Housing Wealth and Overpayment:
When Money Moves In[*]

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Abstract

We construct a novel dataset tracking households across property purchases covering 25 years of moves within the U.S. We find that information frictions in residential real estate markets cause movers with larger exogenous housing wealth to overpay for their next house, relative to both time varying local prices as well as time invariant characteristics of the property itself. These housing wealth driven overpayments are associated with larger positive price impacts to the immediately surrounding neighborhood and are larger for local movers relative to non-local movers. The aggregate effect of housing wealth inflows is to increase county-level house prices.

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1 Introduction

The single biggest asset on the balance sheet of most U.S. households is their primary residence (Bhutta et al., 2020). Despite the importance of this asset in a household's portfolio, there is little evidence in the literature regarding how households make housing consumption and investment decisions across properties. Across a large, nationally representative sample of homeowner moves, we document a surprising fact: an increase in housing wealth causes households to overpay for their next house.

Given both the financial costs (overpayment leads to lower future realized returns on the property) and the opportunity costs (buying a larger house or saving the extra money) of this behavior, why do households spend housing wealth on overpayment? Kurlat and Stroebel (2015) show that individuals with greater neighborhood familiarity have higher equity gains on their real estate transactions, consistent with a trade-off between information and overpayment. Because housing markets are segmented and illiquid, information acquisition requires substantial time and effort. We demonstrate that households substitute away from this costly information acquisition by using their sold home equity gains to overpay on their next purchase.

What effect does this have on the household's new neighbors? First, a purchase by a household with a larger equity gain causes increased prices for properties in the nearby neighborhood. Second, we show that the aggregate effect of housing wealth inflows increases county-level house prices. Consequently, increases in housing wealth not only have important effects on individual household investment decisions, but also influence housing market dynamics in the purchase location.

We begin by constructing a novel dataset of household moves based on the Zillow Transactions and Assessments (ZTRAX) data. We focus on moves between owner occupied single-family residential properties between 1996 and 2021 where we observe three specific transactions—the

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purchase and sale of a particular property (the "sold property"), as well as the purchase of the subsequent property (the "purchased property"). This allows us to measure, over the individual household's holding period, the increase in the value of their housing asset (their "equity gain"[1]) and relate it to observed behavior in their subsequent housing purchase. For that subsequent purchase, we recover the residual ("overpayment") from a repeat sales regression model that controls for both time invariant observable and unobservable property characteristics as well as time-varying zip code and census tract average price levels, measured with respect to the entire universe of housing transactions in the ZTRAX data. This measure of overpayment only contains information about the purchase price that is orthogonal to a reasonably objective measure of the fundamental value of the asset. Consistent with this interpretation, we show that overpayment negatively predicts future realized returns on the purchased property.

Figure 1 demonstrates a strong positive correlation between the equity gain a household realized on their sold property and the overpayment observed on their purchased property. However, assessing the causal effects of a household's equity gain is challenging for two reasons. First, households that realize a large equity gain are likely to be more sophisticated or skilled (or have hired better real estate agents) and therefore less likely to overpay for their new house. The existence of sophisticated housing market participants biases downward any naïve estimate of the effect of equity gain on overpayment. Second, potential co-movement in housing prices can bias upward any estimates of the effect of equity gain at sale on outcomes related to the price paid at purchase. Ultimately, while our measure of overpayment is orthogonal to most local price movements of concern, this will make it difficult to identify the spillover effect of equity gains on neighborhood prices.

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[1]We measure equity gain as the difference between the price the property sold for and the original purchase price. This abstracts away from household financing decisions, and represents the total change in housing asset wealth over the period of ownership.

We address these concerns in a three-fold manner. First, we use observable characteristics to control for differences in the types of households moving by including a control for the median house price of the zip code where the house is being sold (but at the time that property was originally purchased), a fixed effect for the number of years lived in the house, and interacted fixed effects for the characteristics of the property being sold. Second, we include zip-year fixed effects for both the sale and purchase locations, allowing us to control for the timing of the move (at the year level) as well as current zip code level price conditions in both the sale and purchase locations separately. Finally, we instrument for a household's change in equity gain using the change in the zip code level housing price index at the sale location over the household's holding period, exploiting variation in equity gain that is orthogonal to any individual household's (or their agent's) housing market sophistication or bargaining ability. This holding period change in the zip code level housing price index strongly predicts a household's equity gain; first-stage F-statistics are well above 100. The exclusion restriction is that, conditional on the fixed effects and controls, the change in housing prices at the property sold zip code level is uncorrelated with the amount the buyer overpays (measured relative to the purchase zip-month and census tract-year) except through the household's equity gain.

The only remaining concern relates to possible local economic shocks under very narrow conditions. If average price growth in the, e.g., Beverly Hills, CA, zip code (90210) where the household is selling their house is correlated with prices in the purchase neighborhood because of some particular affinity (either it is immediately bordering or there is significant co-movement between "high-end" locations) then our estimates could still be biased. But this purchase neighborhood of concern has to both be small in size and unique relative to its surrounding area—its prices have to move differently from the average property in it's zip-month and census tract-year. Moreover, we show that this potential selection into micro-neighborhoods is unlikely to be

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driving our results, as overpayment predicts a lower future return on the transaction relative to other buyers in the area—which is inconsistent with persistent changes in the valuation of the purchased property.

Within this instrumented framework, we find that for every dollar of exogenous equity gain that a seller receives, they overpay for their next house by 7.9 cents. For the average equity gain in our sample, that represents an overpayment of about 2 percent of the overall purchase price. What leads buyers to use their equity gains to overpay? First, to the extent that equity gains relieve capital constraints, buyers might be able to consider a larger set of houses, potentially leading to a better match. Consequently, the overpayment we observe might be driven by buyers using their equity gains to buy a house for which they have a higher private valuation (and thus are more willing to overpay). Second, because acquiring information about neighborhood characteristics in order to become informed about the fundamental value of a property is costly, buyers with large equity gains might trade off expending that effort with simply overpaying. Consistent with both of these possibilities, Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic (2020) show that local area price appreciation causes capital constrained homeowners of that area to search across a broader set of prospective properties (potentially leading to a better match), while not changing the amount of attention devoted to any particular listing and searching in overall less time (consistent with less information acquisition activity).

We distinguish between these two channels by investigating how the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gains varies based on the characteristics of the local market as well as those of the moving household. First, a high volume of historical transactions over the previous 90 days in a very local geography (1/2 mile radius around the purchase property) represents both a deep pool of properties over which to search as well as an abundance of information about recent comparables. Consistent with these high volume areas having less information asymmetry, but

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inconsistent with the broader potential search scope leading to better matches for a given effort, we find that the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain is markedly reduced. Second, for the subset of within-county moves ("local moves"), households that have lived in their sold home for a longer period of time are both more likely to be familiar with the area—thus facing a bigger information advantage relative to their less-tenured neighbors—and to have more strongly developed local housing preferences, perhaps due to relatively older children or more specific community ties. Consistent with more tenured households having relative information advantages, but inconsistent with them having sharper preferences (and thus higher private valuations), we find that their sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain is also reduced. Finally, we find that the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain is increasing in historical price dispersion, a measure of the quality of information om comparables, providing additional evidence consistent with the information asymmetry channel. Consequently, the evidence suggests that equity gains allow movers to substitute overpayment for costly information acquisition.

Having established that equity gains cause overpayment, we next examine how a household with large equity gains moving in affects neighborhood house prices. We show that the equity gain a buyer realized on their recently sold home causes an increase in average housing prices in the nearby neighborhood—8.9 cents for every dollar of equity gain. This spillover effect of equity gain varies in the same manner with market and buyer conditions (transaction volume and years in home) as our overpayment results. This suggests that the spillover effect is also likely a result of the same substitution between equity gain and price discovery as the overpayment effect.

Surprisingly, while buyers from further distances overpay more on average, their overpayment is markedly less sensitive to their equity gains. The spillover of equity gains onto neighborhood prices is 20% higher for local movers relative to non-local movers. Non-local movers may face limited access to information acquisition technologies (repeated forays to open houses

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and multiple extended car tours of target neighborhoods) and consequently consistently over-pay, irrespective of their equity gain. In contrast, local movers with low equity gain overpay the least—engaging in "shoe leather" information acquisition—whilst local movers with high equity gain overpay the most.

To more fully characterize how housing wealth affects buyer behavior, we also estimate the effect of equity gains on other dimensions of the purchase decision. Buyers with larger equity gains spend more on a house, both because they purchase a property in a more expensive zip code and because they buy a bigger house. We find that for each dollar of equity gain, households spend $0.87 more on their next house. Of that, $0.79 represents a house with a higher fundamental value, and the remaining $0.08 is spent on overpayment.

Finally, we examine the extent to which these individual spillover effects explain county-level house price growth. For this analysis, we focus on the effect of aggregate out-of-area equity gain inflows on county house prices. To estimate the causal impact, we need to identify exogenous inflows of equity gains. We do this using predicted equity gain inflows based on historical migration routes calculated using IRS data, similar to Schubert (2021). We show that the cumulative effect of equity gain inflows is to drive up local house prices.

