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The Value Relevance of Intangibles: The Case of Software Capitalization

DAVID ABOODY* AND BARUCH LEV†

1. Introduction

We examine the relevance to investors of information on the capitalization of software development costs, in accordance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement No. 86 (SFAS No. 86). Software capitalization, the only exception in the United States to the full expensing rule of R&D (SFAS No. 2), pertains to the development component of R&D. It therefore provides a laboratory experiment for an accounting treatment of intangibles that differs from the nearly universal full expensing of intangible assets. Our examination of the ten-year record of SFAS No. 86 is also motivated by the 1996 petition from the Software Publishers Association (SPA) to abolish the standard. The FASB has indicated (in an “Action Alert,” dated August 28, 1996) that it will consider the petition.

The major claim put forward by the SPA is that, given industry changes since 1986, capitalization of software development costs does not benefit investors:

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*University of California, Los Angeles; †New York University. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Brad Barber, Daniel Bens, Garry Biddle, Robert Herz, Bertrand Horwitz, Robert Holthausen, James Leisenring, Ed Maydew, Krishna Palepu, Michael Williams, and Paul Zarowin.

1 The essence of this statement is presented in Appendix A.

2 Software capitalization starts upon the establishment of technological feasibility of the product under development. The preceding research costs are fully expensed; see Appendix A.

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The rationale underlying the capitalization of software development costs is to recognize the existence of an asset of the corporation. However, an asset should be recognized . . . only if ultimate realization of the asset is reasonably assured. . . . Due to factors such as the ever-increasing volatility in the software marketplace, the compression of product cycles, the heightened level of competition and the divergence of technology platforms, realization of software assets has become increasingly uncertain even at the point of technological feasibility. . . . We do not believe that software development costs are a useful predictive factor of future product sales.\(^3\)

To bolster their claim, the Software Publishers Association invokes investors’ attitudes toward “soft assets”:

The members of the SPA CFO Committee . . . have indicated the substantial majority of their investors, underwriters, and financial analysts believe financial reporting by software companies is improved when all software development costs are charged to expense as incurred. These users of financial statements do not believe the recording of a “soft” asset for the software being developed is particularly relevant and does not aid the user of financial statements. The users of financial statements . . . have a high degree of skepticism when it comes to soft assets resulting from the capitalization of software development costs. *(SPA Letter, March 14, 1996, p. 5.)*

Thus, the Software Publishers Association concludes: “Financial reporting and financial statements would be more reliable and consistent if all software development costs were required to be charged to expense.”

We examine the relevance to investors of public information on software capitalization by analyzing both associations of financial data with capital market observables and earnings forecast accuracy. We also provide evidence on potential motives underlying the software industry’s petition to abolish SFAS No. 86 and the apparent endorsement of this petition by some financial analysts. This petition raises intriguing interest-group questions, since software capitalization was strongly supported in 1985 by the then trade group of software companies—ADAPSO (the Association of Data Processing Service Organizations).\(^4\) The shift in attitudes toward capitalization is particularly puzzling given the flexibility of SFAS No. 86, which largely enables those who wish to capitalize to do so and others to immediately expense software developments costs. Analysts’ objection to capitalization is equally intriguing, since software capitalization can be easily undone by subtracting the periodic capitalization figure from reported earnings and the capitalized software asset from total assets and equity. At best, capitalization is informative about the success of software development programs and at worst the information can be ignored.

For a sample of 163 firms during the period 1987–95, we find that annually capitalized development costs are positively associated with stock

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\(^{3}\) This is part (p. 4) of a letter, dated March 14, 1996, written by Ken Wasch, president of the Software Publishers Association (1750 M Street, Washington, D.C. 20006) to the FASB. Henceforth it is cited simply as “SPA Letter.” A copy of this letter is in the possession of Baruch Lev; it can also be obtained from the FASB or the SPA.

\(^{4}\) For ADAPSO’s position on software capitalization, as well as the heated debate on the merits of the 1985 software capitalization exposure draft (e.g., over 200 comment letters sent to the FASB), see *FASB Public Record* [1985].
returns and the cumulative software asset reported on the balance sheet is associated with stock prices. Furthermore, software capitalization data are associated with subsequent reported earnings, indicating another dimension of relevance to investors. We find no support for the view that the judgment involved in software capitalization decreases the quality of reported earnings. Finally, we document a significant association between development costs which were fully expensed by firms not following SFAS No. 86 and subsequent stock returns, consistent with a delayed investor reaction to product development of these companies.

In probing the reasons for the software producers’ change in attitude toward the capitalization of software development costs, we document a significant mid-1990s shift in the impact of software capitalization on reported earnings and return on equity of software companies. Whereas in the early period of SFAS No. 86 application (mid- to late-1980s) software capitalization increased reported earnings more than the decrease in earnings by the amortization of the software asset (since that asset was still small), during the early 1990s the gap between the earnings impacts of capitalization and amortization narrowed, and in 1995 the capitalization and amortization positive and negative effects were roughly offsetting. This impact on reported performance may have been among the reasons underlying the SPA’s petition to abolish SFAS No. 86. Analysts’ objection to capitalization may be related to the random element introduced by capitalization to reported earnings which, in turn, complicates the forecasting task. Indeed, we find that analysts’ earnings forecast errors are positively associated with the intensity of software capitalization.

Our evaluation of the ten-year record of software capitalization in the United States is timely given the current interest in accounting for intangibles. For example, the FASB has recently established a Task Force on Business Combinations to examine, among other things, the accounting treatment of acquired intangibles, some of which (R&D-in-process) are immediately expensed by acquirers (Deng and Lev [1998]). Also, the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA (AcSEC) released in March 1998 a Statement of Position on accounting for software for internal use (SFAS No. 86, the focus of this study, deals with software intended for sale), calling for the capitalization of certain development costs in a similar manner to SFAS No. 86. Abroad, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is about to issue Standard No. 38 on intangibles, which calls for the capitalization of internally developed intangibles with identifiable benefits (IASC [1998]). While SFAS No. 86 deals only with the capitalization of postfeasibility development costs, an assessment of the record of SFAS No. 86 should benefit the reexamination of accounting for intangibles.

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5 This accounting practice has received wide media attention; see recent articles in the Wall Street Journal [December 2, 1996 and May 7, 1997] and Briloff’s articles in Barron’s [December 23, 1996], Institutional Investor [March 1997], and the New York Times [July 5, 1998].
2. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics

The initial sample for this study was the 463 firms on the 1995 *Compustat Industrial and Research Files* classified as computer programming and prepackaged software (SIC codes 7370–7372). We excluded 130 firms with fewer than three years of existence as public companies during 1987–95, to accommodate certain tests which require limited time-series data (e.g., for computing two-year lagged changes in earnings). Eighty of the 130 firms deleted had an initial public offering in 1994 or 1995, while the remaining 50 were acquired or ceased to operate as public companies after fewer than three years. We also excluded 64 firms that were not engaged in developing software products and 56 firms (primarily non-U.S. registrants) with no price or return data on the 1995 *CRSP* database. Finally, we deleted 30 firms for which no or only one financial statement could be located on *Laser Disclosure* or *Lexis/Nexis* (from which we obtained information missing from *Compustat*), as well as 20 firms which reported only purchased software, or for which information pertaining to internally developed software could not be separately identified. The final sample consists of 163 software companies.

