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Published Works Since 1995

Transitive Regret.
S. Bikhchandani, U. Segal. Theoretical Economics. 6: 95-108. 2011.
[Abstract] [Full Text]

An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid.
S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, R. Vohra. Operations Research. 59(2): 400-413. 2011.
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Information Acquisition and Full Surplus Extraction.
S. Bikhchandani. Journal of Economic Theory. 145(6): 2282-2308. 2010.
[Abstract] [Full Text For ScienceDirect Subscribers]

Information Cascades.
S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2008.
[Abstract] [Full Text]

Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mualem, N. Nisan, A. Sen. Econometrica. 74(4): 1109-1132. 2006.
[Abstract] [Full Text For Wiley Subscribers]

Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions.
S. Bikhchandani, J. Ostroy. Games and Economic Behavior. 55(2): 215-241. 2006.
[Abstract] [Full Text For ScienceDirect Subscribers]

Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods.
S. Bikhchandani. Theoretical Economics. 1: 369-393. 2006.
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From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions.
S. Bikhchandani, J. Ostroy. Combinatorial Auctions. Eds.: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg. MIT Press. 2006.
[Abstract] [Book Information]

On the Right of First Refusal.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Lippman, R. Ryan. Advances in Theoretical Economics. 5(1:4). 2005.
[Abstract] [Full Text For BE Press Subscribers]

Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions.
S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, R. Vohrapp. Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction and Markets. B. Dietrich, R. Vohra (eds.). 75-115. The Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. New York: Springer Verlag. 2002.
[Abstract] [Full Text]

The Package Assignment Model.
S. Bikhchandani, J. Ostroy. Journal of Economic Theory. 107: 377-406. 2002.
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Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions.
S. Bikhchandani, P. Haile, J. Riley. Games and Economic Behavior. 2002.
[Abstract] [Full Text For Science Direct Subscribers]

Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: A Review.
S. Bikhchandani, S, Sharma. IMF Staff Papers. 2001.
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Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects.
S. Bikhchandani. Games and Economic Behavior. 26: 193-220. 1999.
[Abstract] [Full Text For Science Direct Subscribers]

Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades.
S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12: 151-170. 1998.
[Abstract] [Full Text For JSTOR Subscribers]

Competitive Equilibrium in a Exchange Economy with Indivisibilites.
S. Bikhchandani, J. Mamer. Journal of Economic Theory. 74: 385-413. 1997.
[Abstract] [Full Text For Science Direct Subscribers]

Optimal Search with Learning.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Sharma. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 20: 333-359. 1996.
[Abstract] [Full Text For Science Direct Subscribers]

Working Papers

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller.
S. Bikhchandani, K. McCardle. July 2011.
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Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction.
S. Bikhchandani, I. Obara. April 2011.
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Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Unit Auctions.
S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterjee, A. Sen. June 2003.
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The Treasury Bill Auction and the When-Issued Market: Some Evidence.
S. Bikhchandani, P. Edsparr, C. Huang. Revised August 2000.
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