Our paper's ability to track households across multiple home purchases allows us to contribute relative to a literature exploring the role and behavior of buyers (Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic, 2020; Reher and Valkanov, 2021; Han and Hong, 2022), sellers (Guren, 2018; Andersen, Badarinza, Liu, Marx, and Ramadorai, 2022; Fu, Jin, and Liu, 2022; Giacoletti and Parsons, 2021), their agents (Aiello, Garmaise, and Nadauld, 2022), and participants' overall performance (Wolff, 2022) in residential real estate. Additionally, we contribute to a literature that explores the existence of information asymmetries in real estate markets (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004; Levitt and Syverson, 2008; Kurlat and Stroebel, 2015; Agarwal, Sing, and Wang, 2018; Liu, Nowak,

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and Smith, 2020) and characterizes overpayment behavior as a function of either search frictions (Lambson, McQueen, and Slade, 2004; Akin, Lambson, McQueen, Platt, Slade, and Wood, 2013), preferences (Agarwal, Choi, He, and Sing, 2019), or bargaining intensity (Cvijanović and Spaenjers, 2021). There exists a significant literature exploring the manner in which households make housing consumption decisions (Simonsohn and Loewenstein, 2006; Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2019; Kabas and Roszbach, 2021; Bian and Lin, 2022) and the manner in which housing influences other household consumption decisions (Stroebel and Vavra, 2019; Aruoba, Elul, and Kalemli-Ozcan, 2022; Atalay and Edwards, 2022; Benmelech, Guren, and Melzer, 2022; Graham and Makridis, 2022), but which has heretofore been unable to look directly at how housing asset performance influences housing consumption decisions for the next property. Finally, we contribute relative to a literature exploring aggregate migration, location choice, and house price dynamics (Saiz and Wachter, 2011; Sinai and Souleles, 2013; Sá, 2015; Oswald, 2019; Badarinza and Ramadorai, 2018; Davids, 2020; Gorback and Keys, 2020; Hoxie, Shoag, and Veuger, 2020; Li, Shen, and Zhang, 2020; Favilukis and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021; Haslag and Weagley, 2021; Schubert, 2021; Howard, 2020; Mondragon and Wieland, 2022).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the matching process that generated it, as well as descriptions of our main variables of interest. Section 3 explains our identification strategy. Section 4 presents our estimates of the effect of equity gain on housing consumption decisions, as well as the spillover of those decisions to neighborhood prices. Section 5 discusses our analysis of aggregate equity gain flows and their impact on county-level housing prices. Section 6 concludes.

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2 Data and Matching

To estimate the effect of equity gains on overpayment, we first construct a novel dataset of household moves based on the Zillow Transactions and Assessments (ZTRAX) data. The ZTRAX data is based on property deeds and covers the entire U.S. We begin with the ZTRAX universe of 220 million house transactions that occur between 1996 and 2021. We then limit the sample to owner-occupied single family residences to filter out investors as well as vacation properties. This results in a set of 136 million house transactions that we search across to find potential moves.

Within this subset of transactions, we identify potential moves by matching based on names and addresses listed on the recorded deeds. To qualify as a move in our data, the purchase transaction needs to occur less than 274 days after, but no more than 182 days before, the sale transaction.[2] If there are multiple potential matches within that date range, we privilege the strongest name match available (e.g., matches based on multiple names listed on both deeds), only retaining matches that have unique "strongest" match pairs. This matching process results in a set of 19 million moves.

Because we are interested in the effects of equity gain on overpayment, we limit our sample to transaction series where we observe the three relevant consecutive prices—the original purchase and subsequent sale of the sold property, as well as the next purchased property—and are able to calculate our residualized measure of overpayment for the purchase transaction. This excludes moves to or from non-disclosure states.[3] We further limit the sample to transactions where all

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[2]Deeds are recorded in a manner that bunches on particular days of the week. These cut-offs are chosen to represent round week day counts for three-quarters and one-half of a year, respectively.

[3]Non-disclosure states are Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and all counties in Missouri except for Jackson County, St. Charles County, St. Louis County, and St. Louis city. We observe prices for a very small set of transactions in non-disclosure states. These prices might be erroneous, or the seller might have voluntarily disclosed the price. For sample consistency, we drop these observations from our sample. However, the results are not sensitive to the decision of whether or not to include these observations.

three prices are greater than $30,000 and less than $2 million, occur on a property that was never subject to a foreclosure, and where we are able to calculate all relevant inputs into our regression model. This results in a final sample of around 3.2 million moves. After excluding fixed effect singletons, our final regression sample consists of 3,1 million moves.

Figure 2 shows a map of the counties in our data where households purchase homes. Importantly, our sample covers a broad cross-section of the U.S. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our regression sample.

2.1 Sample Selection Concerns

Our data is a sample of home owner to home owner moves. As a result, we are missing first-time home owners and any owners that are transitioning either to or from the rental market. Furthermore, our sample is conditioned on the decision to move. It is possible that potential equity gains influence the decision to move; thus, we are cautious about extrapolating our results to households that haven't yet made the decision to move. We interpret our results as the effect of exogenous equity dollars on a household's next purchase conditional on moving.

Conditional on moving, our sample of household moves seems broadly representative. ZTRAX has near universal coverage of housing transactions, and we successfully match around 14% of these transactions to moves. Aggregate flows across counties through time in our sample compare favorably with aggregate flows calculated on the universe of moves with the IRS data.

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2.2 Definition of Equity Gain

Our main explanatory variable of interest is a household's equity gain on their sold property, which we define as the change in the value of the house over the length of ownership, i.e.,

$$Equity\ Gain_{i,t} = P_{i,t}^{S} - P_{i,t-tenure}^{S} \tag{1}$$

where $P_{i,t-tenure}^{S}$ is the original purchase price that household i paid for the property being sold, and $P_{i,t}^{S}$ is the price that the property sells for at time t, the time of the move.

This measure of equity gain represents the change in the house's asset value, and is broadly a measure of the change in the household's housing wealth. Our definition of equity gain does not account for a household's financing decisions; however, conceptually the change in housing wealth is independent of financing choices. While household leverage decisions might change the timing of when housing wealth is liquidated (e.g., cash-out refinances or home equity lines of credit), the total change in wealth over the period that the household owns the house are captured in our measure of equity gain.

In our sample, the average household lives in a sold property for 6.6 years and realizes an average equity gain of $86,244.

2.3 Definition of Overpayment

We define overpayment as the price residual from a repeat-sales model. Specifically, we estimate:

$$P_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{z,m} + \alpha_{n,y} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{Price}$$
$$Overpayment_{i,t} = \varepsilon_{i,t}^{Price} \tag{2}$$

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where $P_{i,t}$ is the price of property i purchased at time t, α_i is a property-level fixed effect, $\alpha_{z,m}$ is a fixed effect for the zip code by month of the property being purchased, and $\alpha_{n,y}$ is a fixed effect for the census tract by year of the property being purchased. We refer to the residual from this model, $\varepsilon_{i,t}^{Price}$, as overpayment.

This measure of overpayment represents the amount paid in excess of the average price in the neighborhood (at both the zip-month and census tract-year level), as well as the amount paid in excess of the average price that this particular property has been purchased for across the full sample. Consequently, we interpret overpayment as the amount paid in excess of a reasonably objective measure of the current fundamental value of the property. In our sample, overpayment has a median value of about $4,300, or about 1.5% of the purchase price. Overpayment, however, exhibits substantial variation across our sample, with the interquartile range extending from about -$17,500 to $31,200 (or -6.4% to 9.7% of the purchase price).

This measure of overpayment accounts for any time-invariant differences in characteristics between properties though the property-level fixed effects and captures any changes in property value arising from neighborhood-level trends through zip-month and tract-year fixed effects. While our data do not allow us to observe changes in property characteristics over time (such as renovations or additions), we provide evidence in Section 4.1 to suggest that changes in property characteristics are unlikely to explain our estimates.

3 Empirical Strategy

We are interested in estimating the effect that the equity gain, which a household realized on their sold property, has on the extent to which they overpay on their purchased property. Figure 1 shows that equity gains are positively correlated with overpayment. In this section, we discuss

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the potential concerns with interpreting this correlation, and introduce a strategy to identify the causal effect of equity gains on overpayment.

3.1 Identification Concerns

We investigate the correlation visible in Figure 1 by estimating regression models of the following form:

$$Overpayment_{i,t} = \beta \, Equity \, Gain_{i,t} + \phi' \Gamma_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{3}$$

where $Overpayment_{i,t}$ is the dollar amount the household overpays on their next purchased home (defined in Equation 2), $Equity \, Gain_{i,t}$ is the dollar change in house price the household experienced over the years lived in their sold home (defined in Equation 1), and $\Gamma_{i,t}$ represents control variables at the property or area level and any included fixed effects. All of our property-level regressions include a fixed effect $\alpha_{z,y}^{P}$ for the zip-year of the purchase, in addition to the other controls and fixed effects described in the next section. This fixed effect controls for housing market conditions at the time and place of the purchase. Throughout the paper, we cluster our standard errors by both year and purchase county separately to account for potential correlation both within and across county-level housing markets.

For Equation 3 to recover the causal effect of equity gain on overpayment, it is necessary that the household's equity gain in their previous home is uncorrelated with any unobserved, price-relevant characteristics of the transaction, conditional on the fixed effects. There are two reasons that this is unlikely to be the case. First, due to differences in experience, bargaining ability, and the quality of real estate agents, households are likely to have varying amounts of housing market sophistication. A more sophisticated household is likely to both receive a higher price when selling a house (and thus realize a larger equity gain) and also pay a lower price when

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buying a house (and thus be less likely to overpay). To the extent housing market sophistication is common, this will bias our OLS estimate downward. Second, Sinai and Souleles (2013) show that prices tend to be highly correlated across move locations. This implies that households that experience a high equity gain are likely to purchase a home that has a higher price. Because overpayment is orthogonal to zip-month and census-tract year average prices, this correlation is unlikely to bias estimates of the effect of equity gain on overpayment. However, this correlation will make it difficult to identify spillover effects of equity gains to neighborhood prices.

3.2   Identification Strategy

To address concerns that households with high equity gains are more likely to exhibit housing market sophistication, as well as potential concerns over co-movement in house prices across move locations, we take a three-fold approach. First, we include a set of controls/fixed effects to account for potential differences in the types of households moving. While we do not observe individual demographic characteristics in our data, we do observe a rich set of property/transaction characteristics that we use as proxies for household wealth and experience. Specifically, we control for the zip code house price index of the sold property at the time that the household originally bought the home. We further include a set of fixed effects for the property characteristics of the sold property, constructed as the interaction of the square footage of the home (in percentiles), lot size (in deciles), number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and age of the home (in 5-year buckets). Finally, we include a fixed effect for the number of years lived in the sold home. Together, this strategy controls for differences in the household wealth (as proxied by the zip-level house price when the household originally bought the sold home as well as the characteristics of the home itself), and differences across long- and short-tenured movers (such as the likelihood of the transaction being an owner-occupied flip).

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Second, we include zip-year fixed effects separately for both the sold and purchased property locations. These control for the timing of the move, and absorb house price dynamics surrounding both the sold and purchased properties.