We used both the *Current and Research Compustat Tapes* to avoid survivorship bias. For example, a firm that was publicly traded during 1987–90 but failed in 1991 will be included in the sample. A minor survivorship bias, however, may have been introduced by excluding firms with less than three years of data, which eliminates from the sample recent (1994 and 1995) IPOs.

Because *Compustat* generally aggregates the capitalized software asset with other assets and includes the related amortization with cost of sales, we obtained the financial statements of the sample companies from *Laser Disclosure* and *Lexis/Nexis* databases. We collected the following data: net capitalized software asset, the annual software development expense, the annual capitalized software amount, the annual amortization of the software asset, and the occasional write-offs of capitalized software.

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample companies. The sales and total assets figures indicate that over the examined period

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6 Following is our analysis of the 50 deleted companies. The financial data of 9 companies were not available on *Laser Disclosure*. Eight companies did not engage in software production. Of the 33 remaining firms, 23 capitalized software development costs and 10 fully expensed such costs, a ratio of capitalizers-to-expensers similar to that of our sample. The 35 deleted firms were public an average (median) of 18.1 (18.0) months. Twenty companies were purchased (18 in pooling transactions and 2 in purchase transactions) and 13 companies went bankrupt. In section 5.1 we comment on the effects of including the deleted companies on our regression results.

7 We identified 58 software asset write-offs by our sample companies. Given this small number, we did not examine the write-offs separately.

8 There are 163 companies in our sample. However, since we require a minimum of three years of data, there are fewer than 163 firms in each sample year (see the *N* column in table 1).
### TABLE 1

**Sample Summary Statistics**

Means and Medians of Various Attributes of the 163 Sample Companies during 1987–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Median Sales ($ million)</th>
<th>Mean Sales ($ million)</th>
<th>Median Total Assets ($ million)</th>
<th>Mean Total Assets ($ million)</th>
<th>Median ROE</th>
<th>Mean ROE</th>
<th>Median Market/Book</th>
<th>Mean Market/Book</th>
<th>Median Long-Term Debt/Equity</th>
<th>Mean Long-Term Debt/Equity</th>
<th>Median Capitalization Intensity</th>
<th>Mean Capitalization Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24.96</td>
<td>70.41</td>
<td>32.58</td>
<td>69.61</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>35.06</td>
<td>86.30</td>
<td>33.94</td>
<td>82.32</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>102.98</td>
<td>36.28</td>
<td>98.36</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>39.36</td>
<td>123.28</td>
<td>37.72</td>
<td>117.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>41.53</td>
<td>129.29</td>
<td>40.58</td>
<td>126.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>45.53</td>
<td>151.37</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>147.99</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>40.02</td>
<td>155.64</td>
<td>43.92</td>
<td>155.49</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>51.35</td>
<td>204.97</td>
<td>49.65</td>
<td>207.66</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>50.94</td>
<td>265.23</td>
<td>56.39</td>
<td>283.66</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Reported net income over beginning-of-year equity.

2 Both debt and equity are measured at book values.

3 Annual capitalized software development costs divided by total development costs (i.e., the development expense plus the capitalized portion).
(1987–95) software companies, on average, quadrupled in size (doubling at the median). For both sales and total assets, the means are substantially larger than the medians, indicating that the sample includes a small number of very large companies. The increasing sample size \( N \) indicates that the software industry has not yet gone through a “shakeout period,” typical of maturing industries, where the number of firms grows quickly during an initial stage, which is followed by a fast decline (shakeout) and stabilization of the number of competitors.\(^9\)

The return on equity (\( ROE \)) figures in table 1 indicate that the median sample \( ROE \) ranged between 10% and 20% during 1987–92, decreasing to 8–15% in 1993–95 (the mean \( ROE \) fluctuates widely because of a few outliers).\(^10\) The reduced \( ROE \) figures in recent years, reflecting intensified competition and continued entry, are yet another indication that the software industry has not reached maturity. The steadily increasing market-to-book ratio, at both the mean and the median, indicates that investors’ growth expectations of the software industry keep rising. The median debt-to-equity ratios are very small, yet at the mean, a software company has roughly a 5:1 capitalization ratio, at book values.

Capitalization intensity (the annually capitalized portion of software development costs divided by total development costs, expensed as well as capitalized) is among the key variables we examine. Both the mean and median values are stable at 25–30% through 1992 and decline thereafter. This apparent sharp decline of capitalization intensity is driven mainly by recent entrants to the industry, who tend to capitalize less than older companies. For example, in 1987, sample firms that were publicly traded for two years or less had a mean (median) capitalization intensity of 30% (27%), whereas in 1995, similarly young firms had a mean (median) capitalization intensity of 7.9% (0%).\(^11\) In contrast, mature sample firms that were public for at least eight years had a stable mean capitalization ratio of 23% throughout the 1987–95 period, while their median capitalization intensity decreased from 18% to 15%.

Young companies may have low capitalization intensities because most of their software development efforts have not yet reached the technological feasibility stage required for capitalization (see Appendix A). Alternatively, analysts’ frequent claims that software capitalization “contaminates” financial reports and reduces earnings quality may have a stronger effect on young firms trying to establish reporting credibility

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9 On the industry shakeout phenomenon, see, for example, Gort and Klepper [1982] and Klepper and Graddy [1990].

10 The mean \( ROE \) series is influenced by ten very small firm-year observations (eight independent firms) with a mean (median) book value of $1.24 million ($1.21 million). Removing those ten firm-years from the sample considerably reduces fluctuations in the mean \( ROE \).

11 Deloitte and Touche [1996, p. 1] also note that firms in the “younger” segments of the industry (e.g., software for education and entertainment) and recent IPOs tend to capitalize less than mature companies.
than on mature companies. Analysts' skepticism concerning capitalization may have also induced some profitable mature firms to curtail capitalization. Nevertheless, despite the recent decline in capitalization intensity, many software companies still capitalize a substantial portion of development costs, as evidenced by the fact that the top quartile of the sample firms (ranked by capitalization) had a median capitalization intensity of 48% in 1995.

3. Distinguishing "Capitalizers" from "Expensers"

Since SFAS No. 86 affords considerable implementation flexibility to software companies, it is important to distinguish at the outset between software capitalizers and immediate expensers. Doing so sheds light on whether capitalization is practiced by underperforming companies to enhance their reported earnings and provides control variables.

