

Phenomenological Assumptions and Knowledge Dissemination within Organizational Studies

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Abstract

Phenomenological assumptions—assumptions about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon being studied—affect the dissemination of knowledge from sub-fields to the broader field of study. Micro-process research in organizational studies reveals implicit phenomenological assumptions that vary in the extent to which micro-processes are treated as parts of larger systems. We suggest that phenomenological assumptions of recursive interactions between the phenomenon and the environment will make the relevance of micro-process research findings to broader organizational questions easier to discern, and therefore more likely to disseminate to the larger field of organizational research. We empirically assess this assertion by analyzing studies of negotiation published in top peer-reviewed management, psychology, sociology, and industrial relations journals from 1990 to 2005. Our findings illuminate a continuum of open systems to closed systems phenomenological assumptions revealed in this micro-process research. Analysis of the citation rates of the articles in our data set by non-negotiation organizational research reveals that more open systems assumptions increase the likelihood that a negotiation article will be cited in organizational studies, after controlling for other, previously identified effects on citation rates. Our findings suggest that sub-fields can increase the impact they have on the broader intellectual discourse of their field by situating their phenomena in rich contexts that illuminate the connections between their findings and questions of interest to the broader field.

Field-wide integration of knowledge generated by sub-field specialists is critical for new discoveries and more comprehensive and accurate understanding of complex phenomena (Anand, Gardner & Morris 2007; Boyer 1990; Kilduff & Kelemen 2001). In spite of the recognized value of broadly disseminating knowledge within the social and physical sciences, scholarly discourse tends to be contained within sub-fields of research (Augier, March & Sullivan 2005; Biehl, Kim & Wade 2006; Gallagher & Appenzeller 1999; Pieters & Baumgartner 2002). Further constraining innovation and understanding, knowledge dissemination between academics and practitioners or clinicians is often limited and inaccurate (Beyer & Trice 1982; Rynes, Giluk & Brown 2007; Shrivastava & Mitroff 1984). In this article, we explore the barriers limiting the integration of knowledge generated within a sub-field into the broader intellectual discourse of its field.

Scholars of organizational studies, an academic field generating knowledge about organizations, the people in them and the markets they comprise (Blackburn & Michell 1981), have bemoaned the proliferation of parochial approaches to research and the consequent splintering of the field (Augier et al. 2005; Gioia & Pitre 1990; Heath & Sitkin 2001; Pfeffer 1997). Reflecting the multi-level and multi-

faceted nature of organizations, the field of organizational studies is multi-disciplinary. Psychology, sociology, economics, political science, anthropology and industrial relations all contribute to our understanding of organizations. Sub-fields draw from these diverse disciplines and apply different methodologies to focus on particular organizational phenomena, such as inter-organizational networks, firm culture, groups and teams, and managerial decision making. This diversity of disciplinary foundation and method, while a notable and commendable feature across studies of organizational phenomena, is seldom apparent within individual studies (Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn & Michell 1981; Salancik 1986). In spite of the co-location within business schools of scholars from multiple disciplines, pluralistic research remains rare (Augier et al. 2005). This is the setting in which we explore the dissemination of knowledge generated by a particular sub-field into the broader field of study.

Past research indicates that shared meanings are essential to coordinating across boundaries (Donnellon, Gray & Bougon 1986; Kellogg, Orlikowski & Yates 2006). Sub-fields have their own “thought worlds” with particular “funds of knowledge” – what is known – and “systems of meaning” – how they know (Fleck 1979), creating barriers to knowledge dissemination across sub-fields. Research on the production of knowledge in the natural sciences identifies different sub-fields of closely tied scholars (deSolla Price & Beaver 1966) creating and sharing knowledge through distinctive practices within “epistemic cultures” (Knorr-Cetina 1999). Specific to organizational studies, Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four distinct paradigms of scholarship and asserted that there was little intellectual mingling across the paradigms. Burrell and Morgan detail how incommensurate meta-theoretical assumptions across the paradigmatic fields act as constraints on the cross-fertilization of ideas.

The design and execution of research require working assumptions about the nature of the focal process, event or object. Just as incompatible meta-theoretical assumptions raise barriers across broad paradigms of organizational research (Burrell & Morgan 1979), lower level assumptions about the basic nature of the ‘object’ being studied (Carlile 2002, 2004; Dougherty 1992) may act as barriers to knowledge dissemination across sub-fields and to the broader research field. Knowledge dissemination within academic research does not involve tangible objects in the same way that manufacturing processes

do (Bechky 2003a), but assumptions about the object of study—the phenomenon under investigation—may create interpretive barriers in research contexts just as they do in production settings (Dougherty 1992).

We define “phenomenological assumptions” in academic research as revealed beliefs about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon under investigation. For example, contrast the phenomenological assumptions underlying “reductionist” and “holistic” approaches to scientific study. Studies taking a reductionist approach investigate objects and events through the elementary subsystems comprising a larger system, without considering the relationships between these elements (Gallagher & Appenzeller 1999). In contrast, “holistic” research studies the interactions and integration among multiple subsystems in order to understand the system as a whole (Verschuren 2001). Parallel sets of phenomenological assumptions can be seen in the organizational metaphors of “machines,” conceptualizing an organization and its components as technologically driven mechanisms with purposively rational means-ends relationships, versus “organisms,” viewing organizations as adaptive entities comprised of inseparable, interdependent parts facing a constantly changing environment (Morgan 1980). Similarly, Thompson (1967) argued that organizational scholars divide according to their treatment of variables within and across organizations as open systems, characterized by exchange with the environment, or closed systems, characterized as independent from the environment. Reductionism, studying phenomena as machines, and treating phenomena as closed systems have in common that they assume the phenomenon under investigation can be studied in isolation from its surrounding environment. In contrast, holism, studying phenomena as organisms, and treating phenomena as embedded in open systems have in common that they assume the phenomenon under investigation is both a product of and constitutive of the broader environment.

Phenomenological assumptions of recursive interactions between the phenomenon and the environment may make the relevance of a sub-field’s research findings to broader organizational questions easier to discern, and therefore more likely to disseminate to the larger field of organizational research. Though studies are not labeled as, for example, “reductionist” or “open systems,” the details of

investigation within a study reveal assumptions about who is central to the phenomenon, what the critical features of the phenomenon are, and when these features are best studied or measured. To illuminate the effects of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination, we investigate the assumptions underlying the knowledge generated within a single sub-field of organizational research and explore whether those assumptions affect knowledge dissemination to the larger field.

One way to examine the dissemination of knowledge within a field of research is by studying citations of scholarly articles. Citations, while not a perfect measure of knowledge dissemination, offer a visible “footprint” of the evolution of scientific knowledge and are typically conceptualized as indicating scientific impact (Judge, Cable, Colbert & Rynes 2007). Previous research on the impact of scholarly articles in organizational studies has considered the extent to which presentational and political characteristics of articles determine the likelihood of scholarly impact, i.e., citation rate. For example, past research has found that citations are positively associated with the number of pages in an article (Stremersch, Verniers & Verhoef 2007). Judge, et al. (2007) found that the single best predictor of an article’s citation rate is the citation rate of the journal in which the research was published. Other studies have identified disciplinary cliques among journals, with articles more likely to cite other articles published within their “clique” of journals (Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn & Michell 1981). In the study presented here, we assess and measure the additional influence of phenomenological assumptions on citation rates in organizational studies. These phenomenological assumptions could be “the difference that makes a difference” (Deetz 1996: 191) in terms of the impact of sub-field research.