Finally, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification that isolates variation in equity gains that is plausibly exogenous to idiosyncratic household choices. We construct an instrument, $\Delta\text{HPI}^S_{z,t}$, for a household's equity gain using the change in the median zip code housing prices over the years that the household lived in the home,

$$\Delta\text{HPI}^S_{z,t} = \text{HPI}^S_{z,t} - \text{HPI}^S_{z,t-tenure} \tag{4}$$

where $\text{HPI}^S_{z,t}$ is the Zillow house price index for the zip code of the sold property at the time that the house is sold, and $\text{HPI}^S_{z,t-tenure}$ is the house price index at the time that the house was originally purchased. By using local area house price appreciation as an instrument for equity gain, we exclude the variation in a household's equity gain that is due to bargaining ability or other market sophistication of the household when they sold their previous home.[4]

Using the change in the zip code house price index as an instrument, we estimate the first stage regression:

$$Equity\ Gain_{i,t} = \beta\,\Delta\text{HPI}^S_{z,t} + \lambda\,\text{HPI}^S_{z,t-tenure} + \alpha^S_{z,y} + \alpha^P_{z,y} + \alpha^{tenure}_i + \alpha^S_h + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{5}$$

where $\text{HPI}^S_{z,t-tenure}$ is the zip-level house price index of the sold property in the year that the household originally bought the home, $\alpha^S_{z,y}$ is a sold property zip code by year fixed effect, $\alpha^P_{z,y}$

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[4]The one possible exception is within-year strategic timing. However, our results are robust to including an additional calendar month fixed effect to absorb seasonal differences in house prices. We can also replicate our results with sold and purchased zip-quarter fixed effects, which effectively eliminates the potential for any meaningful differences in strategic timing.

is a purchased property zip code by year fixed effect, α_i^{tenure} is a years lived in sold home fixed effect, and α_h^S is a fixed effect for the set of interacted house characteristics described above. Unsurprisingly, the change in zip code house prices over the years lived in the house strongly predicts the realized equity gain; the first stage *F*-statistic is 241.4 in our main specification.

We then use the predicted equity gain from Equation 5 to estimate the following second stage regression.

$$Overpayment_{i,t} = \beta \, \widehat{Equity \, Gain}_{i,t} + \lambda \, \mathrm{HPI}^S_{z,t-tenure} + \alpha_{z,y}^S + \alpha_{z,y}^P + \alpha_i^{tenure} + \alpha_h^S + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (6)$$

We expect that $\hat{\beta}_{IV} > \hat{\beta}_{OLS}$, since our instrument is predominantly designed to eliminate the effects of housing market sophistication which are likely biasing our naïve estimate downward. To interpret $\hat{\beta}_{IV}$ as the causal effect of equity gains on overpayment, the instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction that changes in the average house price in the sold property zip code over the holding period do not affect the amount of overpayment for the purchased property except through changes in the household's housing wealth, conditional on our fixed effects and controls.

The fixed effects used in Equation 6 severely limit potential violations of this exclusion restriction. Any remaining concern is limited to a shock that simultaneously affects the average price of houses in the entire sold property zip code and the price of houses only in a small neighborhood within the purchased property zip code. The shock cannot affect the entire purchased property zip code average, or it will be absorbed by the purchased property zip-year fixed effect. Additionally, the shock has to differentially affect properties within the purchased census tract-year, since overpayment is orthogonal to average prices in this dimension. One possibility, consistent with this type of shock, could be the opening of a new, highly regarded school that has boundaries that

include all of the sold zip code, but only a very small corner of the neighboring zip code, wherein the household purchased their new property. It is unlikely that this type of narrow story explains the average effect of our results.[5] Moreover, if the overpayment reflected persistent changes in very local amenities, we would expect this type of overpayment for a property to be persistent as well. However, we show below that overpayment predicts *lower* future returns from holding the property.

One additional concern is that the realized equity gain on a sold property influences the decision of where to move. For example, a household that experiences a substantial appreciation in local house prices might endogenously decide to sell and move to a lower priced area, either to significantly upgrade their house or to extract the equity gains. It is not obvious how this selection affects overpayment, since overpayment is defined relative to average prices in the purchase zip-month and census tract-year. Moreover, we include both sold and purchased property zip-year fixed effects to account for any differences in house price dynamics across move locations. To more fully account for potentially endogenous location decisions, in the Appendix we replicate our results using a different specification that includes a purchase county × sale county × year × years in home fixed effect. This specification is conditional on move location choices—we compare two buyers moving from the same county to the same county in the same year after having owned their home for the same number of years. This eliminates any differences due to move location decisions. We find similar results using this alternative specification. In Section 5, we further account for endogenous move location decisions at the aggregate county-level using pre-established migration routes as an instrument for the move decision.

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[5]Our results are also robust to excluding moves across short distances.

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4 The Effect of Equity Gains on Housing Transactions

While there is a substantial literature examining frictions that impact residential real estate transactions (Kurlat and Stroebel, 2015; Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic, 2020), lack of data has prevented researchers from exploring how households make housing investment decisions across properties. The novel transaction-level panel dataset that we construct in Section 2 provides the first large, nationally representative source of data that tracks households across housing transactions. Using this data, combined with the two-stage least squares strategy described in Section 3, we examine how changes in household wealth affect housing decisions when homeowners change their primary residence.

4.1 Equity Gains Cause Overpayment

Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence of the relation between equity gain and overpayment. We begin to investigate the positive correlation visible in the figure by estimating the OLS model specified in Equation 3. The regression result, reported in Table 2 column (1), confirms the correlation visible in the figure. There is a positive and significant relation between equity gain and overpayment—$1 of equity gain on the sold property leads to $0.01 of overpayment on the purchased property. However, as discussed in Section 3, this estimate is likely biased downward due to a housing market sophistication effect that simultaneously results in a household receiving a larger equity gain on the sold property and paying a lower price on the purchased property.

To identify the causal relation between equity gain and overpayment, we use the change in the zip-level house price index over the period that the household owned the home as an instrument for the household's equity gain as specified in Equations 5 and 6. Because this instrument is designed to address housing market sophistication concerns, we expect the IV estimate to be

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larger than the OLS estimate. The results confirm that this is the case. In Table 2 column (2) we show that the instrumented effect of equity gain on overpayment increases to $0.08 per dollar of equity gain. For the average household in our sample, which has an equity gain of $86,000, this implies an overpayment amount of about $6,800.

The large increase in β_{IV} relative to β_{OLS} suggests that housing market sophistication is prevalent in the data. To explore how plausible this is, we calculate the annualized net return a household earned on their sold property over their holding period. We then estimate the future returns that a household will earn on their purchased property as a function of their realized returns on their current sold property.[6] We include the same set of fixed effects as in Equation 6, which absorbs average prices at both the sold and purchased property location. The results are reported in Appendix Table A.1. We find a positive and highly significant relation between the realized return on a sold property and the future realized return on the purchased property, consistent with persistent housing market sophistication.

One advantage of this dollar on dollar specification is that we can interpret the coefficient as the marginal propensity to overpay out of a dollar of exogenous equity gains. Our estimate of about 8% is broadly similar to existing estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth,[7] which is consistent with households treating overpayment as a type of consumption.

While the marginal propensity to overpay out of housing wealth is an important economic concept, it is also interesting to understand the extent to which equity gain-induced overpayment scales up with the price of the purchased property. To investigate this, we define *Overpayment Percent* as the dollar amount overpaid on the purchased property (i.e., Equation 2) divided by the

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[6]Both are winsorized at a 1% and 99% level.

[7]Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011) find marginal propensities to consume out of housing wealth that range from 6−11%.

total price paid for the property. Using the same two-stage least squares framework, we estimate the effect of equity gain on *Overpayment Percent* and report the results in Table 2 column (3). We find that equity gains cause a statistically significant increase in overpayment as a percentage of the purchase price. A household with a $100,000 equity gain on their sold house overpays by 2.1% of the purchase price on their subsequent house purchase.

One potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that our measure of overpayment might not represent true overpayment. In particular, perhaps households with large realized equity gains are particularly likely to purchase houses that have value-enhancing characteristics that are not absorbed in the overpayment model specified in Equation 2 (such as substantially renovated properties). We cannot test this directly because our data does not allow us to observe property improvements.[8] To get a sense of how plausible this concern is, we estimate an OLS regression of the future realized returns on the purchased property as a function of overpayment. To the extent that our measure of overpayment represents the excess of the price over the fundamental value of the housing asset, we expect future returns to be lower when overpayment is higher. In contrast, if overpayment represents paying the correct price for, e.g., recently completed renovations, we would not expect to see any effect on future returns. In column (4), we find that overpayment is associated with lower future returns—a household that overpays by the average amount in our sample ($11,538) receives a 1.4% lower return when selling the property in the future. This suggests that at least some portion of what we define as overpayment actually is an amount in excess of the fundamental value of the house. Appendix Table A.2 shows that the decrease in the annualized return associated with overpayment persists for households that sell again quickly, suggesting that overpayment is not being driven by paying for recent renovations to the house.

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[8]Importantly, problematic property-level improvements would have to be performed in excess of the average level of improvements in the census tract.

4.2 Why do Equity Gains Cause Overpayment?

It is puzzling that households spend some of their realized wealth on overpayment, particularly given the financial costs documented above. Additionally, households sacrifice the opportunity costs of these overpayment dollars. Absent frictions, it seems likely that households would be better off using these overpayment dollars to either buy a bigger/better house or to consume or save the money. In this section, we explore potential frictions that might explain the relation between equity gains and overpayment.

On the one hand, buyers in residential real estate markets face substantial information asymmetry (Kurlat and Stroebel, 2015). Overcoming these information frictions is costly—buyers have to expend substantial time and effort to become informed about the fundamental value of a particular house. Buyers with large equity gains might choose to remain ignorant and overpay rather than exerting the effort necessary to discover the fundamental value of the house. On the other hand, to the extent that equity gains relieve capital constraints, buyers can consider a larger set of houses. This increases the probability that the buyer finds a match for which they have a higher private valuation, and consequently is more willing to overpay. Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic (2020) provide evidence that is consistent with both of these channels. They show that local area price appreciation causes capital-constrained potential movers to search across a broader set (both in terms of geography and in terms of house characteristics) of potential properties. This broader search could lead to a better, higher private valuation match. However, Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic (2020) also show that this increase in local price appreciation does not change the amount of time potential movers devote to any particular listing and furthermore shortens the ultimate duration of the search. Searching across a broader set of properties in a shorter period of time could be consistent with putting less effort into acquiring information about specific properties.

