Sushil Bikhchandani

Professor in Decisions, Operations, and Technology Management, and in Strategy

Phone: (310) 206-2686

Fax: (310) 825-1581

sbikhcha at anderson dot ucla dot edu

Cornell Hall, Room D-516


Professor Bikhchandani has been at the UCLA Anderson School since 1985. He is interested in auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Dr. Bikhchandani currently teaches Data and Decisions and an elective course on game theory and strategic behavior. 


Ph.D. Decision Sciences, 1986, Stanford University
MBA 1980, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
B.Tech. Electrical Engineering, 1978, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur


Auctions, Strategic Behavior, Social Learning
  • S. Bikhchandani. (2017). Stability with One-sided Incomplete Information. Journal of Economic Theory, 168, 372-399. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and U. Segal. (2014). Transitive Regret over Statistically Independent Lotteries. Journal of Economic Theory, 152, 237-248. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and J. Mamer. (2013). Decreasing Marginal Value of Information Under Symmetric Loss. Decision Analysis, 10, 245-256. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani and K. McCardle. (2012). Behavior-based Price Discrimination by a Patient Seller. The B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics (Contributions), 12 (1), Article 21. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Uzi Segal. (2011). Transitive Regret. Theoretical Economics, 6, 95-108. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, and R. Vohra. (2011). An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid. Operations Research, 59, 400-413. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani. (2010). Information Acquisition and Full Surplus Extraction. Journal of Economic Theory, 145, 2282-2308. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. (2008). Information Cascades. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, Shurojit Chatterji, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mualem, Noam Nisan, and Arunava Sen. (2006). Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation. Econometrica, 74, pp. 1109-1132. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy. (2006). Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 55, pp. 215-241. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani. (2006). Ex Post Implementation in Environments with Private Goods. Theoretical Economics, 1, pp. 369-393. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy. (2006). From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions. Combinatorial Auctions, eds.: P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, MIT Press. [ Link ]
  • Sushil Bikhchandani, Steven Lippman, and Reade Ryan. (2005). On the Right of First Refusal. Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 4. [ Link ]
  • S. Bikhchandani. (December 2016). Intermediate Surge Pricing.
  • S. Bikhchandani and I. Obara. (September 2013). Mechanism Design with Acquisition of Correlated Information, to appear in Economic Theory. [ Download ]

The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, by S. Bikhchandani, J. Hirshleifer, and J. Riley, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press. [Link]