Specifically, we study the dissemination of research findings on a critical micro-process in organizations, negotiations, to organizational studies more generally. We analyze the content and citations of the empirical negotiation articles published over fifteen years in peer-reviewed journals. Qualitative examination of each study allows us to infer underlying phenomenological assumptions about the critical features of negotiations in relation to the environment in which they occur: 1) *Who* is involved in and affected by the negotiation and the relationships among these actors; 2) *What* issues are negotiated and what is affected by negotiation processes and outcomes; and 3) *When* the negotiation occurs and has its

effects. We then offer formal hypotheses linking these inferred phenomenological assumptions to citation rates. Our quantitative analyses show that the revealed assumptions reliably predict citation rates in non-negotiation organizational research, after controlling for variables past social science citation research has found to be critical. We conclude by discussing the effects of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination from sub-fields to broader fields of knowledge.

#### PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN NEGOTIATION RESEARCH

Organizational scholars have attributed to negotiations and exchange processes an essential role in the maintenance, adaptation, and management of organizations (Barley & Tolbert 1997; Follett 1918; Pondy 1967; Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood 1980; Scott 1992). Negotiation research has generated a host of illuminating findings regarding individuals' behaviors and limitations as independent and interdependent decision makers. In spite of this theoretical centrality and empirical grounding, the negotiation sub-field has been criticized for its isolation from the broader field of organizational studies (Pfeffer 1997). Some scholars have explicitly asserted that the a-contextual nature of mainstream negotiation research precludes the application of its findings into organizational research (Barley 1991; Kolb & Bartunek 1992; Kramer 1991). Such sweeping critiques of negotiation research have ignored variance within the sub-field. If there is variation in the phenomenological assumptions that undergird negotiation research, some studies may be more accessible to the field than others. Phenomenological assumptions situating negotiations in rich contexts may simplify the translation of a study's findings from a particular setting to a more generalized organizational setting. Because of this, studies that treat negotiation as part of a larger system may disseminate outside the sub-field more readily than studies conceptualizing negotiations as isolated sub-systems.

In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mary Parker Follett (1918) set the stage for both organizational theory and negotiation research (Fox 1968). She illuminated varied and conflicting motives among factions in organizations, highlighted the importance of coalitions and the social nature of authority, and identified the necessity of interdependent decision makers to negotiate in the face of these

organizational realities. Nearly fifty years later, Walton and McKersie led negotiation research into the mainstream of modern organizational studies with *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (1965). Referring to their own case study in industrial relations, as well as work in the burgeoning fields of game theory, behavioral decision theory and social psychology, they exposed four interrelated sub-processes of negotiations: integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining, attitudinal structuring and intra-party bargaining (Walton & McKersie 1965). Their theory rests on the recognition that negotiators bargain in the shadow of a complex social system. Consistent with this social theory of bargaining, negotiated order theory (Strauss 1978) detailed how social systems are constructed through contextualized interactions. Negotiated order theory suggests that, "[a]ctors create institutions through a history of negotiations that lead to ... generalized expectations and interpretations of behavior. The patterned relations and actions that emerge from this process ... shape future interactions and negotiations" (Barley & Tolbert 1997: 94). Bargaining research coming out of labor relations and sociology tended to follow in this vein, studying negotiations as contextualized, open systems with recursive influence between environments and interactions (e.g., Friedman & Poldony 1992; Kochan & Rubinstein 2000; Kolb & Bartunek 1992; Morrill 1991).

In other bargaining research, including studies carried out in the traditions of social psychology and behavioral game theory, Walton and McKersie's (1965) concepts of integration and distribution rose to the forefront. This work tended to treat negotiation as a discreet process, focusing on outcomes in isolation from structure, other interactions or social constructions within organizations. The emphasis on one-shot bargaining, measurable payoffs and at-the-table interaction was amenable to laboratory studies, leading to a quickly growing field of negotiation research investigating bargaining as a generic form of interaction. Walton and McKersie's concepts of intra-party bargaining and attitudinal structuring — attending to indirect effects from and on audiences, alliances and constituencies away from the table — seemed to fall by the wayside.

The history of the sub-field of negotiation research suggests that there is a continuum of phenomenological assumptions regarding the relationship between negotiation episodes and the

environments in which they occur. These assumptions, while not explicitly stated, set the foundation for the design and execution of negotiation research. Organizational studies scholars seeking to understand other systems or processes in and across organizations may find negotiation studies based on holistic, open systems, contextualized phenomenological assumptions more accessible and generalizable to organizational questions than studies reflecting reductionist, closed system, a-contextual assumptions about the nature of negotiations.

## METHODS

We investigate phenomenological assumptions and their role in citations based on a set of peer-reviewed empirical studies of negotiation published between 1990 and 2005 in top-tier organizational behavior (OB), psychology, industrial relations (IR) and sociology journals. Using this data base, we conducted our analyses in three steps: 1) content coding of the who, what and when of negotiations implied by the design of each study; 2) qualitative analyses to inductively derive measures of phenomenological assumptions in negotiation studies; and 3) citation analyses assessing the relationship between phenomenological assumptions and each negotiation article's frequency of citation in non-negotiation organizational research.

### *Articles Reviewed*

We attempted to include all empirical studies of negotiation published in top tier, peer-reviewed organizational behavior (OB), psychology, industrial relations (IR) and sociology journals between 1990 and 2005.<sup>1</sup> We limited our search to "top tier" journals based on Starbuck's ranking of business-related journals.<sup>2</sup> This resulted in a review of negotiation research published in three OB journals (*Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)*; *Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ)*; and *Organization Science (OS)*), five psychology journals (*Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP)*; *Journal of Experimental Social*

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<sup>1</sup> At the time of data collection, articles published before 1990 were not consistently available on line. This is changing rapidly and all past research is likely to be available on line at some point. In addition, citation data is constantly being updated. Our citation counts were finalized on May 20, 2007. We counted citations in articles published prior to January, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Rankings by average annualized citations per article, estimated in 2004. Available at <http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/cites.htm>. Accessed January 29, 2007.

*Psychology (JESP)*; *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP)*; *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (OBHDP)*; and *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (PSPB)*),<sup>3</sup> one IR journal (*Industrial and Labor Relations Review (ILRR)*), and two sociology journals (*American Journal of Sociology (AJS)*; and *American Sociological Review (ASR)*).