We first examine the interaction of equity gains with historical transaction volume, defined as the number of transactions that occurred within a half-mile radius of the purchased property over the prior 90 days. A deep pool of recent transactions suggest that there is an abundance of information about recent comparable transactions. Because this reduces information asymmetry, the information channel predicts that the sensitivity of equity gains will be lower when transaction volume is high. However, high historical transaction volume also suggests that the market is very liquid with lots of potential properties for sale. Because this increases the probability that the household finds a good match, the private valuation channel predicts that the sensitivity of equity gains will be higher when transaction volume is high.

We estimate the interaction between historical transaction volume and equity gain using our instrumental variable model for overpayment.[9] The results are reported in Table 3 column (1). Consistent with the information channel, and inconsistent with the private valuation channel, we find that the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gains is lower in markets with higher historical transaction volume. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of historical transaction volume decreases the effect of equity gain on overpayment by about 7%.

In Table 3 columns (2) and (3), we use neighborhood price dispersion as an additional proxy for the information environment of the local area. We measure price dispersion in two ways: the standard deviation of overpayment amounts and the standard deviation of transaction prices for all transactions that occur within 90 days before the purchase and within 1/2 mile radius of the purchase property.[10] While the transaction volume result reported in column (1) measures the availability of comparable historical sales, columns (2) and (3) measure the precision of those comps. Higher price dispersion in the recent local market increases the difficulty of determin-

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[9]These specifications have two potentially endogenous variables: equity gain and equity gain×characteristic. We use our original instrument (change in zip-level house prices) interacted with the characteristic as a second instrument for these specifications.

[10]We divide the standard deviation by 100 to make the coefficient easier to read.

ing the correct price for a property. Consequently, the information channel predicts that the sensitivity of equity gains to overpayment will be higher for areas with higher price dispersion. Across both measures of price dispersion (historical variation in overpayment and in transaction prices) we find that the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain is higher in more uncertain environments.

In Table 3 columns (4) and (5), we investigate the interaction of equity gain with the number of years that the household lived in their sold property. For these analyses, it is necessary to subset the sample to within-county moves. For this set of local moves, a household that has lived in their sold home for a longer period of time is likely to be much more familiar with the local area, and thus face less information asymmetry when moving. Consequently, the information channel predicts that the sensitivity of equity gains to overpayment will be lower for these long-tenured local movers. In contrast, households that have lived in the area longer and that are also moving within that same area are likely to have more strongly developed housing preferences, perhaps due to having relatively older children or more specific community ties. Moreover, these long-tenured households have implicitly had a longer period of time to search the local housing market (even if only passively), and so they are more likely to have found houses that are particularly well-matched for their preferences. As a result, the private valuation channel predicts that the sensitivity of equity gains will be higher for local, long-tenured movers.

We estimate the interaction of equity gain both with a continuous measure of the years lived in the sold property in column (4), as well an indicator variable for households that have lived in their home for more years than the sample median in column (5). Across both definitions we find that the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain is lower for long-tenured local movers. A household that has lived in their house more than the median number of years has a sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain that is nearly 30% smaller than a household that has lived in their

home less than the median number of years. Similar to the transaction volume results, this is consistent with the information channel and inconsistent with the private valuation channel.

Appendix Table A.3 shows that the results in Table 3 are robust to using percentage overpayment, rather than dollar overpayment, as the dependent variable. Combined, this evidence suggests that information frictions drive the relationship between equity gain and overpayment. Capital constrained households substitute the effort costs of acquiring information about the fundamental value of a house with simply overpaying.

4.3 Equity Gains Cause Neighborhood Price Spillovers

In this section, we investigate the impact that a household with large equity gains has on neighborhood house prices when they move in. Because residential housing markets are relatively illiquid and because prices are often based, in part, on previous transactions used as comparables, it is possible that households with large equity gains that overpay for their house cause prices to go up in the surrounding neighborhood.

To investigate this possibility, we first define the neighborhood price following a property purchase as

$$\text{NeighborhoodPrice}_{i,N,t,T} = \frac{\sum_{s=0}^{T} \sum_{j \neq i \in N} P_{j,t+s}}{\sum_{s=0}^{T} \sum_{j \neq i \in N} 1} \tag{7}$$

where household i purchases a house in neighborhood N at time t. The neighborhood price is the average price of all homes j located in neighborhood N that sell within T days of the purchase. We examine spillovers for two time windows T (180 and 360 days) and four different definitions of neighborhood N (houses within 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2 miles of the purchased house).

We estimate the spillover effect that a household's equity gain from their sold house has on prices in the neighborhood surrounding their purchased house using the same two-stage least

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squares framework that we use to study overpayment. The results are reported in Table 4. Focusing on column (1), we find that a household moving in with a larger equity gain causes a larger increase in neighborhood prices. An extra $1 of equity gain causes the average price of homes sold in the half mile radius around the purchased property to go up by $0.09 in the 180 days after the purchase. The magnitude of this price spillover is very similar to the magnitude of the effect of equity gain on overpayment, which is consistent with the overpayment being impounded into neighborhood house prices.

Looking across the columns of Table 4, we find that the impact of equity gain on neighborhood prices diminishes both with time and over distance. By one year after the purchase, the effect of equity gain on house prices within a half-mile is still significant, but 20% smaller. In contrast, for houses within 2 miles, the effect has fallen by 60% and is no longer statistically significant. This pattern is strongly consistent with price spillovers operating through a comparables channel, either directly (through appraisals) or indirectly (through affecting sellers' reservation prices).[11]

Our identification strategy is designed to estimate the causal effect of equity gain on overpayment and spillovers. Thus, while we believe that the most likely channel through which equity gains cause price spillovers is overpayment, we cannot test that directly. However, in Table 5 we provide additional evidence that suggests that the spillover effect operates through the overpayment channel by showing that the spillover effect of equity gain on neighborhood prices varies with the information environment in strikingly similar ways as the effect of equity gain on overpayment. Specifically, we find that the effect of equity gain on price spillovers is smaller in areas with high historical transaction volume and for households moving locally that have lived in the

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[11]In line with the declining spillover effects when going beyond a 1-mile distance that we find here, Freddie Mac's "Single Family Seller Servicer Guide" notes that an appraiser would most likely use comparables "in the immediate vicinity" of the property if it is in a suburban or urban area. (URL: https://guide.freddiemac.com/app/guide/home). Similarly, the "HUD Instructions for Completing the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report" declared in 1994 that a separate explanation was needed, "if comparable is more than 1 mile from subject" (URL: https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_36119.TXT)

area for longer periods of time, and larger for areas with increased historical price dispersion.

While not dispositive, the collective evidence in Table 5, combined with the fact that the magnitude of the effect of equity gain on price spillovers is very similar to the magnitude of the effect of equity gain on overpayment, strongly suggests that equity gain-induced overpayment pushes up prices in the neighborhood surrounding the purchased property.

4.4   Local vs. Non-local Movers

A remaining interesting question is the extent to which the sensitivity of overpayment and spillovers to equity gain varies by the distance of the move. A popularly held opinion in the press is that wealthy, out-of-town home buyers are driving prices up for everyone.[12] In this section, we explore the extent to which that is true for individual transactions. However, because the effects of spillovers might build on each other, it is possible that the aggregate effects of housing equity flowing into an area differ from the transaction-level effects. We explore the aggregate effects of housing equity inflows on county-level prices in a separate analysis described in Section 5.

To investigate the effect of move distance, we split household moves into four categories based on the sale and purchase locations: within zip; out-of-zip, but within county; out-of-county, but within state; and out-of-state. We include indicators for each of these move types, as well as the interaction of these indicators with equity gain, in our two-stage least squares estimates of the effects of equity gain on overpayment and price spillovers.[13] Note that our baseline category is within-zip moves, so the estimated coefficients represent the marginal difference in the sensitivity of overpayment and spillovers to equity gains relative to households that move within the same zip code.

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[12]For example, consider this recent headline from Bloomberg, "Out-of-Town Home Buyers Will Pay 30% More Than Locals in Hottest U.S. Markets." See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-02-15/top-10-most-competitive-housing-markets-where-out-of-towners-outspend-locals

[13]As with Table 3, we use the indicator×IV as an instrument for the interactions.

The results are reported in Table 6. In columns (1) and (2), we show how the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gain varies across move distances. Unsurprisingly, and consistent with overpayment being a function of information asymmetry, the average level of overpayment is monotonically increasing with distance. However, the sensitivity of overpayment to equity gains follows the exact opposite pattern. Non-local movers use less of their equity gain to overpay—out-of-state movers have a sensitivity of equity gain to overpayment that is half the magnitude of within-zip movers.[14] In Column (2), we show that this result is not driven by our choice of move categories—the effect of equity gain on overpayment continuously decreases with the distance of the move.

Not only does local equity gain result in a larger overpayment than non-local equity gain, but it also results in higher spillovers. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 6 show that the effect of equity gains on price spillovers also monotonically decreases with distance. Relative to within-zip movers, out-of-state movers have an equity gain sensitivity to spillovers that is 15% smaller.

Our results may be driven by large and wealthy counties (such as Los Angeles County, CA) where locals overpaying more than non-locals might seem intuitive. To test this, we run a specification similar to that of column (2) of Table 6 at an individual county level, for the 100 largest counties by observation count in our main regression sample. Rather than indicators for four classes of move distances across political boundaries, we collapse to a single binary indicator for whether the move was a non-local (i.e., out-of-county but within-state or out-of-state) move.[15] Appendix Figure A.1 displays a map of these 100 counties as well as information regarding the

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[14]For the average equity gain in our sample, the total effect of equity gain on overpayment varies very little across move distance. Interestingly, if spillovers are driven by overpayment, this would suggest that the average effect of equity gain on spillovers will not vary by distance. This is consistent with the level effects of the distance indicators being small and insignificant in Table 6 Column (3).

