Barney Hartman-Glaser

Assistant Professor of Finance

Phone: (310) 825-4083


Barney Hartman-Glaser is an Assistant Professor of Finance at UCLA Anderson School of Management. Prior to joining UCLA Anderson, he was an assistant professor at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. He received his Ph.D. in finance and real estate from the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley. Professor Hartman-Glaser's research applies contract and game theory to financial and real estate markets. Recently, he conducted research on the consequences of private information in mortgage markets in which he showed that mortgage-backed securities issuers may cash-in on their reputations by selling low-quality assets.

Professor Hartman-Glaser has also written on the incentives of mortgage originators to screen for good borrowers. He showed that requiring originators to retain an equity "tranche" is the most effective way to encourage good behavior.

At Duke, Professor Hartman-Glaser taught real estate finance and core corporate finance. He teaches Foundations of Finance at UCLA Anderson.


Ph.D. Finance, UC Berkeley
M.S. Mathematics, 2004, Stanford University
B.S. Mathematics, 2003, Stanford University


Finance, Corporate Finance, Dynamic Contracting, Security Design, Mortgage Markets, Real Estate Finance and Economics, Real Options


Stanford University: graduated with Honors in Mathematics, 2003
Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics Fellow 2005-2009
White Foundation Dissertation Fellow 2009-2010
Institute for Business and Economics Research Mini-grant 2010
Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics Research Grant 2010-2011

  • Hartman-Glaser, B; Piskorski, T.; Tchistyi, A.. (July 15, 2012). Optimal Securitization with Moral Hazard. Journal of Financial Economics, [ Link ]
  • Barney Hartman-Glaser. (Revised June 2013). Reputation and Signaling. Review of Financial Studies, [ Download ] [ Show Abstract ]
    Static adverse selection models of security issuance show that informed issuers can perfectly reveal their private information by maintaing a costly stake in the securities they issue. This paper shows that allowing an issuer to both signal current security quality via retention and build a reputation for honesty leads that issuer to misreport quality even when owning a positive stake--the equilibrium is neither separating nor pooling. An issuer retains less as reputation improves and prices are more sensitive to retention when the issuer has a worse reputation.
  • Barney Hartman-Glaser, Sebastian Gryglewicz. (2013). Dynamic Agency and Real Options. [ Download ] [ Show Abstract ]
    We present a model integrating dynamic moral hazard and real options. A risk averse manager can exert costly hidden effort to increase productivity growth of a firm. In addition, the risk neutral owners of the firm can irreversibly increase the firms capital stock. In contrast to the literature, moral hazard may accelerate or delay investment relative to the first best depending on the severity of the moral hazard problem. When the agency problem is more severe, the firm will invest at alower threshold than in the first best case because investment acts as substitute for effort. This mechanism provides an explanation for over-investment that does not rely on "empire building" preferences. Effort decreases after investment, however pay performance sensitivity increases after investment when the agency problem is less severe and the growth option is large.