Using Business Source Complete, Science Direct, and Springer Link database search engines, limiting our search to the journals noted above, we conducted a Boolean search for articles with any of the terms “negotiat”<sup>4</sup>, “bargain”, or “conflict” in search terms, titles, keywords, or abstracts. We then dropped all articles with the following characteristics: review or theory not accompanied by an empirical study; studies focused on the efficacy of a specific negotiation software package; and research exploring negotiations in a specific context outside of formal organizations, such as international treaties, sexual aggression, or family conflict. To refine the list further, we adopted Walton and McKersie’s broad definition of negotiation: “interaction of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their interdependence” (1965: 3). Using this definition as a guide, the authors read through the abstract of each article. Reflecting that negotiations take place between “social units,” we dropped studies employing only computer simulations of negotiations, but we retained studies in which at least one of the parties was a human negotiating with a computer-simulated counterpart(s). We also deleted research on identity negotiation if the work referred to an intrapersonal, psychological process only, without reference to interaction between two or more parties (e.g., McNulty & Swann 1994). Studies of team decision making were dropped if there was no mixed motive component, i.e., the terms of the interdependence focused all of the parties on making optimal decisions for the group (e.g., Choi & Kim 1999). We also excluded research on organizational or group conflict if negotiation was not an explicit facet of or variable in the studies. For example, Jehn’s conflict typology studies (Jehn 1995, 1997) were excluded, since they investigate the performance effects of different types of group conflict but do not explore the processes involved in the management of those conflicts. The final set included 225

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<sup>3</sup> Following Biehl et al. (2006), we break this group into two segments for our quantitative analyses.

<sup>4</sup> Searching for the root, “negotiat” captured all forms, including negotiate, negotiation, negotiations, negotiator and negotiators.

empirical negotiation articles. Short citations of the articles included in the review, along with indicators of the most highly cited article from each journal in our sample are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 Here

## QUALITATIVE ANALYSES

### *Coding*

We reviewed each article, focusing on design, measures and analyses, to inductively derive the underlying assumptions revealed in the empirical negotiation research. As a first step, the authors together read through a subset of articles and developed an initial set of codes capturing the nature of the phenomenon under investigation in each study. The codes focused on: who is treated as critical to the negotiation; what are the outcome variables of interest; and what are the temporal features of the negotiation. We looked for distinctions on these questions of who, what and when across studies, expanding the codes in each dimension as we identified new categories. We continued to add to the coding set until no more categories were needed to capture the specifics described in the articles. When we reached this point of saturation, we agreed on an initial protocol defining each code. Independently, each author then coded all of the articles based on the abstracts. Each article could receive multiple codes as needed to reflect multiple dimensions of who, what or when within a single study or across multiple studies in a single article. When an abstract did not contain enough information to discern one or more of the codes, we perused the body of the article. Throughout this step, we continued to refine our coding protocol in discussions between the authors as we became more familiar with the negotiation research. When this process was complete, we compared each of the codes on every article. At this point, agreement rate on all codes was 77%. We discussed each disagreement. To determine the final codes, the articles were evenly split between the authors, based on alphabetical order of article authorship. We read the text of each article to confirm or disconfirm the coding derived in the previous step. We discussed and agreed on all changes to the original coding.

Insert Table 2 About Here

For “who”, we coded the nature of the actual relationship between the parties involved in the focal negotiation(s) described in each article: strangers; classmates; ongoing interpersonal relationship except for being classmates; hierarchical relationship; and/or shared membership in a collective such as a union or a social network (excluding classroom). Each study could have multiple “who” codes. For example, Weingart, Hyder and Prietula (1996) studied the impact of knowledge about negotiation tactics on negotiator behaviors and joint outcomes. They hypothesized that access to written information about alternative tactics would provide negotiators with knowledge that could be used effectively in a negotiation, leading to different negotiation behaviors and higher joint outcomes for negotiators with this information (relative to those without). Participants in the experiment were undergraduate students who either participated to fulfill a research requirement in an introductory organizational behavior or marketing course or responded to advertisements posted on campus. “Who” for this article was, therefore, coded as both classmates and strangers. Table 2 presents the percentages of articles receiving each “who” code.

For “what,” we coded the nature of the empirical measures used in each study, based on the dependent variables: tangible outcomes (e.g., points or money); perceptions of outcomes; process measures/issues; levels of or changes in power or status; measures or issues of trust; and expectations or explicit measures of future relationships. The majority of studies (86%) described effects on tangible outcomes, often in addition to other outcome measures. For example, Weingart, et al. (1996), described above, determined the Pareto efficiency of the agreements achieved by the negotiators as well as the integrative and distributive tactics negotiators used, based on coded transcripts of the video-taped interactions. “What” was coded as both tangible outcomes and negotiation processes. In a second “what” code, we coded whether or not the study considered outcomes outside the focal negotiation, such as effects on other organizational processes. The Weingart, et al. (1996) article was coded as zero on this variable because all of the outcomes examined were proximate to the focal negotiation. Table 2 also presents the breakdown of “what” codes.

For “when,” we coded the temporal aspect of the negotiation: one-shot; one-shot with distinct phases; multiple rounds of the same negotiation, or recursive (i.e., multiple, separate negotiations affecting one another over time). Weingart, et al. (1996), for example, examined a single negotiation episode in their study. All interactions took place during the one hour experiment. Although the authors carefully coded the specific tactics used by the negotiators during their exchanges, they did not break these tactics down into discreet phases of the negotiation. We, therefore, coded the “when” of this article as one-shot. Table 2 presents the percentages of “when” codes assigned to the articles.

### *Results*

Based on our coding of who, what and when in each study, we iterated back and forth between our data and definitions presented in the organizational literature to develop broad conceptualizations of phenomenological assumptions in negotiation research and to categorize our codes according to these assumptions. At one end of the spectrum we found assumptions consistent with a holistic, open systems, contextualized view of negotiations. We label this end of the continuum “open systems.” At the other end were assumptions consistent with a reductionist, closed system, a-contextual view of negotiations. We label this end of the continuum “closed systems.” Table 3 summarizes the general features of open and closed systems assumptions induced through our qualitative analyses.

Insert Table 3 Here

Open systems assumptions. At one end of the continuum, design choices regarding “who” reveal an assumption that negotiations are influenced by and affect not only those parties sitting at the table, but also others whose interests are only indirectly represented in the negotiation. Networks of interpersonal relationships, as well as status and power hierarchies, are anticipated to have meaningful effects on the negotiation, constraining behavior while opening up strategic opportunities within bargaining. “What” choices at this end of the continuum allow negotiations to affect structures, rules, beliefs, and practices away from the bargaining table, and measure symbolic resources such as legitimacy, reputation, identity, honor, esteem, respect and status. “When” choices imply an assumption that past (dis)agreements bear on

the present negotiation and the present negotiation bears on future interactions, taking temporal linkages into account by studying negotiations over time or across multiple, recursive events.

An illustrative example of articles with phenomenological assumptions at this end of the continuum is Glynn's (2000) study of negotiations over identity and legitimacy during a musician's strike at the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. This research explores how the social structure of the organization was reconstructed through the negotiation process. Although the dispute was ostensibly over wages and working conditions, Glynn paints the musicians and administrators as competing parties vying for the legitimacy to define the core identity of the orchestra. Embedded within the multi-layered negotiations, reports Glynn, "were conflicts over status and power, and implicitly, control over the resources that would confer such status and power" (pp. 291). Through the protracted and often acrimonious negotiation, the disputants came to share a "new, integrated, negotiated identity" (pp. 292).