[15]The specification is also altered from that of Equation 6 because the focus on a single county obviates some of the fixed effect and clustering dimensions. The zip-year fixed effects for both the sale and purchase locations are replaced by a transaction year fixed effect and the purchase zip clustering dimension is dropped.

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sign and significance of the (instrumented) coefficient on the interaction between equity gain and a non-local move. Red counties have negative coefficients (non-locals overpay less than locals), while blue counties have positive coefficients (non-locals overpay more than locals). Significance at the 95% level is displayed by a deeper shade. Appendix Figure A.2 displays the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each of the 100 counties underlying the map. There are no counties where non-locals are overpaying more than locals as a function of their equity gain at a 95% confidence level.[16] These results suggest both that our results are not being driven by large metropolitan areas and that the popular press narrative is not true for any individual major county.

As a final robustness check, we replicate columns (2) and (4) of Table 6 for the pre-COVID-19 period (1996-2019) and the COVID-19 period (2020-2021) in Appendix Table A.4. During the pre-pandemic period, displayed in columns (1) and (3), we recover results consistent with our main sample effects, demonstrating our results are not driven by pandemic induced shifts in household behavior.

Together, the evidence in this section suggests that, at least at the individual level, equity gains in the hands of local movers actually drive prices up more than equity gains in the hands of non-locals. Why might that be? Our evidence in Section 4.2 suggests that households spend equity gains on overpayment to avoid paying the time and effort costs of acquiring information about the fundamental value of a property. This trade-off makes sense only to the extent that a household has the ability to exert effort and acquire information. For a local mover, this trade-off is especially salient—it is always possible to drive around the neighborhood one more time or schedule one more visit to the property. As move distance increases, it becomes less and less practical to exert additional effort. For a buyer moving across the country, it might only be possible to make one

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[16]Although one county out of the hundred tested, Naples, FL, is significantly positive at the 90% level.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4280776

or two in-person trips of limited duration to learn about potential houses. This constraint on the ability to gather information blunts the incentives to trade-off information acquisition with overpayment. As a result, long-distance buyers overpay more on average (because they are less informed), but simultaneously use less of their equity gains to overpay (because the benefits to avoiding information gathering are small). The popular press narrative regarding wealthy out-of-towners outbidding locals is potentially still true in selected areas, as the non-local movers may on average have experienced higher equity gains than locals, which may more than make up for their smaller sensitivity to each dollar of housing equity. However, the results in this section show that the popular discussion misses the important distinction between the equity gain sensitivity, the total housing equity gains of movers, and their overall tendency to overpay due to information disadvantages.

4.5   Characterizing the full effects of equity gain

We have established that increases in housing wealth cause households to overpay for their next home. How do equity gains affect other aspects of the housing purchase decision? Our data, combined with our two-stage least squares approach, allow us to explore the effect of equity gain on various aspects of the purchase price, as well as on the characteristics of the home that is purchased.

In column (1) of Table 7, we present the results from estimating the effect of the sold property equity gain on the purchase price of the subsequently purchased property. We find that for every $1 of equity gain, households spend another $0.87 on their next house. We can decompose this spending into overpayment (see Table 2) and the fundamental value of the house (defined as the predicted price from the overpayment model in Equation 2. Mechanically, these two coefficients sum to the overall effect of equity gain on purchase price. In Column (2) we show that $1 of

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equity gain causes houses to purchase a house that has $0.79 higher fundamental value. This implies that the spending on overpayment ($.08 per dollar of equity gain) represents about 9% of the total equity gain-induced house spending.

A well-documented fact in the literature is that buyers who pay in cash receive a discounted price (Reher and Valkanov, 2021). If equity gains are large enough, it is possible that they allow a household to purchase a home in cash, which would push against the overpayment results we document. In Appendix Table A.5, we find that equity gains do not predict the probability of purchasing a home in cash.[17] The results further confirm that households that pay in cash overpay less (i.e., they receive a cash discount), but even accounting for this fact households with large equity gains still overpay on net.

Across the remaining columns of Table 7, we show how equity gain affects the purchase neighborhood and the purchased property characteristics. We find that equity gains cause households to move to a more expensive zip code and to purchase a modestly older, but significantly larger house. For example, a household with the average equity gain in our sample purchases a 5% larger home (or 120 square feet larger based on the average house in our data). While overpayment is the most salient and interesting aspect of a household's response to equity gains (see Section 4), these results highlight the many and varied ways that a household's housing consumption and investment decisions are determined across multiple transactions.

5   Aggregate Impact of Housing Equity Gains

An important policy concern related to housing capital gain flows is what share of overall house price growth in destination locations can be attributed to the inflow of housing capital

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[17]This is less surprising given that our average equity gain is $86,000, and even the 95th percentile is only around $300,000; not enough to purchase the average home in our sample.

gains.

There are several reasons why the spillover effects estimated above cannot easily be translated into an estimate of the aggregate effect: (1) Our property-level estimates condition on characteristics of the buyers' areas of origin, which at least partially eliminates the effects coming from an area's exposure to particular *geographies* (rather than households within geographies) that have higher equity gains. (2) The spillover effects on other properties may lead to knock-on effects on further properties and may interact with the spillovers from other purchases in the area – as a result, the aggregate effect may differ from the partial equilibrium effects. (3) If high housing equity purchases cluster in the same year and county, then the effect on individual properties and their neighborhood may cumulate as overpayment for the first purchases enters the comparables for the later ones.

5.1   Aggregate effect specification

Therefore, we analyze the overall effect of the equity gains of buyers moving into a neighborhood by considering the impact on house prices at the county level. We focus on identifying the effect of buyers moving into a county from outside, as it is easier to construct plausibly exogenous variation with regard to destination county trends in such long-distance moves. The moving decision of households that come from the same county in which we are measuring our outcome variable is more likely to be endogenous with regard to local house price trends.

We want to estimate county-year-level regressions of the form:

$$\ln P_{ct} = \alpha_g + \alpha_t + \beta \ln eg_{ct}^{\text{non-local}} + \epsilon_{ct}, \tag{8}$$

where we include county c and year t fixed effects α_c and α_t in order to capture general differences

in house prices across counties, or macroeconomic trends (e.g. interest rate changes) that affect all locations equally. The equity gain variable $eg_{ct}^{\text{non-local}}$ is the expected total equity gains brought by in-migrants, scaled to be in units of dollars per local household in the destination county.

This total inflow of equity gains cannot be directly measured in our property-level data as we do not necessarily have full coverage of all transactions in a county. Instead, we combine our data on average equity gains among buyers with data on total movers between counties from the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income (SOI) database. Specifically, we use the ZTRAX data to estimate the average equity gain among observed out-of-county buyers in county c as:

$$\overline{\text{EquityGain}}_{c,t} = \left(\frac{\sum_i^{N_{c,t}^{\text{ZTRAX}}} \text{EquityGain}_{i,t,c} \times \mathbb{1}[\text{Out-of-County Origin}]_{i,t,c}}{\sum_i^{N_{c,t}^{\text{ZTRAX}}} \mathbb{1}[\text{Out-of-County Origin}]_{i,t,c}} \right)$$

and then scale this average equity gain into an estimate of total equity gains from all non-local movers per local household by calculating,

$$eg_{it}^{\text{non-local}} = \overline{\text{EquityGain}}_{c,t} \times \frac{\text{OutOfCountyMovers}_{ct}^{\text{IRS}}}{\text{ResidentHHs}_{c,t}^{\text{IRS}}} \times \text{HOShare}_c^{\text{ACS}}, \tag{9}$$

where $\text{OutOfCountyMovers}_{ct}^{\text{IRS}}$ and $\text{ResidentHHs}_{c,t}^{\text{IRS}}$ are the IRS estimates of total household inflows into the county, and total local households residing in the county. However, our ZTRAX estimate of average mover equity gains only applies to movers that are home buyers in the destination county, not renters, so we also scale the total equity gain by $\text{HOShare}_c^{\text{ACS}}$, the share of homeowners among all people moving into that county, computed from American Community Survey data as a county-level average over 2005-2019.

However, movers between counties may be selected in a way that would introduce bias into a simple OLS estimation of the effect of these equity gains on local house price growth. For example, movers that sell their house in response to high house price growth and equity gains in their origin

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county may be more likely to move to other counties experiencing high house price growth (for instance, because there is a common cause for these house price changes, such as a revaluation of shared natural amenities). At the same time, high house price growth destinations may attract additional equity gain inflows from speculators *because* their prices are rising. To mitigate these concerns around the endogenous location choice of movers, we construct an instrument that captures plausibly exogenous equity gain flows between counties.

We construct *exogenous* predicted equity gain inflows from out-of-area origins for each county as

$$\widetilde{eg}_{it}^{\text{non-local}} = [\text{Predicted Avg. Equity Gain for Movers}] \times [\text{Predicted Movers}].$$

To construct a plausibly exogenous flow of *predicted movers* for each origin-destination county pair, we use historical migration links as predictors of contemporaneous equity flows (Howard, 2020; Schubert, 2021). That is, the predicted number of movers from k to i is constructed from IRS migration data as a "shift-share" instrument of the form

$$\widehat{Mig}^{k \rightarrow i} = \left(\frac{MigShare_{'90-'99}^{k \rightarrow i}}{1 - MigShare_{'90-'99}^{k \rightarrow i}} \right) \times OutMig_t^{k \rightarrow \neg i},$$

where $MigShare_{'90-'99}^{k \rightarrow i}$ is the average share of outflows from county k that go to county i during 1990-1999, and $OutMig_t^{k \rightarrow \neg i}$ is the total outflow of migrants in year t to all locations *other* than county i.[18] The intuition for using this measure of expected migration flows is that it captures the degree to which the characteristics of county k are prompting outflows in period t, and the average share of those outflows that would be expected to go towards county i - for instance,

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[18]The reason for dividing by $(1 - MigShare_{\}90-\}99}^{k \rightarrow i})$ is to re-scale the leave-one-out outflows to the expected magnitude if county i flows of historic proportions had been included.

because of low migration costs between these locations - but without using any period t variation from county i itself that might potentially be correlated with local house price trends in i. Moreover, when aggregating these predicted flows from other counties, we will omit any flows from counties that are in the same commuting zone as county i in order to eliminate bias from the migration dynamics of counties that may have overlapping local housing and labor markets with the county of interest.

