Kumar Rajaram

Professor of Decisions, Operations, and Technology Management; Ho-Su Wu Chair in Management; DOTM Area Chair

Phone: (310) 825-4154


Gold Hall, Room B-410


Professor Rajaram's current research interests include improving operations in the health care industry, non-profit sector and in process manufacturing sectors including food processing, pharmaceuticals and petrochemical industry. He has focused on developing analytical models of complicated systems with a strong emphasis on practical implementation. His research has been published in journals such as Operations Research, Management Science, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Marketing Science and Production and Operations Management.

Professor Rajaram has developed a new operational technique called "Robust Process Control" to increase the productivity of large-scale industrial processes. By focusing on the design and control of these processes in operational environments, this technique has resulted in four-fold increases in productivity in several types of industrial processes. These methods have been implemented at several process companies worldwide. He has also developed techniques to better balance supply with demand for products with short life cycles and highly unpredictable demand. This work has been applied at several large fashion retailers in Europe and North America and has resulted in substantial improvements to profitability at these sites.


At the UCLA Anderson School, Professor Rajaram teaches the MBA core course on operations and technology management, various Executive Education courses and doctoral level courses on operations management and models for operations design, planning and control.


Best Application Paper, Institute of Industrial Engineers, 2010

Deloitte Consulting Award for Management Field Study Achievement, 2009

Niedorf "Decade" Teaching Award, UCLA Anderson School, 2005

Eric and “E” Juline Faculty Excellence in Research Award, UCLA Anderson School, 2003

Citibank Teaching Award, UCLA Anderson School, 2000

George Robbins Assistant Professor Teaching Award, 1999

Franz Edelman Laureate, Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS), 1998

Research Interests

operations management in the process industry, process improvement in health care, process improvement in non-profits, retail operations management, theme park operations, operations management in the motion picture industry


Ph.D. Operations Management, 1998, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
M.A. Managerial Science and Applied Economics, 1997, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
M.S. Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, 1993, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
M.Sc. Mathematics, with Honors 1991, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, India
B.E. Electrical and Electronics Engineering, with Honors 1991, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, India
  • S. Deo, K. Rajaram, S. Rath, U.S. Karmarkar, M.B. Goetz. Planning for HIV Screening, Testing, and Care at the Veterans Health Administration. Operations Research, 63(2): 287-304. March-April 2015. [ Link ]
  • F.Caro,K.Rajaram,J.Wollenweber. Process Location and Product Distribution with Uncertain Yields. Operations Research., 60(5): 1050-1063. September-October 2012.. [ Link ]
  • C.S. Tang, K.Rajaram, A. Alptekinoglu, J.Ou. The Benefits of Advanced Booking Discount Programs: Model and Analysis. Management Science, 50(4):465-478, April 2004. [ Link ]
  • K.Rajaram and C.Corbett.. Achieving Environmental and Productivity Improvements Through Model Based Process Redesign. Operations Research, 50(5): 751-763,2003. [ Link ]
  • K.Rajaram and R.Ahmadi. Flow Management To Optimize Retail Profits At Theme Parks. Operations Research, 51(2): 175-184, 2003.. [ Link ]
  • K.Rajaram and U.Karmarkar. Product Cycling With Uncertain Yields: Analysis And Application To The Process Industry.. Operations Research, 50(4): 680-691, 2002.. [ Link ]
  • U.Karmarkar and K.Rajaram. Grade Selection and Blending to Optimize Cost and Quality. Operations Research, 49(2): 271-280. 2001..
  • M.Fisher and K.Rajaram. Accurate Retail Testing Of Fashion Merchandise: Methodology And Application.. Marketing Science, 19(3): 266-278. 2000.. [ Link ]
  • K.Rajaram et. al. Robust Process Control At Cerestar's Refineries. Interfaces Specail Issue: Edelmann Award Papers, 29(1): 30-48, 1999.. [ Link ]
  • . Complete List of Publications. [ Link ]
  • F. Caro, P. Chintapalli, K. Rajaram, C.S. Tang. (October 22, 2015). Improving Supplier Compliance Through Joint and Shared Audits. [ Download ] [ Show Abstract ]
    When suppliers (i.e., contract manufacturers) fail to comply with environmental or safety regulations, several non-governmental agencies and consumer activists put pressure on the buy- ers (customers) to take necessary actions to improve supplier compliance. Due to concerns over negative image and public boycotts, many buyers are conducting costly audits to improve sup- plier compliance. By considering a common practice that calls for independent audits (i.e., each buyer performs its own audit) as a benchmark, we examine the implications of two new audit mechanisms in this paper. The first mechanism is called the joint audit mechanism un- der which buyers conduct joint audits by sharing the joint audit cost and impose a collective penalty if the supplier fails their joint audit. The second mechanism is referred to as the shared audit mechanism under which each buyer conducts its own audit independently but shares its audit report with the other buyer. By sharing the audit reports, the buyers impose a collective penalty on the supplier if the supplier fails any one of the audits. Using a game-theoretic model with 2 buyers and 1 supplier, our analysis reveals that the joint audit mechanism is beneficial in two important ways. It can make the supplier increase its compliance level in equilibrium. Also, when the audit cost is below a certain threshold, the joint audit mechanism can increase the supply chain profit so that it is Pareto-improving. Moreover, we find that the shared audit mechanism is beneficial in a similar manner when the audit cost lies within a certain range. Ultimately, our analysis reveals that joint audits can be Pareto-improving when the buyer's audit cost is low, shared audits can be Pareto-improving when the buyer's cost is medium, and independent audits turn out to a practical mechanism when the buyer's audit cost is high.
  • W. Zhang, K. Rajaram. (June 2014). Joint Assortment and Inventory Management for Basic Products with Limited Retail Space. [ Download ]