Closed systems assumptions. Phenomenological assumptions at the other end of the continuum are revealed in a very different set of who, what and when design choices. "Who" design choices at this end of the continuum imply a belief that the actual relationships between subjects will not affect or distort their negotiation processes or outcomes. Pairing strangers or class members in fictional negotiation scenarios, for example, suggests an unstated assumption that negotiators are independent from the larger social and historical context in which negotiating occurs. Alliances at and away from the bargaining table are considered to be a specific, circumscribed variation of negotiations, not a core feature central to negotiation processes and outcomes. "What" design choices point to an assumption that the most important outcomes from negotiations are tangible and proximate, not symbolic or involving factors or people outside the focal negotiation. Closed systems "when" design choices suggest that other processes, conflicts, or negotiations occurring before, during or after the focal negotiation were not viewed as central to the negotiation at hand; negotiations are treated as discrete events, happening outside the routine of daily life. For example, many of the one-shot studies were conducted in classrooms. A few of the classroom-based studies noted the point in the course during which the data were collected (e.g., Kray, Galinsky & Thompson 2002; White & Neale 1994), but the majority neither mentioned other negotiations

that had been or were to be experienced in the course nor discussed the effect of prior and/or future classroom negotiations on the focal negotiation.

An illustrative example of papers at this end of the continuum of phenomenological assumptions is Kray, Galinsky and Thompson's (2002) study of how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. In a series of classroom-based experiments, the authors generate gender stereotype threat effects (Steele 1997) on negotiation outcomes by manipulating whether stereotypically feminine skills, gender-neutral skills or stereotypically masculine skills are associated with negotiation success (study 1) and failure (study 2). The studies show the powerful result that simple manipulations of performance expectations can reverse gender stereotype threat effects even in a narrowly circumscribed setting, with classmates as negotiation partners, with no economic incentives and no mention of consequences for how negotiations are carried out or how payoffs are allocated.

Hybrid assumptions. Although 52 of the articles were coded as revealing fully closed system assumptions and ten articles were coded as revealing fully open system assumptions, the majority of the papers in our sample lie somewhere in between. Some articles, for example, adopted an open systems "who" assumption that negotiations take place between socially embedded parties, while retaining closed systems assumptions on other dimensions. In one illustrative study, Tenbrunsel and her colleagues ran a classroom experiment exploring the effect of personal relationships on simulated market-based negotiations (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag & Bazerman 1999). The study retained closed systems assumptions for "what" and "when," but the independent variable was a measure of the actual personal relationships between students acting as buyers and sellers.

## HYPOTHESES

With our qualitative analyses in mind, we turned to organizational studies to explore the possible implications of phenomenological assumptions on the dissemination of findings from negotiation research. We considered how phenomenological assumptions about the who, what and when of negotiations might make bargaining research more or less accessible to the broader field of organizational

studies. Evidence from organizational studies suggests that phenomenological assumptions situating negotiations in rich contexts may make the application of negotiation research findings to broader organizational questions more straightforward.

Organizational studies have shown that decision makers in organizations are inextricably embedded in networks of relationships (Martin 1990; Podolny & Baron 1997). Multiple features of relational ties, such as quality of information conveyed, relative power and trust, play themselves out in exchange interactions (Granovetter 2005). Hierarchical and status relationships, for example, have been shown to have measurable effects on interaction processes and outcomes (Ridgeway 1991). These studies suggest that conflict and interaction within organizations is influenced by and affects not only those parties directly involved in the process, but also others whose interests are only indirectly represented. The mere possibility of forming a coalition in the future may be enough to influence current behavior, even if the allies are never mobilized (Baumgartner, Buckley & Burns 1975; Morrill 1995; Schmidt & Kochan 1972). Because of the high degree of relational embeddedness among organizational actors assumed in much of organizational studies, and the documented effects of that embeddedness, we propose that the broader field will be more likely to incorporate findings from a study of negotiations to the extent that the study is designed to be attentive to relationships both among and beyond the parties directly involved in the negotiation. Formally:

*HYPOTHESIS 1(H1): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions that negotiators' direct and indirect relationships influence negotiation processes and outcomes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

Organizational studies posit interpersonal interaction within organizations to be both “constituted and constitutive” of organizational structure (Ranson et al. 1980). Individual and interpersonal action within organizations is shaped by beliefs, rules, practices and structures already in place, while simultaneously holding the potential to alter future beliefs, rules, practices and structures (Pratt & Rafaeli 2001). Interactions also reflect and affect the distribution of symbolic resources such as legitimacy, trust, reputation and status (Morrill 1995; Zhou 2005). Disputes over symbolic resources may generate

behaviors that appear inexplicable when considering material resources alone (Maines & Charlton 1985). Hambrick and Cannella (1993), for example, show that strategic and economic models cannot explain why favorable retention packages do not keep executives from resigning after their companies are acquired. Their study suggests that these decisions, as costly as they are in economic terms, are motivated by the executives' losses in social status following acquisitions. This view of organizations suggests that a negotiation study will be more readily incorporated into the broader field if the outcomes considered in the study go beyond the circumscribed negotiation process and objective payoffs to the parties at the table. Formally,

*HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions regarding the symbolic and constitutive nature of negotiation outcomes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

Research contextualizing interpersonal interaction within organizational environments assumes that behavior reflects a history of past interactions and an expectation of future interactions (Raven 1993). Realization of the long term, recursive effects of actions may feed into individuals' strategies and give rise to different behaviors at different points in time (Fligstein 1987). Westphal and Khanna (2003), for instance, demonstrate how directors who support changes instituting greater board control over management action and compensation are subjected to informal sanctioning by directors on other boards. Directors who experience such social control are deterred from subsequent participation in governance changes that threaten the interests of fellow top managers. Taking such linkages for granted assumes that conflict and conflict resolution is ongoing in organizations, and that episodes of intense negotiation are temporally tied, recursive events (Barley 1991; Fine 1984; Kolb & Bartunek 1992). We propose that negotiation research will be more accessible to broader organizational research when the negotiation studies reflect temporal interdependence across negotiation episodes. Formally,

*HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The more that negotiation articles exhibit assumptions regarding temporal interdependence across negotiation episodes, the more frequently they will be cited in organizational research.*

## QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES

*Analyses*

To test our hypotheses regarding the effect of phenomenological assumptions on knowledge dissemination within organizational studies, we collected data on the citation counts of the 225 negotiation articles in our data set. None of the articles published in 2005 had any record of citations in ISI-SSCI when we finalized the citation count, so we dropped that year's articles from the quantitative analyses. For the remaining 212 articles, we collected data through the ISI-SSCI<sup>5</sup> on citations within articles published in 71 of the 86 journals identified as management journals by ISI. We excluded four journals focused narrowly on decision making and negotiations, since we are studying the dissemination of negotiation research into the broader field of organizational studies.<sup>6</sup> We also excluded 11 journals focusing on quantitative engineering or operations research.<sup>7</sup> We dropped all author self-citations and all citations from within our sample of negotiation articles. The final citation count in management articles was our primary dependent variable (mgmt cites).

Because our dependent variable is a count of citations over a maximum of 17 years (the earliest articles were published in 1990 and citation data were collected in 2007), we estimate our models with negative binomial maximum-likelihood regressions (Stremersch et al. 2007). A negative binomial regression assumes the dependent variable is an over-dispersed count variable (i.e., the variance is very high relative to the mean and the distribution is truncated at zero), and corrects for varying lengths of exposure time across observations. In our model, the exposure time is number of years since publication.

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<sup>5</sup> Accessed through <http://scientific.thomson.com/webofknowledge/>, Web of Science Database. The database includes: Science Citation Index Expanded; Social Science Citation Index; and Arts & Humanities Citation Index.