Similarly, the predicted average equity gain among people moving into county i is constructed without using data on the characteristics of contemporaneous flows from k to i, which might be selected based on destination characteristics. Instead, we assume that movers from high equity gain locations are generally more likely to have higher equity gains. Thus, destination counties i are expected to have higher average equity gains among their incoming households if they have higher historic migration exposure to counties that are experiencing high equity gains among their sellers in period t,[19]

$$\overline{eg}_{it}^{\text{movers}} = \sum_{k\,:\,CZ(k)\neq CZ(i)} \left(\frac{\widehat{Mig}^{k\rightarrow i}}{\sum_{k\neg i} \widehat{Mig}^{k\rightarrow i}} \right) \times \overline{eg}_{kt}$$

Here, $\overline{eg}_{kt}$ is the average gross equity gain among *all* sellers in county k in period t in the ZTRAX data, without netting out equity losses (under the assumption that one mover's lack of funds would not negate another mover's overpayment). Moreover, we again omit the housing equity gains in any counties that are in the same commuting zone as i to avoid bias from common shocks to nearby local housing markets. Combining these measures as shown above, our instrument for

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[19]Note that this is similar to the identification in Gargano, Giacoletti, and Jarnecic (2020), who use average exposure of a postcode's listings to users from other postcodes, multiplied by those other postcodes' house price growth, as a measure of expected visitor price growth in an estimation of the effect of the past house price experiences that visitors to a postcode's listings have on that postcode's future house price growth.

equity gains flowing into county i from other counties is then

$$\widetilde{eg}_{it}^{\text{non-local}} = \left(\sum_{k\,:\,CZ(k) \neq CZ(i)} \widehat{Mig}^{k \to i} \right) \times \overline{eg}_{it}^{\text{movers}} \tag{10}$$

5.2   Aggregate effect estimates

We use this instrument in a two-stage least squares setup to obtain an estimate of the causal effect β of out-of-area equity flows on local house price growth. We also include county fixed effects in the estimation to account for the fact that some counties may have higher house price growth trends on average, as well as year fixed effects to control for common macroeconomic trends in house prices.

The results are shown in Table 8. Column (1) shows the first stage, corresponding to a regression of the log of $eg_{it}^{\text{non-local}}$ on the log of $\widetilde{eg}_{it}$. The instrument has a significant and positive effect on the predicted actual equity gains flowing into the county. In column (2), we first use OLS to estimate the specification shown in equation 8. The raw relationship between housing equity gain inflows and local house prices is positive but relatively small, with a coefficient of about 0.3. In column (3), we use our instrument to estimate the causal effect of out-of-area housing equity gains flowing into county i on its house prices. We find that out-of-area equity flows have a positive and significant causal effect on the destination county's house price growth, with an estimated elasticity of local house prices with regard to equity inflows per local household of about 14. This implies that a 1% increase in the average housing equity gain per local household brought into a county by out-of-county movers causes a 14% increase in local house prices. This higher IV coefficient suggests that the OLS estimate is downward-biased. That is, migrants on average seem to endogenously choose to move from housing markets that have experienced high housing equity gains to markets that are relatively cheap in that period, in line with movers

responding endogenously to differences in housing market opportunities across cities.

Note that, while the log-log specification here is not directly comparable to the property-level results in the previous section, the aggregate effect estimates are generally larger than our estimates of property-level impacts of housing equity gains on house prices. There are two possible reasons for this. First, our overpayment results deliberately control for zip code level price trends in order to avoid conflating a property's higher price with increasing prices in an area in general. This means that if multiple high equity gain movers were to move into the same neighborhood at the same time then the overpayment estimates we recover are net of the *common effect* of high equity gain movers on the zip code house prices. In contrast, the aggregate effect analysis shown here includes the common effects caused by multiple moves into the same area, which is the relevant effect for quantifying the importance of these flows for housing market dynamics. Second, the spillover effects found above could cumulate over time within a year. If one high equity gain purchase increases a neighborhood's prices, it may then feed into the comparables for later purchases, which, in turn, may be affected by overpayment from other high equity gain movers. The resulting aggregate effect of multiple movers into a neighborhood can be higher than individual property effects because of this multiplicative dynamic.

In general, the large positive effects from inflows of out-of-area housing equity gains on local housing markets provide causal evidence of a mechanism oftentimes postulated in anecdotal reports of why house prices lift off in smaller markets experiencing inflows. We find that the housing equity gains of the migrants indeed play an important role by amplifying the impact on the destination housing markets of the migrants with higher gains from their previous sale. However, while we are unable to estimate comparable causal effects of *local* movers housing equity gains on local housing markets, the property level results caution that the latter group's overpayment for a given amount of gain from their previous sale might be of similar or larger

magnitude as that of outsiders coming in.

6 Conclusion

House price appreciation over the last several decades has generated substantial wealth for homeowners. Using a novel dataset that allows researchers to track homeowners across moves, we document a surprising fact: households use this housing wealth to overpay for their next house. This overpayment has real consequences on household wealth; overpayment leads to significantly lower future returns when selling the property. Given this, why do households use their housing wealth to overpay?

We show that the relation between equity gains and overpayment is driven by information frictions in the residential real estate market. Because housing markets are segmented and illiquid, acquiring information about the fundamental value of a house takes a significant amount of time and effort. Households use equity gains to substitute for the effort of costly information acquisition; they choose to overpay and remain ignorant about the price rather than pay the effort costs necessary to become informed. This individual behavior creates externalities—households with large equity gains that move into an area drive up their new neighbor's home prices by approximately the same amount that they overpaid.

Unexpectedly, the individual effect of equity gains on overpayment and on price spillovers is higher for local than for non-local movers, and this appears to be true for the vast majority of counties in our data. In this sense, the common story that rich out-of-towners drive up prices is incomplete—local movers with lots of housing wealth drive up neighborhood prices by more than similarly wealthy non-local movers. At the aggregate-level, though, the effects of housing wealth flowing into an area do put a significant amount of price pressure on local house prices.

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Together, our results show that heterogeneity in housing wealth plays an important role both in explaining household-level housing decisions and in explaining aggregate-level housing dynamics.

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
Figure 1. Overpayment and Equity Gains This figure presents the average $Overpayment_{i,t}$ (as calculated in Equation 2) in 20 bins of $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ (as calculated in Equation 1), after absorbing an interacted fixed effect for the purchase property zip and transaction year following the specification found in Equation 3.

Figure 2. County-Level Observation Count This figure presents a county-level representation of the location of the purchased property for the 3.1 million household moves in our main regression sample.

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Table 1

Summary Statistics

This table reports summary statistics related to the full sample of matched household moves. Panel A reports the characteristics associated with the sold property and the sale transaction. Panel B reports the characteristics of the move itself. Panel C reports the characteristics associated with the purchased property. Panel D reports results related to the neighborhood (at various levels) surrounding the purchased property.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Q5	Q25	Q50	Q75	Q95
Panel A: Sold Property								
Equity Gain	3,103,108	86,244	142,872	-35,000	16,000	50,000	116,000	333,100
Years Lived in Home	3,103,108	6.58	5.27	0.90	2.84	5.13	9.10	16.93
Realized Return	3,040,584	9.6%	25.1%	-1.9%	1.7%	4.6%	9.4%	28.1%
Zip ΔHPI over Holding Period	3,103,108	65,304	100,434	-44,000	10,000	43,550	98,600	245,583
Zip Median HP at Purchase	3,103,108	215,038	133,045	83,089	130,000	176,500	257,939	473,000
Square Footage	2,854,888	2,024.81	1,063.63	931	1,331	1,776	2,424	3,862
House Age	2,955,949	29.51	24.86	3	10	22	44	81
Number of Bedrooms	2,337,181	3.21	0.89	2	3	3	4	5
Number of Bathrooms	2,114,884	2.51	0.93	1	2	2	3	4
Panel B: The Move								
Transaction Date	3,103,108	05/13/2011	6 Yrs 11 Mos	02/10/2000	02/22/2005	09/17/2012	08/09/2017	09/04/2020
Move Distance (Miles)	3,054,146	330.60	616.06	0.53	3.33	12.20	373.11	1,965.03
In-Zip Move	3,103,108	18.3%						
Out-of-Zip, In-County Move	3,103,108	30.5%						
Out-of-County, In-State Move	3,103,108	19.4%						
Out-of-State Move	3,103,108	31.7%						
Panel C: Purchased Property								
Transaction Price	3,103,108	372,314	268,691	94,000	197,304	301,000	460,000	885,000
Overpayment	3,103,108	11,538	76,607	-77,461	-17,528	4,296	31,210	128,469
Overpayment Percent	3,103,108	-1.9%	37.3%	-32.3%	-6.4%	1.5%	9.7%	29.9%
Future Realized Return	1,480,493	11.8%	41.5%	-6.5%	0.4%	3.5%	8.9%	42.9%
Cash Only	3,103,108	18.0%						
Square Footage	2,866,987	2,318.19	1,154.00	1,030	1,542	2,089	2,798	4,319
House Age	2,891,616	25.13	24.07	0	7	18	38	75
Number of Bedrooms	2,331,311	3.41	0.94	2	3	3	4	5
Number of Bathrooms	2,098,338	2.76	0.99	1	2	3	3	4
Panel D: Purchase Neighborhood								
Zip Median House Price	3,101,240	279,165	169,713	103,500	165,000	236,000	340,000	612,500
Average Sales Price, 1/2-Mile, 0-180 Days	3,013,245	331,264	205,802	112,768	191,768	277,691	409,421	740,554
Historical Average Sales Price, 1/2-Mile, 0-180 Days	3,016,753	321,483	200,519	109,438	185,682	269,311	397,183	720,000
Historical Transaction Volume, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days	3,076,397	18.23	23.00	1	6	12	23	52