Since SFAS No. 86 conditions capitalization on the technological aspects of software development (e.g., the "product design" or a "working model" must be completed prior to capitalization), economic factors underlying software development may influence the decision to capitalize or expense. For example, immediate expensing may be suitable for products with a short development period, while capitalization fits products developed over several years. Since the specifics of firms' production functions are difficult to identify from public information, we proxy for them by categorizing the sample firms by the type of products developed. We adopt the four software product types (or industry subdivisions) used in the Deloitte and Touche [1996] annual survey: engineering, education and entertainment, business applications, and PC packaged software.13

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12 It is relatively easy for software companies to justify immediate expensing. For example, SFAS No. 86 requires that the expected net realizable value of the project exceed the capitalized value of the software asset. Given the subjectivity in assessing expected net realizable values, it seems that managers who prefer immediate expensing can easily justify this approach.

13 Following are descriptions of the four product types taken from financial reports: Engineering—"The firm designs, produces, and markets proprietary computer software products for use in computer aided engineering." Education and Entertainment—"Develops, publishes, manufactures, and distributes high-quality educational software products for home and school use." Business Applications—"Develops, licenses, and markets system software products, including monitoring and event management tools, back up and recovery products, and data-base administration tools to improve performance, reliability, and manageability of large scale mainframe systems software, open systems data bases, and various other systems." PC Packaged Software—"Designs, develops, and markets systems and application software which enables users to work with professional creative tools, assemble illustrations, image, and text into fully formatted documents, output documents directly to any kind of printing device, and distribute documents on paper, video, or compact disc, over an e-mail system, corporate network, on-line service, or the internet" (Deloitte & Touche LLP [1996]).
We then categorized as "expenders" firms that immediately expensed all of their software development costs; and as "capitalizers" those that capitalized a portion of those costs. Of the 163 sample firms, 34 expensed all of their development costs in every sample year, and 102 firms capitalized a portion of their development costs every year. Fifteen firms capitalized development costs in all but one year, and were classified as "capitalizers." Twelve companies that expensed in one period and capitalized in the other were classified as "expenders" in the period they expensed and "capitalizers" in the period they capitalized.\textsuperscript{14}

Our classification of sample firms by product type and accounting policy (capitalization versus full expensing) indicates that engineering is the only product type where nearly all firms (96.7\%) capitalize development costs. However, this product type constitutes only 7.1\% of the sample observations. In the other product types (education and entertainment, business applications, and PC packaged software) between 65\% and 80\% of the firms capitalize development costs, and pairwise significance tests for the differences between the number of "capitalizers" and "expenders" across the product types failed to reveal statistically significant differences (at the 0.05 level). We therefore conclude that product type does not systematically discriminate between "capitalizers" and "expenders."

To distinguish between "capitalizers" and "expenders," we considered attributes derived from the debate which surrounded the 1985 software capitalization \textit{Exposure Draft (FASB [1985])}, where conjectures concerning why, when, and who will expense or capitalize development costs were advanced. Following are the discriminating candidates examined:

1. \textit{Firm Size}, measured as the log of market value of equity three months after fiscal year-end. Large firms tend to spend a substantial part of software development costs on basic research and on maintenance and upgrades of their products. These costs are expensed according to \textit{SFAS No. 86} (see Appendix A), and consequently, large firms are expected to expense a larger share of development costs than smaller firms.

2. \textit{Software Development Intensity}, measured by the ratio of annual software development costs to sales. To the extent that economies of scale characterize the software industry, firms that spend more on software development will experience, on average, a higher success rate in developing products, leading to a larger capitalization share. Accordingly, we expect a positive association between development intensity and capitalization rate.

3. \textit{Profitability}, measured by net income converted to full expensing (i.e., income plus software amortization, minus the annually capitalized

\textsuperscript{14}A period has a minimum of three years. Eight firms expensed in the first period and capitalized in the subsequent period and four firms capitalized in the first period and expensed in the second period.
software) divided by sales. Given analysts’ skepticism about software capitalization, it is widely believed that profitable companies avoid capitalization in order not to taint the perceived quality of their earnings in analysts’ eyes.

4. **Leverage**, measured by long-term debt divided by book value of equity (minus the software asset). Leverage is a proxy for the restrictiveness of loan covenants as motivators of capitalization; firms closer to loan restrictions may favor capitalization which increases equity and earnings.

5. **Systematic Risk**, or β. Basic research is in general riskier than product development. Basic research is also expensed according to **SFAS No. 86**, while product development is capitalized. Thus riskier firms, namely, those devoting a larger share of development efforts to basic research, can be expected to expense more than less risky companies.

Table 2 reports coefficient estimates from a regression of capitalization intensity (scaled by market value) on these five firm-specific attributes. The four variables found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level are: **size** (log of market value), **firm profitability**, **software development intensity**, and **leverage** (the latter is significant at the 0.05 level). The signs of the significant coefficients are in the expected direction, indicating that smaller, less profitable, more leveraged firms, and those with a higher ratio of development costs to sales (development intensity),

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15 We obtained similar regression estimates when the dependent variable was scaled by sales and when we employed a logit analysis (one for capitalizers and zero for full expensers) instead of the regression analysis in table 2.
tend to capitalize more of their software development costs. Accordingly, in subsequent tests we control for those variables by including in the regressions the predicted value of the discriminating regression.\textsuperscript{16}

4. Is Software Capitalization Value Relevant?

“Sophisticated investors will discount the earnings of software developers by the amount of capitalized development expense. The financial and investment community will discount the assets of software developers to limit the risk that balance sheets contain assets whose values are overstated. Only unsophisticated investors will be fooled” (Systematics, Inc., letter to the FASB, November 13, 1984, on behalf of nine major software producers). This letter claims that the relevance of software capitalization ranges from the nonexistent (to sophisticated investors) to the negative (for the unsophisticated). We examine the value relevance of software capitalization using three approaches: associating stock returns with contemporaneous financial data, associating prices with financial data, and examining the predictive ability of capitalization data with respect to subsequent earnings.

4.1 ANNUAL CAPITALIZATION DATA AND STOCK RETURNS

An association between unexpected capitalization-related items and contemporaneous annual stock returns indicates the extent to which the information contained in software capitalization is consistent with that used by investors (such an association test cannot, of course, indicate whether investors actually used capitalization data in assessing security values). We estimate the following cross-sectional regression:

\[
R_{it} = \sum_{Y = 87}^{95} \beta_0 Y R_{it} + \beta_1 \Delta CAP_{it} + \beta_2 \Delta EXP_{it} + \beta_3 \Delta EXPCAP_{it} + \beta_4 \Delta AMRT_{it} \\
+ \beta_5 X_{it}^a + \beta_6 \Delta X_{it}^a + \beta_7 CAPPRE_{it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

(1)

where \( R_{it} \) is the firm’s annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal \( t \) year-end through three months after it, \( \Delta CAP_{it} \) is the annual change in the capitalized amount of software development costs, \( \Delta EXP_{it} \) is the annual change of software development expenses of “expensers,” and \( \Delta EXPCAP_{it} \) is the annual change of the software development expense of “capitalizers.” (For “capitalizers,” the annual amount capitalized \((CAP_{it})\) plus the amount expensed \((EXPCAP_{it})\) equals the annual software development costs.) \( \Delta AMRT_{it} \) is the annual change in the amortization of the software asset for “capitalizers.” \( X_{it}^a \) is the adjusted (presplosure software development items) annual net income of firm \( i \) in year \( t \)

\textsuperscript{16} The following variables were also included in various versions of the regression analysis of table 2 and were found to be insignificant: Altman’s [1968] measure of financial distress, past volatility of returns, and level of earnings.
(i.e., reported income plus the software development expense and the amortization of the software asset). $\Delta X_{it}$ is the annual change in adjusted net income. $YR_{bt}$ is a time indicator variable that equals one if an observation is from fiscal year $Y$ (as defined by Compustat), and zero otherwise. All right-hand variables (except $YR_{bt}$ and $CAPPRE_{it}$) in expression (1) are scaled by beginning-of-fiscal-year market value. The annual change form of the software variables in (1) proxies for the unexpected values of these variables.