<sup>6</sup> We excluded *Decision Sciences*, *Group Decision & Negotiation*, the *Negotiation Journal* and *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*.

<sup>7</sup> We excluded *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, *Information Systems Research*, *International Journal of Operations and Production*, *Industrial Marketing Management*, *International Journal of Technology Management*, *Journal of Information Technology*, *Journal of Management Information Systems*, *Journal of Operations Management*, *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, *MIS Quarterly* and *Technovation*.

Model 1 shows the effects of a wide set of control variables. First, we control for methodology and discipline. We include dummy variables reflecting each article's methodology: laboratory experiment, ethnography or field study<sup>8</sup> (omitted dummy). Additionally, we control for the level of analysis at which the research was conducted with an ordinal variable that equals one for analyses at the interpersonal level, two for analyses at the group or intra-organizational level and three for inter-organizational analyses. To control for the higher likelihood of within-discipline access to information affecting knowledge dissemination (Hansen 1999; Hendriks 1999), we created categorical variables based on Biehl et al.'s (2006) sociometric analyses identifying citation cliques in business journals (see also Salancik 1986). Our analyses include dummy variables for citation cliques in industrial relations (ILRR), sociology (ASR, AJS), social psychology (JESP, PSPB, JPSP), organizational psychology (JAP, OBHDP) and management (AMJ, ASQ, OS) (omitted dummy).

Citations reflect presentational and political factors, as well as methodology and discipline (Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn & Michell 1981; Judge et al. 2007; Stremersch et al. 2007). In terms of presentation, we control for the number of pages in each article (no. pages) because past research has found this to be predictive of citation rate (Stremersch et al. 2007). Past research has also shown that citations are, at least in part, political, reflecting the influence and status of the author, the publication outlet and the institutions with which the author is affiliated (Judge et al. 2007). Within academia, reputation and status are reflected in publication rates (Merton 1968), so we control for how many times the authors appeared as authors on other papers published in our sample (author reputation). In a similar vein, citations are reciprocal: a greater number of citations within an article leads to a greater likelihood of citation of that article (Gilbert 1977; Judge et al. 2007). To control for this, we include a count of within-article citations (no. citations). To account for the prestige of the journal in which an article was published (Judge et al. 2007), we control for average citation rate of each of the eleven journals based on Starbuck's 2004<sup>9</sup> analysis (journal prestige). Finally, authors associated with management departments and business

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<sup>8</sup> Articles with multiple studies could receive multiple methodology codes.

<sup>9</sup> Average annualized citations per article, estimated in 2004, available at <<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/cites.htm>>.

schools may have more interaction with and influence on organizational scholars than authors based in disciplinary departments or otherwise outside business schools. To control for this potential influence effect, we include a dummy variable set to 1 if any of the authors of a paper are in a business school or management department (B-school affiliation).

Insert Table 4 Here

We add our independent variables to the controls in Model 2. The variables of interest are the three sets of open and closed systems variables codifying phenomenological assumptions (*who\_open*, *what\_open* and *when\_open*). The details are presented in Table 4. *Who\_open* equals zero if a study employed students or strangers as research subjects without consideration of their interpersonal relationships and did not measure coalitions; it equals one if a study either measured the actual relationship between the parties *or* considered coalition potential; and it equals two if it considered both the parties' relationship *and* coalition potential. *What\_open* equals zero if the dependent variable(s) measured only the immediate outcomes of material resources and/or negotiator perceptions of outcome or process; *what\_open* equals one if any other combination of dependent variables was considered *or* the study examined the effects of the negotiation on the larger organization or environment; *what\_open* equals two if the dependent variables included any other combination of measures *and* the analyses considered effects on factors external to the negotiation. *When\_open* equals zero for articles in which negotiations were one-shot; it equals one when the study considered phases, multiple rounds, or recursive effects of one negotiation on another.

### *Results*

Means and correlations are presented in Table 5. Average aggregate citation counts and annualized citation counts (e.g., the citation counts divided by the number of years since the paper was published), by who, what and when codes, are presented in Table 6. The results suggest the predicted positive, linear effect for open systems assumptions, before controlling for other factors previously shown to affect citation rates.

Insert Tables 5 and 6 About Here

Table 7 presents the results of the negative binomial regressions, with the coefficients transformed to incidence-rate ratios (IRR), i.e.,  $\exp(\beta)$  rather than  $\beta$ . Incident rate ratios indicate the estimated change in the response ratio, in this case the citation rate (mgmt cites), for each one unit increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant and correcting for exposure time (years since publication). An IRR below 1.0 signifies a decrease in the response variable, e.g., IRR = .95 would signify a five percent decrease in the management citation rate for each unit increase in the independent variable. An IRR above 1.0 signifies a corresponding increase in the response variable, e.g., IRR = 1.05 would signify a five percent increase in the citation rate for each unit increase in the independent variable.

Insert Table 7 Here

Model 1 results show significant effects for methodology, journal clique, journal prestige and the number of citations in the focal article. The IRR for number of citations, for example (IRR = 1.02, s.e. = .006), indicates that each additional citation in the focal article increases the annual rate of citations in management journals by two percent. This pattern of effects for the control variables remains in Model 2 when the independent variables are added to the equation, but experimental methodology falls below standard significance levels. The IRRs for *what\_open* and *when\_open* are greater than 1.0 and significant, indicating positive effects on citation rates. The IRR of 1.41 for *what\_open* indicates that negotiation articles in our sample in which the dependent variable reflected one open system assumption, about *either* the nature of the dependent variable *or* the potential for bargaining to affect variables outside the focal negotiation had a 41 percent higher annual citation rate in management research than articles with fully closed systems dependent variables (e.g., tangible payoffs only), holding all other variables constant. Similarly, the IRR for *when\_open* of 1.67 indicates that the articles in our sample that explored negotiations extending beyond one-shot interactions increased their annual citation rate in management research by 67 percent relative to negotiation articles studying only one-shot interactions, again holding all other variables constant. The coefficient for *who\_open* was not significant. Though the number of citations rises with the extent of open systems assumptions about who is involved in the negotiation, as

indicated in Table 6, and the pairwise correlation between *who\_open* and management citations was positive and significant, this relationship is negative and not significant when entered simultaneously with the other open systems variables and the control variables.

Because the independent variable, *who\_open*, was correlated at greater than .6 with a number of the control variables — methodology (experimental and field) as well as level of analysis — we conducted analyses assessing multicollinearity effects. Negative binomial regression analyses do not allow examination of variance inflation factors (VIF). As a proxy, we conducted OLS regression on annualized citation counts with all of our variables: the mean VIF was 2.24, with a maximum of 5.18 for our organizational psychology journal variable. The VIFs for all open systems variables were less than 3.5. We concluded that multicollinearity does not seem to be driving our results (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman 1996), though we remain cautious that phenomenological assumptions are, at least in part, closely reflected in methodology.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Knowledge dissemination from sub-fields to the broader academic field in which they are situated rests, in part, on phenomenological assumptions that make the sub-field's research questions and findings more clearly relevant to the field as a whole. In addition to presentational, methodological, disciplinary and political drivers of citations, phenomenological assumptions have a strong influence on the citation of micro-process research throughout the field of organizational studies. Our investigation of negotiation articles published between 1990 and 2005 revealed that phenomenological assumptions locating the interaction in a larger system, particularly contextualizing what is negotiated and when the negotiation takes place, facilitate the citation of negotiation research by non-negotiation research published in management journals. Although closed systems, reductionist assumptions may allow clearer demonstration of cause and effect, they lie in stark contrast to the situated interpretation of negotiations as central mechanisms in complex organizational systems (Katz & Kahn 1966; Ranson et al. 1980; Strauss 1978). As such, it appears that closed system phenomenological assumptions about negotiations make it

harder for non-negotiations organizational scholars to recognize and appreciate the relevance of the findings to broader organizational research.