Table 2

Equity Gains Cause Buyers to Overpay for Their Next House

Column (1) estimates Equation 3 reporting the correlation between $Overpayment_{i,t}$ (as calculated in Equation 2) and $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ (as calculated in Equation 1). Column (2) estimates Equation 6 and reports the causal effect of $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$, instrumented with $\Delta HPI^{S}_{z,t}$ (as calculated in Equation 4), on $Overpayment_{i,t}$. Column (3) replicates column (2) but instead reports the causal effect of $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ on the fraction of the purchased property's transaction price that is represented by $Overpayment_{i,t}$. Column (4) reports the OLS estimate recovered from regressing the future realized return on the house being purchased on to $Overpayment_{i,t}$. Results relate to the full sample of matched household moves. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. The Adjusted Reported R^2 is reported for all OLS specifications and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Overpayment, House Being Purchased		Overpayment Percent, House Being Purchased	Annualized Future Realized Return, House Being Purchased
	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.0106** (2.36)	0.0785*** (6.21)	0.0205*** (4.31)	
Overpayment, House Being Purchased				-0.125*** (-17.67)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase		X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE		X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE		X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE		X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variable		Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	
Observations	3,103,108	3,103,108	3,103,108	1,412,419
Adj. R^2	0.018			0.244
Weak ID KP F Stat		241.4	241.4	

Table 3
Overpayment is Decreasing in Information

This table reports results related to estimations of specifications similar to that of Equation 6 and column (2) of Table 2. Column (1) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the local purchase neighborhood's historical transaction volume, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and historical transaction volume, as well as a level of transaction volume term. Column (2) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the standard deviation of historical overpayment in the local purchase neighborhood, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and that standard deviation, as well as a level of the standard deviation term. Column (3) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the standard deviation of historical transaction prices in the local purchase neighborhood, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and that standard deviation, as well as a level of the standard deviation term. Column (4) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a continuous measure of the moving household's years lived in the sold home, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the years in sold home. Column (5) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and an indicator for whether the moving household's years lived in the sold home is above the median observed in the sample, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the years in sold home above median indicator. The level terms in columns (4) and (5) are absorbed by the fixed effects. Columns (1) through (3) report results relating to the full sample of matched household moves, further restricted to observations with valid measurements of historical transaction volume, and standard deviations of overpayment and transaction prices, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report results relating to the sub-set of matched household moves where both the sold and purchased properties are in the same county ("local moves"). All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Standard deviations measures are divided by 100. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Overpayment, House Being Purchased				
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.0871***	0.0578***	0.0532***	0.114***	0.0967***
	(6.50)	(3.66)	(3.58)	(3.46)	(2.95)
Historical Transaction Volume in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days	-0.000358**				
	(-2.40)				
Historical Transaction Volume × Equity Gain	-0.000340***				
	(-4.14)				
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days		0.0000933***			
		(7.81)			
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. × Equity Gain		0.0000167***			
		(4.73)			
Historical Price St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days			0.00000947***		
			(5.94)		
Historical Price St. Dev. × Equity Gain			0.0000302***		
			(7.47)		
Years Lived in Sold Home × Equity Gain				-0.00392***	
				(-6.03)	
Above Median Years Lived in Sold Home (Ind.) × Equity Gain					-0.0266***
					(-3.15)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variables	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction
Sample				Local Moves	Local Moves
Observations	3,074,934	2,692,174	2,800,884	1,444,434	1,444,434
Weak ID KP F Stat	116.5	101.2	106.3	67.52	68.15

Table 4

Equity Gains Cause Neighborhood Price Spillovers

This table reports results related to estimations of specification similar to that of Equation 6. The left-hand side variable is, however, instead a measure of the average sales price in the immediate neighborhood surrounding the purchased property in the time period and geography relevant to the respective column, $\text{NeighborhoodPrice}_{i,N,t,T}$ (as calculated in Equation 7). Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) measure the average price across transactions occurring between 0-180 days after the purchase transaction, while columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) measure across 0-360 days after the purchase transaction. Columns (1) and (2) average transactions across a 1/2-mile radius circle surrounding the purchase property while columns (3) and (4), (5) and (6), and (7) and (8) average across 1-mile, 1 1/2-mile, and 2-mile radii, respectively. In all cases the average price is measured excluding the purchase transaction. Results relate to the full sample of matched household moves, subject to there being at least one subsequent transaction in the time period and geography relevant to the respective column. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated, with "at matched distance" referring to the geography relevant to the respective column. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Average Sales Price within 1/2-Mile of Home Purchase		Average Sales Price within 1-Mile of Home Purchase		Average Sales Price within 1 1/2-Mile of Home Purchase		Average Sales Price within 2-Miles of Home Purchase	
	0-180 Days	0-360 Days	0-180 Days	0-360 Days	0-180 Days	0-360 Days	0-180 Days	0-360 Days
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.0882***	0.0682**	0.0822***	0.0527**	0.0681***	0.0409*	0.0625***	0.0371
	(3.25)	(2.29)	(3.49)	(2.13)	(3.03)	(1.78)	(2.86)	(1.67)
Four Quarterly Historical Average Prices, At Matched Distance	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variable	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period
Observations	2,735,407	2,739,485	2,969,898	2,971,202	3,028,482	3,028,977	3,050,266	3,050,497
Weak ID KP F Stat	231.8	231.9	248.9	249.5	256.2	256.6	258.7	258.6

Table 5
Spillovers Decreasing in Information

This table combines the specification of Table 4 column 1 with the interaction specifications of Table 3. Columns (1) through (3) report results relating to the full sample of matched household moves, further restricted to observations with valid measurements of historical transaction volume, and standard deviations of overpayment and transaction prices, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report results relating to the sub-set of matched household moves where both the sold and purchased properties are in the same county ("local moves"). All columns are subject to there being at least one subsequent transaction in the time period and geography relevant to the respective column. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Standard deviations measures are divided by 100. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated, with "at matched distance" referring to the geography relevant to the respective column. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Average Sales Price, within 1/2-Mile and 0-180 Days of Home Purchase				
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.0969***	0.0770**	0.0695**	0.170***	0.164***
	(3.55)	(2.52)	(2.35)	(3.46)	(3.32)
Historical Transaction Volume in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days	-0.00117***				
	(-5.09)				
Historical Transaction Volume × Equity Gain	-0.000158**				
	(-2.73)				
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days		0.0000375***			
		(6.28)			
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. × Equity Gain		0.00000433			
		(1.39)			
Historical Price St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days			-0.0000577***		
			(-15.01)		
Historical Price St. Dev. × Equity Gain			0.00000435***		
			(2.96)		
Years Lived in Sold Home × Equity Gain				-0.00344***	
				(-3.54)	
Above Median Years Lived in Sold Home (Ind.) × Equity Gain					-0.0380**
					(-2.66)
Four Quarterly Historical Average Prices, At Matched Distance	X	X	X	X	X
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variables	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction
Sample				Local Moves	Local Moves
Observations	2,735,407	2,594,042	2,670,788	1,285,159	1,285,159
Weak ID KP F Stat	115.4	106.8	109.8	61.59	62.55

Table 6
Local Movers vs. Non-Local Movers

This table reports results related to estimations of specification similar to that of Equation 6. Columns (1) and (2) are similar to column (2) of Table 2 and columns (3) and (4) are similar to column (1) of Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) include additional interactions between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and indicators for the distance, in terms of political boundaries, between the sold and the purchased properties, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the relevant indicator, as well as the respective indicators for the move distance. The left out indicator level is for In-Zip moves. Columns (2) and (4) include an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and the distance, in miles, between the sold and the purchased properties, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the move distance, as well as a level of move distance term. Results relate to the full sample of matched household moves, with columns (2) and (4) further restricted to observations with valid measurements of distance between the sold and purchased properties, and columns (3) and (4) subject to there being at least one subsequent transaction in the time period and geography relevant to the respective column. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated, with "at matched distance" referring to the geography relevant to the respective column. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Overpayment, House Being Purchased		Average Sales Price, within 1/2-Mile and 0-180 Days of Home Purchase	
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.109***	0.104***	0.0972***	0.0927***
	(8.03)	(7.56)	(3.49)	(3.38)
Out-of-Zip, In-Count, Move Indicator	0.0218***		0.00408	
	(3.43)		(1.33)	
Out-of-County, In-State Move Indicator	0.0370***		0.00437	
	(3.20)		(1.09)	
Out-of-Stat, Move Indicator	0.0456***		0.00582	
	(2.82)		(0.87)	
Out-of-Zip, In-County Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0206***		-0.00600**	
	(-6.40)		(-2.71)	
Out-of-County, In-State Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0329***		-0.0108***	
	(-6.92)		(-3.62)	
Out-of-State Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0507***		-0.0144***	
	(-8.58)		(-3.78)	
Log Move Distance (Miles)		0.00716***		0.000874
		(2.95)		(0.90)
Log Move Distance (Miles) × Equity Gain		-0.00726***		-0.00181***
		(-8.41)		(-3.64)
Four Quarterly Historical Average Prices, At Matched Distance			X	X
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variables	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction
Observations	3,103,108	3,045,683	2,735,407	2,709,409
Weak ID KP F Stat	59.12	114.4	56.89	112.7

Table 7

Equity Gains Cause Movers to Spend More On Their Next House

This table reports results related to estimations of specification similar to that of Equation 6. The left-hand side variables are, however, instead various measures related to the overall characteristics of the transaction and purchased property. Columns (1) through (7) utilize, as their left-hand side variables, the transaction price, the fundamental value of the property (transaction price - $Overpayment_{i,t}$), the median house price of the zip code where the purchased property is located, the log square footage of the purchased property, the log years since the purchased property was built, the number of bedrooms in the purchased property, and the number of bathrooms in the purchased property, respectively. Results relate to the full sample of matched household moves, with columns (3) through (7) further restricted to observations with valid measurements for the respective outcome variables. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Transaction Price House Being Purchased	Fundamental Value House Being Purchased	Zip Median HP, House Being Purchased	Log House Size (Sq. Ft.), House Being Purchased	Log House Age (Years), House Being Purchased	Number of Bedrooms, House Being Purchased	Number of Bathrooms, House Being Purchased
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.871***	0.793***	1.234***	0.0591***	0.0329*	0.0808***	0.118***
	(22.31)	(20.68)	(21.22)	(7.87)	(1.75)	(6.44)	(6.62)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variable	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period
Observations	3,103,108	3,103,108	3,100,649	2,857,897	2,600,440	2,304,821	2,068,888
Weak ID KP F Stat	241.4	241.4	239.9	223.3	219.2	253.3	210.9