The variable $CAPPRE_{it}$ in expression (1) is the predicted value for each firm-year obtained from the regression of software capitalization intensity on the five company attributes described in the preceding section (and defined in table 2). We include this predicted value in regression (1) to control for company attributes systematically associated with the capitalization decision.

We applied the incremental information test suggested in Biddle, Seow, and Siegel [1995] to expression (1). We therefore test the incremental informativeness (with respect to stock returns) of the level and changes of the independent variables. The test indicated that for capitalized software ($CAP$), expensed development costs of “expensers” ($EXP$), and expensed costs of “capitalizers” ($EXPCAP$), the annual changes of the variables are incrementally informative at better than the 0.10 level, whereas the levels of those variables are not informative. With respect to the annual amortization ($AMRT$), the test indicated that both level and changes are relevant. However, the level and the change of $AMRT$ are highly correlated, so that we found it advisable to report regression results based on the change in $AMRT$.\footnote{Our results are qualitatively the same when we include the level of $AMRT$ instead of the change.} With respect to earnings, the Biddle test indicated that both the level and changes were incrementally informative, consistent with the findings of Easton and Harris [1991] and Ohlson and Shroff [1992]. Accordingly, expression (1) includes the level and annual change of adjusted earnings.

If the change in annual capitalized development costs ($\Delta CAP$) represents value-relevant information to investors, then $\beta_1$ in (1) should be positive. Since $EXP$ and $EXPCAP$ (the total development costs of “expensers” and the portion of annual development costs expensed by “capitalizers,” respectively) likely include development expenditures incurred before technological feasibility has been achieved, we predict both $\beta_2$ and $\beta_3$ to be positive but smaller than $\beta_1$. Our reasoning is that while firms will generally undertake positive expected value projects, achieving technological feasibility (indicated by capitalization) confirms to investors that the project has a positive expected value. We predict $\beta_4$ to be negative as it captures the unexpected decline in value of the software asset. Based on previous findings, $\beta_5$ and $\beta_6$ are predicted to be positive.
4.2 THE SOFTWARE ASSET AND SHARE PRICES

Expression (1) examines the value relevance of the annual capitalized development costs. To examine the value relevance (in the association sense) of the cumulative software asset presented on the balance sheet, we used the following regression:

$$P_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 YR_{it} + \beta_1 EPS_{it} + \beta_2 BVPS_{it}^a + \beta_3 CAPSOFT_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $P_{it}$ is firm $i$'s stock price three months after fiscal year-end, $EPS_{it}$ is reported annual earnings per share, $BVPS_{it}^a$ is the book value of equity per share minus the capitalized software asset per share at year-end, and $CAPSOFT_{it}$ is the net balance of the software asset per share ($YR_{it}$ are year dummies defined above). If investors value the cumulative amount of capitalized software, we expect $\beta_3 > 0$.

Although equation (2) is frequently used in empirical research (e.g., Collins, Maydew, and Weiss [1997]), it suffers from several shortcomings. While the variables are all per share, and firm size ($BVPS$) is among the independent variables, it is not clear whether scale (size) is fully controlled for. Moreover, omitted variables are likely to affect the price regression (2) more than the returns regression (1), since in the latter the omitted variables which are constant over time are eliminated by the differencing operation.

4.3 CAPITALIZED SOFTWARE AND SUBSEQUENT EARNINGS

Our third set of value relevance tests examines the association between capitalization-related variables and future earnings. Because the prediction of future earnings is of considerable importance to investors, we interpret a positive association between capitalized software and subsequent earnings as evidence of value relevance. A positive association is a priori expected, since software capitalization indicates the development program has achieved technological feasibility and the capitalized projects have, in management’s opinion, positive net present value. (However, if managers systematically abuse their discretion in determining technological feasibility and expected profitability of the developed projects, there should be no relation between capitalization of development costs and subsequent performance.) We also test whether the development costs of firms which, as a matter of policy, fully expense them (e.g., Microsoft, Novell) are nevertheless associated with future company performance.

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18 However, expression (2) is the one recommended by Barth and Kallapur [1996, p. 556] to deal with scale issues: “the most effective remedy [control for scale] is to include a scale proxy as an independent variable and report inferences based on White standard errors.”
The following cross-sectional model is used in the intertemporal test:

$$
\Delta X_{it}^g = \sum_{r = 87}^{95} \beta_0 YR_{it} + \beta_1 \Delta X_{i,t-1}^g + \beta_2 \Delta \text{CAP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{EXP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{EXP}_{i,t-1} \text{CAP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \text{CAPPRE}_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{it}
$$

(3)

where $\Delta X_{it}^g$ is year $t$ annual change in reported income, either operating or net income, before software development expenses (the software development and amortization expenses were added back to income when appropriate). For firms that did not deduct software development expense from operating income, we of course did not make the adjustment. We estimate expression (3) with one-year-ahead ($\Delta X_{i,t}^g$) and two-year-ahead ($\Delta X_{i,t+1}^g$) earnings changes. (There are thus, in total, four regressions involving one- and second-year-ahead operating and net income.) In (3) $\Delta X_{i,t-1}^g$ is the lagged (year $t - 1$) annual change in reported income (either operating or net income), where software development and amortization expenses were added back; $\Delta \text{CAP}_{i,t-1}$ is the annual change in capitalized software development costs in year $t - 1$ relative to $t - 2$; $\Delta \text{EXP}_{i,t-1}$ is the annual change in software development expense of full expensing firms in year $t - 1$, and zero for “capitalizers”; $\Delta \text{EXP}_{i,t-1}$ is the annual change in the development expense of capitalizing firms in year $t - 1$, and zero for “expensers”; $\text{CAPPRE}_{i,t-1}$ is the predicted value obtained from the regression of software capitalization on the five company attributes described in section 3. We include $\text{CAPPRE}_{i,t-1}$ to control for company attributes associated with the capitalization decision. All right-hand variables in equation (3) (except $\text{CAPPRE}_{i,t-1}$ and the year indicators $YR_{it}$) are deflated by beginning-of-fiscal-year $t - 1$ market value.