To explore the validity of this interpretation of our results, we selected two papers that were similar on as many dimensions as possible but differed in their phenomenological assumptions and examined *how* they were cited. Hardy and Phillips (1998) and Coff (1999) both present field studies of inter-organizational negotiations published in *Organization Science*, and both have similar numbers of citations in management journals (Hardy and Philips have 12 and Coff has 11 management citations). Hardy and Philips (1998) is coded as having four open system assumptions (what\_open = 1, who\_open = 2, and when\_open = 1); Coff (1999) is coded as having one open system assumption (who\_open = 1, all others = 0). We read the papers citing each of these articles to better understand the nature of the knowledge dissemination. The Hardy and Philips (1998) paper, with its revealed assumptions about the open, holistic nature of negotiations, was used primarily to motivate theoretical questions in the citing organizational studies. In contrast, the Coff (1999) paper, with revealed assumptions about the closed, mechanistic nature of negotiations, was cited more narrowly to justify specific hypotheses or to aid the interpretation of results. This limited exploration of citing articles supports the logic underlying our hypotheses: negotiation studies revealing open system phenomenological assumptions appear to be cited more frequently because their contextualized perspective on negotiations enables them to speak more broadly to other organizational processes.

Our study illuminated the implicit phenomenological assumptions in micro-process negotiation research. While the authors of the articles in our data set may not have articulated or even consciously acknowledged these assumptions when they designed their studies and wrote their papers, the assumptions are evident in the choices made in design, analyses and presentation of the research. Morgan and Smircich note that even meta-theoretical assumptions are not made explicit in research and are likely to be taken for granted rather than consciously chosen: “To the extent that these assumptions are continually affirmed and reinforced by fellow scientists, ... they may remain not only unquestioned, but also beyond conscious awareness” (1980: 605). The lack of dissemination of micro-process research may,

in part, be a product of how researchers think about and present the connections between their questions, the phenomena they study and the larger organizations in which these phenomena take place.

Phenomenological assumptions about the nature of the process under investigation affect knowledge dissemination even after controlling for the effects of method, level of analysis, disciplinary citation cliques, journal prestige, author reputation and business school affiliation, and number of citations and pages within the focal article. Our results indicate, however, that not all open systems assumptions were equally important to increasing management research citations of negotiation studies. Assumptions about what constitutes critical outcome variables and when important process and outcome variables can be measured had significant effects on citations. Contrary to our hypotheses, assumptions about who is involved in the negotiation did not significantly affect citation rates in our full model. Negotiation scholars who are interested in disseminating their research findings outside their own sub-field may broaden the appeal of their research to organizational scholars by adopting some open-systems assumptions, while retaining some closed system design features, such as focusing on only those directly involved in the negotiation.

Although citations are not a perfect measure of intellectual influence, we, like other scholars who have utilized similar data (e.g., Biehl et al. 2006; Blackburn & Michell 1981; Judge et al. 2007; Stremersch et al. 2007), believe that they provide an accurate, if conservative, picture of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. While previous research has focused on presentational or political factors affecting citations, we have demonstrated that the phenomenological assumptions upon which studies are based have measureable effects on knowledge diffusion. Future research could explore other features of the knowledge content that relate to citations.

Our qualitative exploration identified studies across a continuum of phenomenological assumptions. By revealing how negotiation research can be rigorous and situated, both parsimonious and accessible to organizational scholars, these studies illustrate how phenomenological assumptions help establish a shared language and facilitate joint knowledge transformation. We found that the negotiation studies in our data set seldom were explicit about the assumptions made and seldom acknowledged

reasonable boundary conditions for their findings. Although our data did not let us examine this systematically, we believe that studies of micro-processes could potentially enhance the impact they have, and deserve, in organizational studies by confronting the assumptions incorporated into their research designs and the implications of these assumptions for generalizing into organizational contexts. Just as articulating assumptions about physical objects may facilitate knowledge transformation across boundaries (Bechky 2003b), explicating assumptions underlying academic research may make new information more transparent and easily adopted.

Disseminating knowledge from sub-fields of specialists to the broader academic field benefits scholarship by increasing the likelihood of producing innovative, rather than incremental, knowledge (Dauphinee & Martin 2000). We hope our exposure of the role of phenomenological assumptions in the dissemination of negotiation research to the larger field of organizational studies not only enhances our understanding of knowledge dissemination, but also influences scholars to expose and discuss their assumptions and infuses organizational scholarship with new vigor and ideas.