Table 8

County Level Equity Inflows Increase House Prices

This table reports results related to estimations of specification similar to that of Equation 8. The left-hand side variable is a measure of the log of the Zillow housing value index (ZHVI). The key right-hand variable of interest is the estimated total positive housing equity gain of in-migrants per local household $eg_{i,t}^{\text{non-local}}$ (as calculated in Equation 9). Columns estimated with 2SLS use the instrumental variable $\widetilde{eg}_{i,t}^{\text{non-local}}$ as constructed in equation 10, using data only for movers coming from outside the county's commuting zone. Results relate to the panel of county-year cells for 2006-2019 for which the required data is available. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

|	Predicted Log Out-of-County Equity Inflow, Per Capita	Log Median Housing Price, County-Year			
	First Stage	OLS	IV	IV	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Out-of-CZ Equity Inflow Instrument, Per Capita	0.120***				
	(5.67)				
Predicted Log Out-of-County Equity Inflow, Per Capita		0.274***	14.25***	14.42***	14.27***
		(4.07)	(4.93)	(3.72)	(4.93)
County FE	X	X	X	X	X
Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Lagged Log Median Housing Price	X	X	X	X	X
Log Local Households (IRS)				X	
Log Predicted Out-of-CZ In-Migration, HHs				X	
Log County Home Sales, per HH					X
Instrumental Variable			Log Exp. Out-of-CZ Equity Inflow, Per Capita	Log Exp. Out-of-CZ Equity Inflow, Per Capita	Log Exp. Out-of-CZ Equity Inflow, Per Capita
Observations	14,819	14,904	14,740	14,740	14,739
Adj. R^2	0.519	0.994			
Weak ID KP F Stat			32.75	10.69	32.70

Appendix

Figure A.1. Effect of Equity Gain on Overpayment for Non-Locals Relative to Locals for the 100 Largest Counties This figure presents estimates conceptually similar to that of column (2) of Table 6. Collapsing the four-fold distinction in moves across political boundary distances to simply an indicator for a non-local move (strictly out-of-county), the map plots the sign and significance (at a 95% level) of the coefficient on the interaction between that non-local move indicator and equity gains, instrumented with an interaction between the indicator and our standard instrument. Fixed effects and clustering differ from the reference specification—the sale zip by year and purchase zip by year fixed effects are replaced with a single transaction year fixed effect and the purchase zip clustering dimension is removed.

Figure A.2. Effect of Equity Gain on Overpayment for Non-Locals Relative to Locals for the 100 Largest Counties This figure presents the coefficient and significance data underlying the map in Appendix Figure A.1. The left-most three lower confidence intervals are truncated at -0.5 for aesthetic purposes. The names along the x-axis describe county-level bins, where names have been chosen to subjectively refer to the most salient aspect of the county's contents.

Housing Market Sophistication

This table regresses the realized return a household experiences on a home being purchased on the realized return experienced on the home being sold as evidence in support of the existence of housing market sophistication that could be contaminating naïve estimates of the relationship between equity gain and overpayment. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Annualized, Future Realized Return, House Being Purchased
	OLS
	(1)
Annualized Realized Return, House Being Sold	0.332***
	(15.22)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X
Observations	1,371,198
Adj. R^2	0.227

Table A.2

Overpayment and Subsequent Performance - Renovations

This table reports results similar to column (4) of Table 2 in differing sub-samples. Column (1) through (4) report results estimating just on the sample where the mover owned the purchased house for less than a year, two years, five years, and ten years, respectively. Column (5) is run on the full sample (where a subsequent sale of the purchased property is observed in our data) and is identical to column (4) of Table 2. All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. The Adjusted Reported R^2 is reported for all OLS specifications and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Annualized Future Realized Return, House Being Purchased				
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Overpayment,	-0.618***	-0.423***	-0.218***	-0.152***	-0.125***
House Being Purchased	(-9.29)	(-29.72)	(-26.82)	(-20.34)	(-17.67)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sample	Years Held<1	Years Held<2	Years Held<5	Years Held<10	Full Sample
Observations	5,981	136,876	672,321	1,112,709	1,412,419
Adj. R^2	-10.136	0.291	0.282	0.254	0.244

Overpayment Percent is Decreasing in Information

This table reports results related to estimations of specifications similar to that of Equation 6 and column (3) of Table 2. Column (1) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the local purchase neighborhood's historical transaction volume, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and historical transaction volume, as well as a level of transaction volume term. Column (2) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the standard deviation of historical overpayment in the local purchase neighborhood, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and that standard deviation, as well as a level of the standard deviation term. Column (3) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a measure of the standard deviation of historical transaction prices in the local purchase neighborhood, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and that standard deviation, as well as a level of the standard deviation term. Column (4) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and a continuous measure of the moving household's years lived in the sold home, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the years in sold home. Column (5) includes an additional interaction between $Equity\ Gain_{i,t}$ and an indicator for whether the moving household's years lived in the sold home is above the median observed in the sample, instrumented with an interaction between $\Delta HPI^S_{z,t}$ and the years in sold home above median indicator. The level terms in columns (4) and (5) are absorbed by the fixed effects. Columns (1) through (3) report results relating to the full sample of matched household moves, further restricted to observations with valid measurements of historical transaction volume, and standard deviations of overpayment and transaction prices, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) report results relating to the sub-set of matched household moves where both the sold and purchased properties are in the same county ("local moves"). All dollar amounts are in $100,000 units. Standard deviations measures are divided by 100. Controls and fixed effects are included as indicated. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is reported for all 2SLS specifications. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year levels. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Overpayment Percent, House Being Purchased			Overpayment Percent, House Being Purchased	
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.0225*** (4.49)	0.0157*** (3.07)	0.0174*** (3.39)	0.0347*** (3.27)	0.0341*** (3.40)
Historical Transaction Volume in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days	0.000410*** (5.26)				
Historical Transaction Volume × Equity Gain	-0.000146*** (-5.53)				
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days		-0.0000108* (-1.99)			
Historical Overpayment St. Dev. × Equity Gain		0.00000487*** (3.96)			
Historical Price St. Dev. in Purchase Area, 1/2-Mile, 0-90 Days			-0.00000609*** (-4.40)		
Historical Price St. Dev. × Equity Gain			0.00000162*** (3.59)		
Years Lived in Sold Home × Equity Gain				-0.000653** (-2.48)	
Above Median Years Lived in Sold Home (Ind.) × Equity Gain					-0.00815*** (-3.12)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variables	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction
Sample				Local Moves	Local Moves
Observations	3,074,934	2,692,174	2,800,884	1,444,434	1,444,434
Weak ID KP F Stat	116.5	101.2	106.3	67.52	68.15

Local Movers vs. Non-Local Movers - COVID-19

Column (1) and (2) replicate column (1) of Table 6, but for the pre-COVID-19 period (1996-2019) and the COVID-19 period (2020-2021) respectively. Columns (3) and (4) are structured similarly, but replicating column (3) of Table 6. Our local vs. non-local results are not being driven by shift in household behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year level for columns one and three and at the purchase county level for columns two and four. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Overpayment, House Being Purchased		Average Sales Price, within 1/2-Mile and 0-180 Days of Home Purchase	
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	0.113***	0.0584**	0.0756***	0.224***
	(8.53)	(2.52)	(3.48)	(8.70)
Out-of-Zip, In-County, Move Indicator	0.0245***	-0.0290***	0.00212	0.0310**
	(3.82)	(-2.65)	(0.86)	(2.04)
Out-of-County, In-State, Move Indicator	0.0405***	-0.0241*	0.00227	0.0159
	(3.42)	(-1.87)	(0.60)	(1.16)
Out-of-State, Move Indicator	0.0540***	-0.0737***	0.00208	0.0305**
	(3.40)	(-5.76)	(0.35)	(2.28)
Out-of-Zip, In-County, Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0200***	-0.00249	-0.00505**	-0.0240**
	(-5.58)	(-0.30)	(-2.48)	(-2.01)
Out-of-County, In-State, Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0323***	-0.0164	-0.0105***	-0.0165
	(-6.71)	(-1.52)	(-3.09)	(-1.57)
Out-of-State, Move Indicator × Equity Gain	-0.0494***	-0.0224**	-0.0147***	-0.0214**
	(-8.12)	(-2.13)	(-3.34)	(-2.15)
Four Quarterly Historical Average Prices, At Matched Distance			X	X
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variables	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interactions
Sample	Before 2020	2020-2021	Before 2020	2020-2021
Observations	2,811,675	267,016	2,485,711	226,297
Weak ID KP F Stat	60.72	147.1	58.32	121.2

Equity Gains and Cash Discounts

This table reports results exploring the relationship between equity gain and cash purchase on overpayment. In column (1) equity gains exhibit no causal relationship on whether or not a household purchases their next house all with cash. Consistent with the literature, we find a negative and significant relationship between a cash purchase and the purchase price of the home in column (4). Similarly, a cash purchase is associated with a decrease in overpayment in columns (2) and (3). Overpayment for cash purchases is significantly less sensitive to equity gain in column (3), whilst total transaction price is more so in column (4). This is, perhaps, consistent with a violation of the exclusion restriction for the Reported t-statistics in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at both the purchase county and transaction year level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

	Cash Purchase, House Being Purchased	Overpayment, House Being Purchased	Overpayment, House Being Purchased	Log Transaction Price, House Being Purchased
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Equity Gain, House Being Sold	-0.00325	0.0779***	0.0815***	0.186***
	(-0.62)	(6.23)	(6.33)	(15.40)
Cash Purchase Indicator, House Being Purchased		-0.176***	-0.162***	-0.289***
		(-20.91)	(-23.28)	(-24.66)
Cash Purchase Indicator × Equity Gain			-0.0132***	0.0158***
			(-3.35)	(6.29)
Zip Median HP of Sold Home at Purchase	X	X	X	X
Five Interacted Property Sold Characteristic FE	X	X	X	X
Years Lived in Sold Home FE	X	X	X	X
Sale Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Purchase Zip × Transaction Year FE	X	X	X	X
Instrumental Variable(s)	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction	Zip ΔHPI over Sold Home Holding Period and Interaction
Observations	3,103,108	3,103,108	3,103,108	3,103,108
Weak ID KP F Stat	241.4	242.9	122.2	122.2