We expect $\beta_2 > 0$ since projects reaching technological feasibility should increase near-term earnings. We predict $\beta_4$ to be smaller than $\beta_2$ because investment in projects that have not reached technological feasibility should take, on average, more than a year or two to be reflected in earnings. Moreover, the development cost expensed by capitalizing firms ($\Delta \text{EXP}_{i,t-1}$) may also reflect the cost of failed projects which, naturally, will not contribute to future earnings. We have no prediction for $\beta_3$, since fully expensing firms provide no information to distinguish between projects before and after technological feasibility, or for the other control variables ($YR_{it}$, $\Delta X_{i,t-1}^g$, and $\text{CAPPRE}_{i,t-1}$).

5. Empirical Findings

5.1 Contemporaneous Analyses

Table 3 presents estimates of regression (1) for the pooled sample and individual years (1987–95). In panel A, the coefficients of the changes in the annual capitalization of development costs and amortization of the software asset ($\Delta \text{CAP}$ and $\Delta \text{AMRT}$) have the expected signs and are
### Table 3

**The Value Relevance of Software Capitalization**

*Regression Estimates of Annual Stock Returns on Reported Financial Data and Capitalization-Related Items (t-values in parentheses)*

#### Panel A: Pooled Sample (1987–95)

Model: \( R_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 Y R_{it} + \beta_1 \Delta \text{CAP}_{it} + \beta_2 \Delta \text{EXP}_{it} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{EXPCAP}_{it} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{AMRT}_{it} + \beta_5 X_{it}^a + \beta_6 \Delta X^a_{it} + \beta_7 \text{CAPPRE}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{CAP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{EXP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{EXPCAP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{AMRT}_{it} )</th>
<th>( X^a_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta X^a_{it} )</th>
<th>( \text{CAPPRE}_{it} )</th>
<th>Adjusted ( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Return</td>
<td>1.488</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-2.207</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>-0.912</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.637)</td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(-0.118)</td>
<td>(-2.908)</td>
<td>(9.583)</td>
<td>(2.905)</td>
<td>(-2.220)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B: Nine Separate Year Regressions (1987–95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Coefficient</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{CAP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{EXP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{EXPCAP}_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta \text{AMRT}_{it} )</th>
<th>( X^a_{it} )</th>
<th>( \Delta X^a_{it} )</th>
<th>( \text{CAPPRE}_{it} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>-1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coefficients &gt; 0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of t-Statistics &gt; 1.65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z1</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-3.10</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>-3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z2</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-4.45</td>
<td>9.71</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>-4.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression results are based on 711 firm-years (4 firm-years identified as outliers were removed). Panel A regression includes year intercept (not reported). Reported t-statistics are based on White [1980] standard errors.

\( R_{it} \) is the firm’s annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal year-end through three months after it, \( \Delta \text{CAP}_{it} \) is the annual change in software capitalization, \( \Delta \text{EXP}_{it} \) is the annual change in software development expense for firms classified as “expensers,” \( \Delta \text{EXPCAP}_{it} \) is the annual change in software development expense for firms classified as “capitalizers,” \( \Delta \text{AMRT}_{it} \) is the annual change in amortization of the software asset, \( X^a_{it} \) is the adjusted net income of firm \( i \) in year \( t \) (i.e., reported annual net income plus the software development expense and amortization of the software asset), \( \Delta X^a_{it} \) is the annual change in income, and \( \text{CAPPRE}_{it} \) is a predicted value obtained from regressing capitalization intensity on five company attributes (see table 2). All right-hand variables (except the year intercept dummies and \( \text{CAPPRE}_{it} \)) are scaled by beginning-of-fiscal-year market value.

\[ Z_1 = \left( \frac{1}{T} \right) \sum_{j=1}^{T} \left( t_j / \sqrt{k_j} / (k_j - 2) \right), \] where \( t_j \) is the \( t \)-statistic for year \( j \), \( k_j \) is degrees of freedom, and \( T \) is number of years.

\[ Z_2 = \text{mean } t-\text{statistic} / (\text{standard deviation of } t-\text{statistics} / \sqrt{T - 1}). \]
highly statistically significant. In addition, as reported in panel B, the unexpected software capitalization coefficient (ΔCAP) is positive in all of the nine annual regressions, with t-statistics > 1.65 in six of nine years. The across-years significance level of ΔCAP is 0.01, as indicated by both Z-statistics.\(^{19}\) The yearly regressions also indicate that the estimated coefficient of unexpected amortization (ΔAMRT) is negative in all years, as expected, with t-statistics > |1.65| in four of nine years (the across-years significance level is 0.01 for Z1 and for Z2).\(^{20}\)

In contrast to the large and highly significant coefficient of the software capitalization variable (ΔCAP), the estimated coefficient of fully expensed development costs (ΔEXP) is only 0.667 (t-statistic = 1.394). In the individual year regressions (bottom panel of table 3), the coefficient of ΔEXP was positive in seven of the nine regressions and statistically significant (t > 1.65) in three regressions. The low significance level of the unexpected development costs incurred by “expensers” may be partially due to the small number of observations (152) in this subsample, or it may reflect investors’ reaction to the absence of information in the financial reports of full expensers on the progress of their development efforts.

The coefficient of the portion of development costs expensed by “capitalizers” (ΔEXPCAP) is statistically insignificant in the pooled regression (t = -0.118) as well as in each individual year, perhaps because investors cannot distinguish between the portion of development costs representing research efforts preceding technological feasibility and the portion representing failed development efforts.

Our yearly regressions allow us to examine directly one of the claims in the Software Publishers Association petition to the FASB—that over time capitalized software development costs lost their relevance to investors. Inspection of the yearly coefficients of the annually capitalized development cost (ΔCAP), not reported in table 3, indicates the contrary: the coefficients of ΔCAP were insignificant in the early sample years, 1987–89, and statistically significant (at the 10% level) in each of the years, 1990 to 1995. This suggests that over time the credibility of the amounts of capitalized software development costs increased in capital markets rather than decreased.

\(^{19}\)The Z1-statistic, which assumes residual independence, is \((1/\sqrt{T} \cdot \Sigma_{j=1}^{T} (t_j/\sqrt{k_j/(k_j-2)})\) where \(t_j\) is the t-statistic for year \(j\), \(k_j\) is degrees of freedom, and \(T\) is number of years. The Z2-statistic, which accounts for cross-sectional and temporal residual dependence, is mean t-statistic / (standard deviation of t-statistics / \(\sqrt{T-1}\)) (see White [1984]).