**Table 1.** Summary of articles in data set.<sup>a</sup>

Type	Journal (Count)	Simple Citation
Industrial Relations	ILRR (18)	(Bell, 1995); (Belzer, 1995); (Budd, 1992); (Burgess & Marburger, 1993); ( <b>Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991</b> ); (Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al., 1996); (Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Kochan, 2004); (Deery & Iverson, 2005); (Erickson, 1992); (Erickson, 1996); (Hebdon & Hyatt, 1998); (Iankova, 2000); (Ichniowski & Delaney, 1990); (Morishima, 1991); (Nay, 1991); (Paul & Kleingartner, 1994); (Ready, 1990); (Thomas & Kleiner, 1992)
Management	AMJ (14)	(Balogun & Johnson, 2004); (Brett et al., 1998); (Brett & Okumura, 1998); (Conlon & Fasolo, 1990); (Conlon & Sullivan, 1999); (Floyd et al., 1994); (Martin & Berthiaume, 1995); (Parks & Conlon, 1995); (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995); (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994); (Polzer et al., 1998); (Simons, 1993); (Tenbrunsel, 1998); ( <b>Yan &amp; Gray, 1994</b> )
	ASQ (10)	(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991); (Brockner et al., 2000); (Cooper et al., 1992); (Dyck & Starke, 1999); (Friedman & Poldony, 1992); (McGinn & Keros, 2002); (Pisano, 1990); ( <b>Robinson, 1996</b> ); (Rosenkopf et al., 2001); (Seidel et al., 2000)
	OS (10)	(Adair & Brett, 2005); (Coff, 1999); (Glynn, 2000); (Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997); (Greenwood et al., 1994); (Griffith & Northcraft, 1994); (Hardy & Phillips, 1998); (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000); (Rosenblatt et al., 1993); ( <b>Zaheer et al., 1998</b> )
Organizational Psychology	OBHDP (83)	(Allred et al., 1997); (Anderson & Thompson, 2004); (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995); (Ball et al., 1991); (Bazerman et al., 1992); (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002); (Bereby-Meyer et al., 2004); (Blount et al., 1996); (Blount & Larrick, 2000); (Boles et al., 2000); (Bottom & Studt, 1993); (Bottom, 1998); (Brockner et al., 2005); (Brodt, 1994); (Brodt & Tuchinsky, 2000); (Chen & Komorita, 1994); (Chen et al., 1996); (Chen, 1996); (De Dreu et al., 1994); (De Dreu & Boles, 1998); (De Dreu, 2003); (Diekmann et al., 1996); (Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1993); (Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski, 1994); (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999); (Ghosh, 1996); (Gist & Stevens, 1998); (Handgraaf et al., 2004); (Harinck et al., 2000); (Harris & Carnevale, 1990); (Hilty & Carnevale, 1993); (Keysar et al. et al., 1995); (Kim, 1997); (Kim et al., 2003); (Kramer et al., 1993); (Kray et al., 2002); (Kristensen & Garling, 1997); (Larrick & Boles, 1995); ( <b>Lim &amp; Murnighan, 1994</b> ); (Loewenstein et al., 2005); (Mannix & Loewenstein, 1993); (Mannix et al., 1995a); (Mannix et al., 1995b); (Messick et al., 1997); (Moore et al., 1999); (Moore, 2004); (Morgan & Tindale, 2002); (Naquin, 2003); (Northcraft et al., 1998); (Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004); (O'Connor, 1997); (O'Connor & Arnold, 2001); (Okhuysen et al., 2003); (Olekals et al., 1996); (Oliver et al., 1994); (Peterson & Thompson, 1997); (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996); (Pinkley et al., 1994); (Pinkley et al., 1995); (Rapoport et al., 1997); (Ravenscroft et al., 1993); (Ritov, 1996); (Robert & Carnevale, 1997); (Shapiro & Bies, 1994); (Singh, 1997); (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999); (Sondak & Bazerman, 1991); (Sondak et al., 1995); (Srivastava, 2001); (Stuhlmacher & Stevenson, 1994); (Tenbrunsel et al., 1999); (Thompson & Hastie, 1990); (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992); (Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994); (Thompson et al., 2000); (Tinsley et al., 2002); (Valenzuela et al., 2005); (Valley et al., 1992); (Walters et al., 1998); (White et al., 1994); (White & Neale, 1994); (White et al., 2004); (Whyte & Sebenius, 1997)
	JAP (19)	(Adair et al., 2001); (Arnold & O'Connor, 1999); ( <b>Ashford &amp; Black, 1996</b> ); (Conlon & Ross, 1993); (De Dreu et al., 1998); (Gelfand & Realo, 1999); (Gelfand et al., 2002); (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991); (Humphrey et al., 2004); (Kim & Fragale, 2005); (Kwon & Weingart, 2004); (Leung et al., 2004); (Naquin & Paulson, 2003); (O'Connor et al., 2005); (Pinkley, 1995); (Ross & Wieland, 1996); (Stevens et al., 1993); (Tinsley, 2001); (Weingart et al., 1993)
Social Psychology	JESP (18)	(Bornstein et al., 2004); (Chen et al., 2003); (Curhan et al., 2004); (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004); (De Grada et al., 1999); (Drolet & Morris, 2000); (Matheson et al., 1991); (Moore, 2004); (Morris & Sim, 1998); (Ohtsubo & Kameda, 1998); ( <b>Olekals &amp; Smith, 2003</b> ); (Thompson, 1990); ( <b>Thompson, 1991</b> ); (Thompson, 1993); (Thompson et al., 1995); (Van Beest et al., 2005); (Van Dijk et al., 2004); (Weingart et al., 1999)
	JPSP (21)	(Barry & Friedman, 1998); (Bornstein, 1992); (Bowles et al., 2005); (Cotterell et al., 1992); ( <b>De Dreu et al., 2000a</b> ); (De Dreu et al., 2000b); (Diekmann et al., 1997); (Diekmann et al., 2003); (Enzle et al., 1992); (Forgas, 1998); (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001); (Galinsky et al., 2002); (Kray et al., 2001); (Larrick & Blount, 1997); (Morris et al., 1999); (Thompson, 1990); (Thompson, 1995); (Thompson et al., 1996); (Van Kleef et al., 2004); (Weingart et al., 1996); (Wit & Kerr, 2002)
	PSPB (18)	(De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995); (De Dreu et al., 1999); (Eggin et al., 2002); (Galinsky et al., 2002); (Galinsky et al., 2005); (Garcia et al., 2001); (Kray et al., 2004); (Kray et al., 2005); ( <b>Liberman et al., 2004</b> ); (Moore, 2005); (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997); (Ohbuchi et al., 1996); (Olekals & Smith, 1999); (Olekals & Smith, 2005); (Paese & Gilin, 2000); (Parks & Rumble, 2001); (Van Beest et al., 2003); (Vorauer & Claude, 1998)
Sociology	AJS (5)	(Bittman et al., 2003); (Chaves, 1993); ( <b>Molm et al., 2000</b> ); (Morrill, 1991); (Phillips, 2001)
	ASR (9)	(Bonacich, 1990); (Bridges & Villemez, 1991); (Lawler & Yoon, 1993); (Markovsky et al., 1993); ( <b>Molm et al., 1999</b> ); (Molm et al., 2003); (Shrum, 1990); (Stepan-Norris & Zeitlin, 1995); (Thye, 2000)

<sup>a</sup> Bold cites have highest annualized citation rates among those in the journal.

**Table 2.** Coding percentages. Articles are counted more than once when coded on multiple categories.

“WHO”	Relationships among negotiators*						Coalition Potential		
	Classmates	Strangers	Embed’d	Hierarch’l	Relation’p	None	Coalitions		
Percent	65%	16%	20%	1%	8%	90%	10%		
“WHAT”	Nature of Dependent Variables* (70% of articles received > 1 code)							External Effects	
	Tang’ble	Percept’s of outcomes	Process	Power	Status	Trust	Relation’p	Effects outside focal Negotiat’n	All effects within Negotiat’n
Percent	86%	30%	42%	9%	27%	5%	9%	10%	90%
“WHEN”	1-shot	1-shot w/ phases	Multi-round	Recursive					
	Percent	51%	18%	6%	25%				

\*Articles could receive multiple codes in this category.

**Table 3.** Summary of qualitative results regarding open and closed systems assumptions about negotiations

	Closed systems assumptions	Open systems assumptions
Who	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations take place between parties with independent preferences and interests.</li> <li>Coalitions or constituencies are not critical to the negotiation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations take place between parties connected through personal and organizational relationships and social networks.</li> <li>Alliances at and away from the table are critical to negotiations.</li> </ul>
What	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations primarily involve material resource exchanges.</li> <li>Local negotiation outcomes are separable from their effect on the broader organization.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations involve symbolic resources as well as material resources.</li> <li>Negotiations affect and are affected by larger organizational structures and systems.</li> </ul>
When	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations are discreet events.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiations are overlapping, recurrent and recursive events.</li> </ul>

