Sushil Bikhchandani

Professor, Faculty Vice Chairman

Phone: (310) 206-2686

Fax: (310) 825-1581

sbikhcha at anderson dot ucla dot edu

Cornell Hall, Room D-516

Biography

Professor Bikhchandani has been at the UCLA Anderson School since 1985. He is interested in auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Dr. Bikhchandani currently teaches Data and Decisions in the MBA core and an elective on game theory and strategic behavior. He is vice chair of the Anderson School.

Education

Ph.D. Decision Sciences, 1986, Stanford University
MBA 1980, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
B.Tech. Electrical Engineering, 1978, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

Interests

Auctions, Strategic Behavior, Social Learning
  • S. Bikhchandani and K. McCardle. (2012). Behavior-based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller. The B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), 12 (1), Article 21. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. Vohra. (2011). An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid. Operations Research, 59, 400-413. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Uzi Segal. (2011). Transitive Regret. Theoretical Economics, 6, 95-108. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani. (2010). Information Acquisition and Full Surplus Extraction. Journal of Economic Theory, [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. (2008). Information Cascades. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mualem, Noam Nisan, and Arunava Sen. (2006). Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation. Econometrica, 74, pp. 1109-1132. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy. (2006). Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 55, pp. 215-241. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani. (2006). Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods. Theoretical Economics, 1, pp. 369-393. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy. (2006). From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions. Combinatorial Auctions, eds.: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, MIT Press. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, Steven Lippman, and reade Ryan. (2005). On the Right of First Refusal. Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 4. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and J. Mamer. (Jan 2013). Decreasing Marginal Value of Information. [ Download ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and I. Obara. (Aug 2012). Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction. [ Download ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and U. Segal. (May 2012). Transitive Regret over Statistically Independent Lotteries. [ Download ]

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