\(^{20}\)All the reported t-statistics are based on White’s [1980] standard errors. Diagnostic statistics shows that no multicollinearity is prevalent in our data. The Durbin-Watson test indicates that at the 1% significance level the hypothesis of autocorrelation of the residuals can be rejected.
TABLE 4
The Value Relevance of Software Asset
Regression Estimates of Stock Price on Reported Financial Data and
Capitalization-Related Items (t-values in parentheses)

Panel A: Pooled Sample (1987–95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>EPS</th>
<th>BVPS*</th>
<th>CAPSOFT</th>
<th>Adjusted $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock Price</td>
<td>3.509</td>
<td>2.189</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Nine Separate Year Regressions (1987–95)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Coefficient</th>
<th>EPS</th>
<th>BVPS*</th>
<th>CAPSOFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.489</td>
<td>2.031</td>
<td>1.418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Coefficients &gt; 0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of t-Statistics &gt; 1.65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_1$</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_2$</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression results are based on 862 firm-years (3 firm-years identified as outliers were removed). The regression in panel A includes year intercept dummies (not reported). Reported t-statistics are based on White [1980] standard errors.

$P_d$ is the stock price three months after fiscal year-end, $BVPS_d$ is the fiscal year-end-adjusted book value per share, namely, the book value of equity minus the net balance of the capitalized software asset, $CAPSOFT_d$ is the fiscal year-end balance per share of the software asset, net of the accumulated amortization.

$Z_1 = (1/\sqrt{T}) \sum_{t=1}^{T} (t_j / \sqrt{k_j - 2})$, where $t_j$ is the t-statistic for year $j$, $k_j$ is degrees of freedom, and $T$ is number of years.

$Z_2 = \text{mean t-statistic} / \left( \text{standard deviation of t-statistics} / \sqrt{T-1} \right)$.

We conducted two additional stock return tests. First, we substituted size-adjusted returns for raw returns as the dependent variable in (1) and found the significance levels of the estimates to be somewhat higher than those reported in table 3.21 Second, we added to the sample the 33 firms eliminated because they were acquired or went bankrupt less than three years after going public (see section 2). Estimating regression (1) with those firms yielded very similar results to those reported in table 3.

Moving from returns to stock prices, we report in table 4 estimates from regression (2), which indicate that the coefficient of the balance sheet value of the capitalized software asset ($CAPSOFT$) is statistically significant and, as predicted, positive. The coefficient, however, is small relative to that of book value (0.57 vs. 2.189). However, when we estimate regression (2) on the 25% of the sample cases with the highest capitalization intensity, the coefficient of $CAPSOFT$ is 1.325 ($t$-value = 8.39), substantially higher than that of the total sample (0.571) (results not tabulated). This coefficient (1.325) is still significantly lower ($p$-value of 0.054) than the estimated coefficient of equity—1.771—in the regres-

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21 Size-adjusted returns were taken from the CRSP decile file and are provided separately for NYSE and NASDAQ firms.
sion of the top 25% capitalizers, indicating that investors discount, on average, the capitalized software asset relative to tangible assets.

Panel B of table 4 presents estimates of equation (2) from individual year regressions, 1987 to 1995. The across-years significance level of the software asset (CAPSOFTWARE) is 0.01, as indicated by both Z-statistics. Furthermore, in all nine years the coefficient of CAPSOFTWARE is positive and in seven years this coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. The CAPSOFTWARE coefficient is insignificant in 1987 and 1988, perhaps because in those early years of application of SFAS No. 86 investors were still skeptical about the credibility of software capitalization.

To summarize, the analyses reported above indicate that both the annual software capitalization amount and the cumulative software asset are positively and significantly associated with stock returns and prices, respectively. While the software asset reported on the balance sheet appears to be discounted by investors relative to tangible assets, we find no support for the Software Publishers Association’s claim that software capitalization data are irrelevant to investors’ decisions. In assessing our findings, it should be noted that while over 70% of sample firms capitalize a portion of their software development costs, the capitalized portion is, on average, rather small, a fact which works against finding significant associations between capitalization-related items and capital market observables.

5.2 INTERTEMPORAL ANALYSIS

We augment the contemporaneous capital markets analysis presented above with an intertemporal test of the association between capitalization data and subsequent earnings—regression (3). Earnings changes (alternatively, operating and net income) in years t and t + 1 are regressed on lagged changes in capitalized software, the development costs

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22 Eccher [1995] reached a different conclusion: software capitalization is not value relevant, while amortization of the software asset is relevant. The different conclusion appears to be due mainly to sample size and period (although the methodology of the two studies is also substantially different). While Eccher’s sample period is 1988–92 (303 firm-years), ours is 1987–95 (862 firm-years). Furthermore, Eccher reports that 9% of her sample firms fully expensed development costs, while 20% of our sample are full expensers.

We estimated Eccher’s basic regression on our data: market-to-book ratio regressed on revenue growth, R&D expensed, R&D capitalized, expected cash flows, and percentage write-offs. While Eccher finds the coefficients of R&D expensed and R&D capitalized very close (leading to her conclusion that R&D capitalization is not value relevant), we find the two coefficients in our sample significantly different. The estimated coefficient of the R&D expense is 0.450 (p-value = 0.075), while the coefficient of the capitalized R&D is 3.940 (p-value = 0.001). The difference between these coefficients is significant at the 0.01 level. In this footnote, we use the term R&D to conform with Eccher’s study, while in our paper we use the term “software development cost.”

23 This test examines directly the Software Publishers Association’s claim: “We do not believe that software development costs are a useful predictive factor of future product sales” (SPA Letter, March 14, 1996, p. 4).
expensed by “expensers,” and the development cost (uncapitalized portion) expensed by “capitalizers.” Lagged changes in earnings and the predicted value (\textit{CAPPRE}) from regressing capitalization intensity on five company attributes (section 3) are included as control variables. We expect that the lagged change in capitalized software (\textit{\Delta CAP}) will be positively associated with subsequent earnings, and the coefficient of lagged capitalized software (\textit{\Delta CAP}) will be larger than that of the lagged expensed development costs of full expensers (\textit{\Delta EXP}) and that of “capitalizers” (\textit{\Delta EXP\textsc{CAP}}), since the former reflects products which passed a feasibility test, while the latter two include both early research costs and costs of failed projects.

Regression (5) estimates, presented in table 5, confirm our expectations. The coefficients of the lagged \((t - 1)\) change in annual capitalization (\textit{\Delta CAP}) are positive and highly significant in each of the four regressions (operating and net income and one-year- and second-year-ahead earnings), indicating that the capitalization change variable is associated with subsequent earnings changes. Furthermore, in each of the four regressions the coefficient of capitalized software (\textit{\Delta CAP}) is larger than the coefficient of the development costs expensed by “expensers” (\textit{\Delta EXP}), which in turn is larger than the coefficient of the development costs expensed by “capitalizers” (\textit{\Delta EXP\textsc{CAP}}).\(^{24}\) This order of coefficient sizes is consistent with the reasoning of \textit{SFAS No. 86} that capitalized software reflects the costs of projects close to fruition and should therefore be strongly associated with near-term earnings, whereas the development costs of “expensers” reflect the costs of both feasible and prefeasibility projects, which should not be as strongly associated with near-term earnings. The development costs expensed by “capitalizers” reflect both prefeasibility costs and costs of failed projects, consistent with little or no association with subsequent earnings. Note also that the coefficients of the development costs of “expensers” (\textit{\Delta EXP}) are statistically significant in the four regressions, while those of “capitalizers” (\textit{\Delta EXP\textsc{CAP}}) are insignificant (except for the bottom regression). This probably reflects the fact that the development expense of full expensers often includes cost of projects which passed a feasibility test, despite the fact that those firms chose to fully expense them, while the development expense of “capitalizers” reflects only prefeasibility or failed projects.

