
-Rebecca Bilek-Chee, MBA '16
Earlier this month, Larry Fink sent his annual letter to CEOs of leading companies. In this letter, Larry discusses the powerful forces of short-termism afflicting corporate behavior, as well as asking CEOs to better plan for the long-term.
In the past two years, Professor of Finance, Antonio Bernardo, and Distinguished Professor of Finance and J. Fred Weston Professor of Finance, Ivo Welch, have co-published two articles that have been featured in the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization and the Journal of Law and Economics.
Abstract: Common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms counting on future bailouts. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to avoid these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations, such as TARP.
Abstract: Our article offers the first justification for the US bankruptcy code, in which firms are not allowed to commit themselves ex ante in their lending agreements either to (Chapter 7) liquidation or to (Chapter 11) reorganization in case of distress ex post. If fire-sale liquidation imposes negative externalities on their peers, then firms can be collectively better off if they are all forced into a no-opt-out choice (a mandatory “menu”). This is the case even though they would individually want to commit themselves to liquidation, and it is collectively better for them than voluntary contract choice or mandatory liquidation. Our article’s innovation is thus to show not when a later choice should be prohibited, but when a later choice should be mandatory. Equivalent analyses could justify when other ex post choices should remain inalienable (not contractible).