**Table 4:** Coding categories and possible values for Phenomenological Assumptions

<b>WHO = 0, 1 or 2 (additive)</b>	
Relationships among negotiators*	
<u>Open systems (+1)</u> R= Existing direct tie relationship, other than reporting relationship (coded H) H = Hierarchical power or status relationship E = Embedded, tied via the collective; includes market-based negotiations in which parties are embedded in market; excludes classmates	<u>Closed systems (+0)</u> S = Strangers recruited as experimental subjects C = Classroom exercise; participants recruited in class; no consideration of prior or future relationship
Coalition potential	
<u>Open systems (+1)</u> Coal = 1: coalitions available to at least one party	<u>Closed systems (+0)</u> Coal = 0: no coalitions possible
<b>WHAT = 0, 1 or 2 (additive)</b>	
Nature of Dependent Variable*	
<u>Open systems (+1)</u> R = Relationship; e.g., future partner selection based on relationships; attitudes about other party; perceptions of other party, except trust/reputation (coded “T”) or status or power (“S” and”Pw”) S = Status; social esteem and/or position in the informal hierarchy Pw = Power; resources that can be brought to bear on a negotiation, e.g., BATNA T = Trust/reputation	<u>Closed systems (+0)</u> \$ = Tangible, material resources; includes impasse/agreement rates and votes on ratification P = Negotiation process; e.g., perceptions of process; number of offers; perceptions of fair treatment; evaluations of competitiveness/cooperativeness O = Negotiator attitude; perceptions, attitudes, moods or emotions regarding the negotiation; e.g., perceptions of outcome fairness, participant satisfaction, perceptions of others’ motivations; does not include process perceptions (coded “P”) and perceptions of other party (coded “R”)
External effects	
<u>Open systems (+1)</u> E = 1: Negotiation’s effects on larger organizational issues outside negotiation itself	<u>Closed systems (+0)</u> E = 0: All measured effects internal to focal negotiation/parties at the table
<b>WHEN = 0 or 1</b>	
<u>Open systems (+1)</u> Ip = one-shot with distinct phases R = Recursive or ongoing, reserved for those studies in which effects of one negotiation on another were actually measured M = Multiple rounds, ongoing negotiation.	<u>Closed systems (+0)</u> 1 = one-shot; includes experiments in which subjects played multiple separate negotiations with no repeat partners or consideration of carry over effects across rounds.

\*Articles were coded with multiple codes in this category when appropriate.

**Table 5. Correlations (excludes papers published in 2005: N = 212)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Mean/ N = 1	.46	9	165	38	1.44	51	97	14	17	33	2.03	8.53	160	47.9	18.16	.39	.56	105	9.88
(S.D.)	(1.19)	--	--	--	(.65)	--	--	--	--	--	(.76)	(8.09)	--	(19.04)	(6.68)	(.62)	(.64)	--	(4.14)
1. Ann. Mgmt. cites	--																		
2. Ethnography	.26**	--																	
3. Experiment	-.32**	-.39*	--																
4. Field	.21**	-.10	-.88*	--															
5. Level of Analysis	.29**	.18**	-.57**	.53**	--														
6. JPSP, JESP or PSPB	-.12	-.06	.25*	-.23*	-.15*	--													
7. OBHDP or JAP	-.18**	-.19*	.44*	-.38*	-.35**	-.52*	--												
8. Soc. Journal	-.04	.13	-.18*	.12	.14*	-.15**	-.24*	--											
9. I.R. Journal	-.08	-.06	-.55*	.63*	.36**	-.17**	-.27*	-.08	--										
10. Mgmt. Journal	.48**	.30*	-.37*	.24*	.30**	-.24*	-.39*	-.11	-.13	--									
11. Journal Prestige	.24**	.08	-.01	-.03	.11	.39*	-.55*	.20*	-.32*	.39*	--								
12. Author Reputation	-.03	-.17*	.42**	-.36**	-.30**	.19**	.20**	-.17*	-.24**	-.21**	-.02	--							
13. Bus. School Affiliation	.05	.01	-.01	.01	-.01	-.16*	.17*	-.33**	.01	.18**	-.06	.22**	--						
14. Wi/ article citation count	.25**	.23*	-.07	-.05	.07	.08	-.05	.11	-.25*	.10	.26*	.01	-.09	--					
15. No. pages	.17**	.21*	-.22*	.13	.08	-.24*	.00	.28*	.00	.10	-.10	-.01	-.06	.11	--				
16. Who_open	.29**	.32*	-.78*	.68*	.57**	-.26*	-.39*	.23*	.43*	.36*	.02	-.34**	-.02	.11	.25*	--			
17. What_open	.32**	.33*	-.37*	.23*	.25**	-.08	-.21*	.12	.04	.28*	.14**	-.15*	-.05	.27*	.14**	.42*	--		
18. When_open	.18**	.12	-.31*	.28*	.32**	-.20*	-.15**	.12	.23*	.20*	-.01	-.26**	-.01	-.14**	.16**	.34*	.16**	--	
19. Yrs. since publication	.04	-.03	-.16**	.20*	.19**	-.22*	-.02	.08	.21*	.08	-.04*	-.11	.04	-.31	.12	.16**	-.06	.27*	--

\*\* (p < .01); \* (p < .05)

**Table 6.** Management Citation Counts by Who, What, When

Open systems (OS) codes	Number of observations	Mgmt. citations Mean (S.D.)	Annualized Mgmt. citations Mean (S.D.)
Who = 0 OS codes	146	2.38 (3.84)	.28 (.43)
Who = 1 OS code	50	6.52 (19.68)	.64 (1.55)
Who = 2 OS codes	16	15.00 (28.79)	1.63 (2.90)
What = 0 OS codes	110	2.26 (3.50)	.28 (.41)
What = 1 OS code	85	3.81 (12.96)	.35 (.88)
What = 2 OS codes	17	20.00 (31.68)	2.26 (3.12)
When = 0 OS codes	107	1.93 (2.95)	.25 (.40)
When = 1 OS code	105	6.72 (18.09)	.69 (1.62)

**Table 7.** Negative binomial regression testing effects of assumptions on rate of management journal citations, 1990-2007. N = 212.

Mgmt cites	Model 1		Model 2	
	IRR		IRR	
Ethnography	.799		.772	
	(.367)		(.362)	
Experiment	.425*		.475+	
	(.171)		(.202)	
Level of Analysis	.805		.822	
	(.156)		(.157)	
JESP_JPSP_PSPB	.145**		.147**	
	(.054)		(.054)	
OBHDP_JAP	.287**		.266**	
	(.111)		(.105)	
Soc. Journal	.176**		.162**	
	(.077)		(.073)	
I.R. Journal	.175**		.191**	
	(.089)		(.101)	
Journal Prestige	1.54*		1.47*	
	(.291)		(.279)	
Author Reputation	1.02		1.02	
	(.015)		(.015)	
B-School Affiliation	.990		1.07	
	(.247)		(.267)	
No. cites	1.02**		1.02**	
	(.006)		(.006)	
No. pages	1.02		1.02	
	(.016)		(.015)	
Who_open			.654	
			(.176)	
What_open			1.41*	
			(.233)	
When_open			1.67*	
			(.350)	
Yrs. since pub	(exposure)		(exposure)	
/lnalpha	.165	.156	.073	.160
alpha	1.18	.184	1.08	.172
Log likelihood	-419.301		-414.028	
LR chi2 (8)/(11)	112.75		123.30	
Prob > chi2	.000		.000	
Pseudo R2	.119		.130	
Test for change in LR			LR chi2(3) = 10.55	
			Prob > chi2 = .014	

Standard errors are shown below each coefficient. Significance as follows:

\*\* (p < .01); \* (p < .05); + (p < .10)

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