5.3 Quality of Earnings

It is sometimes argued that capitalization of intangibles adversely affects the quality of reported earnings because it is based on subjective

\(^{24}\)In the top regression (one-year-ahead operating income), the difference between the coefficients of \textit{\Delta CAP} and \textit{\Delta EXP} is insignificant, but both coefficients are significantly larger than the coefficient of \textit{\Delta EXP\textsc{CAP}}. In the other three regressions, the coefficients of \textit{\Delta CAP} are significantly larger (at the 0.01 level) than the coefficients of \textit{\Delta EXP} and those of \textit{\Delta EXP\textsc{CAP}}.
TABLE 5
Software Capitalization and Subsequent Earnings

Regression of Earnings (Operating and Net Income) in Years t and t + 1 on Capitalization Related Variables in t − 1 (t-values in parentheses)

Models: $\Delta OL_{it} = \sum_{y=87}^{94} \beta_{0}YR_{it} + \beta_{1}\Delta OL_{it-1} + \beta_{2}\Delta CAP_{it-1} + \beta_{3}\Delta EXP_{it-1} + \beta_{4}\Delta EXP\text{CAP}_{it-1} + \beta_{5}\text{CAPPRE}_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$

$\Delta NI_{it} = \sum_{y=87}^{94} \beta_{0}YR_{it} + \beta_{1}\Delta NI_{it-1} + \beta_{2}\Delta CAP_{it-1} + \beta_{3}\Delta EXP_{it-1} + \beta_{4}\Delta EXP\text{CAP}_{it-1} + \beta_{5}\text{CAPPRE}_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>$\Delta NI_{it-1}(\Delta OL_{it-1})$</th>
<th>$\Delta CAP_{it-1}$</th>
<th>$\Delta EXP_{it-1}$</th>
<th>$\Delta EXP\text{CAP}_{it-1}$</th>
<th>$\text{CAPPRE}_{it-1}$</th>
<th>Adjusted $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-Year-Ahead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta OL_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.075 (2.75)</td>
<td>0.309 (3.696)</td>
<td>0.256 (3.627)</td>
<td>0.095 (0.643)</td>
<td>0.082 (1.030)</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta NI_{it}$</td>
<td>0.140 (5.125)</td>
<td>0.291 (9.972)</td>
<td>0.128 (1.699)</td>
<td>-0.028 (-0.223)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.101)</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Year-Ahead</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta OL_{it+1}$</td>
<td>0.040 (2.886)</td>
<td>1.432 (11.185)</td>
<td>0.189 (1.428)</td>
<td>0.052 (1.168)</td>
<td>-0.400 (-3.922)</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta NI_{it+1}$</td>
<td>0.098 (9.481)</td>
<td>1.013 (5.461)</td>
<td>0.366 (1.998)</td>
<td>0.260 (5.961)</td>
<td>0.103 (0.961)</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-year-ahead regression results are based on 511 firm-years (1987–94). Second-year-ahead t + 1 regression results are based on 402 firm-years (1987–95). The regressions include year intercept dummies (not reported). Reported $t$-statistics are based on White (1980) standard errors. The dependent variables are: $\Delta OL_{it}$ is the change in operating income in year $t$ where development and amortization expenses are added back, and $\Delta NI_{it}$ is the change in net income in year $t$ where development and amortization expenses are added back; $\Delta OL_{it+1}$ is the change in operating income in year $t + 1$ where development and amortization expenses are added back, and $\Delta NI_{it+1}$ is the change in net income in year $t + 1$ where development and amortization expenses are added back. The independent variables are: $\Delta OL_{it-1}$ and $\Delta NI_{it-1}$ are the lagged (year $t - 1$) annual change in $OL$ and $NI$, respectively, $\Delta CAP_{it-1}$ is the annual change in the amount of capitalized software development costs in year $t - 1$, $\Delta EXP\text{CAP}_{it-1}$ is the annual change in the development expense for full expensing firms in year $t - 1$, and zero for “capitalizers,” $\Delta EXP\text{CAP}_{it+1}$ is the annual change in the development expense for capitalizing firms in year $t - 1$, and zero for “expensers.” $\text{CAPPRE}_{it-1}$ is the predicted value from a first-stage regression defined in table 2. All left-hand and right-hand variables (except $\text{CAPPRE}_{it}$ and $YR_{it}$) are deflated by beginning-of-respective-fiscal-year market value.
assumptions and is open to manipulation. If indeed investors perceive earnings under full expensing of software development costs to be of higher quality than earnings under capitalization, that is, if investors adjust the latter for the software capitalization, then the association between adjusted earnings (where the capitalization is reversed) and stock returns should be stronger than that between reported earnings (reflecting capitalization) and stock returns.

We examined this question by regressing annual raw returns on the level and change of reported earnings, and alternatively on the level and change of adjusted earnings (the adjustment involves subtracting the capitalization of development costs from earnings and adding back to earnings the amortization of the software asset). Both the level and change of earnings are deflated by the beginning-of-period market value of the firm.

We find that the estimated coefficients of the level and changes of reported earnings (0.441 and 0.528) are higher than the coefficients of adjusted earnings (0.265 and 0.373), and the $R^2$ of the former regression (0.062) is reliably larger (at the 0.08 level) than that of the latter regression (0.036). We thus find no evidence that software capitalization reduces earnings quality.

6. Delayed Reaction to Expensing?

Evidence derived from the stock return analysis (table 3) indicates that investors distinguish between capitalized and expensed software development costs; while unexpected values of the former are positively associated with stock returns, unexpected values of the latter are not. The insignificant coefficient ($\Delta$EXP in table 3) of the development costs of firms which, as a matter of policy, fully expense those costs is intriguing, since those firms obviously develop projects which pass feasibility tests. After all, many of the full expensers are successful software developers, and their profitability is, on average, higher than that of firms which capitalize development costs (see table 2). A possible explanation for the insignificant coefficient of the development costs of full expensers is that, absent disclosures about the progress of projects under development, investors cannot distinguish among costs of projects that passed the feasibility stage, prefeasibility costs, and costs of failed projects. Given this uncertainty, investors may discount the development costs of full expensers.

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25 For example: “And, the last point, which I think is a critical point from my view is that [software capitalization] overall would reduce the quality of earnings. It would make it more difficult for me to assess which companies are doing well or not” (James Mendelson, software analyst at Morgan Stanley, testifying at the FASB public hearings, May 2–3, 1985; p. 1142 of the Public Record).

26 Recall that SFAS No. 86 is intended to enable investors to make such a distinction.
We examine this conjecture by testing for an association between current development costs and future stock returns. Specifically, if the development costs of full expensers are discounted because of investor uncertainty about the progress of the underlying projects, the resolution of this uncertainty as projects reach fruition should induce positive returns. In contrast, the development costs of "capitalizers," which provide information on the success of their production efforts by the act of capitalization, should not be associated with subsequent returns. This test is formalized in (4).

$$R_{i,t+n} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 Y R_{it} + \beta_1 CAP_{it} + \beta_2 EXP_{it} + \beta_3 EXP \text{CAP}_{it} + \beta_4 MV_{it} + \beta_5 BETA_{it} + \beta_6 LAGRET_{it} + \beta_7 M/B_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$  

(4)

where $R_{i,t+n}$ ($n = 1,2,3$) is the firm's annual stock return in the first, second, and third year after fiscal $t$ (the return cumulation starts in the fourth month after end of fiscal $t$). $CAP_{it}$ is the annual software capitalization, $EXP_{it}$ is the annual software development expense of "expensers," and $EXP \text{CAP}_{it}$ is the annual software development expense of "capitalizers." $MV_{it}$ is the log of market value of firm $i$ three months after end of fiscal year $t$, $BETA_{it}$ is the firm's CAPM beta calculated over 100 days before fiscal year-end, $LAGRET_{it}$ is the firm's annual stock return cumulated from nine months before fiscal $t$ year-end through three months after it, and $M/B_{it}$ is the firm's market value three months after end of fiscal year $t$ divided by its book value. The right-hand variables $CAP_{it}$, $EXP_{it}$, and $EXP \text{CAP}_{it}$ are scaled by fiscal year $t$ market value. Size ($MV_{it}$), risk ($BETA_{it}$), and market-to-book ($M/B_{it}$) are risk and performance control variables (e.g., Fama and French [1992]). The recent return ($LAGRET_{it}$) accounts for price momentum (Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam [1998]). Controlling for those risk and performance dimensions allows us to focus on the incremental association between software development costs and subsequent returns.

Estimates of (4) are reported in table 6 for each of the three years following year $t$. Consistent with our conjecture, the development costs of full expensers ($EXP$), which were not associated with contemporaneous returns (table 3), are positively and significantly associated with future returns. The size of the coefficient decreases over time as information about products under development is revealed to the market.27 The information revelation is relatively quick (2–3 years), commensurate with the typically short production period of software products. The association between full expensers' development costs and subsequent returns

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27 We also estimated regression (4) for individual years 1985–94 (not reported in table 6). The across-year significance tests indicate the coefficient of $EXP$ is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in all three subsequent years (in table 6, pooled results, the coefficient is insignificant in the third year).
### Table 6

Software Capitalization and Subsequent Stock Returns

Regression Estimates of Annual Future Stock Returns on Software Development Costs and Control Variables (t-values in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>CAP_{it}</th>
<th>EXP_{it}</th>
<th>EXP_CAP_{it}</th>
<th>MV_{it}</th>
<th>BETA_{it}</th>
<th>LAGRET_{it}</th>
<th>MI_B_{it}</th>
<th>Adjusted R^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Return ((t + 1))</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>1.779</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(4.825)</td>
<td>(2.126)</td>
<td>(4.076)</td>
<td>(0.924)</td>
<td>(-0.837)</td>
<td>(-2.417)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Return ((t + 2))</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>1.166</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(2.942)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(3.868)</td>
<td>(-1.126)</td>
<td>(-1.097)</td>
<td>(-2.318)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Return ((t + 3))</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>-0.325</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.391)</td>
<td>(0.957)</td>
<td>(-1.384)</td>
<td>(3.571)</td>
<td>(-1.861)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(-3.335)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regression results for one-year-, second-year-, and third-year-ahead raw returns are based on 559, 426, and 318 firm-years respectively (6 firm-years identified as outliers were removed). The regressions include year intercept dummies (not reported). Reported t-statistics are based on White [1980] standard errors.

\(R_{it}\) is the firm’s future annual stock return in years \(t + 1\), \(t + 2\), and \(t + 3\). \(CAP_{it}\) is the annual software capitalization, \(EXP_{it}\) is the annual software development expense for firms classified as "expensers," \(EXP\_CAP_{it}\) is the annual software development expense for firms classified as "capitalizers," and \(MV_{it}\) is the log of market value of firm \(i\) three months after end of fiscal year \(t\). \(BETA_{it}\) is the firm’s CAPM beta, calculated over 100 days before fiscal year-end. \(LAGRET_{it}\) is the firm’s annual stock return, cumulated from nine months before fiscal year-end through three months after \(it\). \(MI\_B_{it}\) is the firm’s market value three months after end of fiscal year \(t\) divided by the firm’s book value. The right-hand variables \(CAP_{it}\), \(EXP_{it}\), and \(EXP\_CAP_{it}\) are scaled by fiscal year \(t\) market value.
is both statistically significant and economically meaningful; on average, first-year- and second-year-ahead annual returns of 3.17% and 2.12%, respectively, are associated with the fully expensed development costs.

Also, as conjectured, the development costs of “capitalizers” (CAP and EXPCAP) are not generally associated with subsequent returns. The exception is EXPCAP in the first-year-ahead regression, but note its small coefficient, 0.389, relative to that of full expensers, 1.779. This suggests that capitalization information affects the contemporaneous pricing of securities. Finally, it is unlikely that the different patterns of subsequent returns of capitalizing and expensing companies are due to different risk characteristics, since various risk dimensions are accounted for in expression (4) and all firms belong to the same industry.

If, as suggested by the evidence in table 6, the full expensing of development costs is associated with a delayed investor reaction (underreaction), why don’t all software companies capitalize development costs? Two answers are plausible. First, the delayed reaction might not be large enough to offset other managerial considerations, such as concern with analysts’ claims that capitalization degrades the quality of earnings and the integrity of the balance sheet. Second, managers may not be aware of the uncertainty discount we document. After all, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first comprehensive evidence consistent with delayed investor reaction to full expensing of software development costs.

7. Why the Petition to Abolish SFAS No. 86?

Our analysis indicates that data on capitalized software development costs summarize information relevant to investors. What, then, prompted the 1996 Software Publishers Association (SPA) petition to abolish SFAS No. 86? This question is particularly intriguing, given the considerable implementation flexibility afforded by this standard.

An analysis of the reporting consequences of intangibles’ capitalization vs. expensing (e.g., Beaver and Ryan [1997]) suggests that early in the life of a firm or an industry, when the growth of intangible investment generally exceeds the firm’s return on equity, capitalization enhances reported income proportionately more than equity, implying a higher reported return on equity (ROE) or return on assets (ROA) under capitalization than under full expensing. As the firm matures, its profitability generally increases, while the rate of intangible investment declines; the enhancing effect of capitalization on income diminishes, while the cumulative effect of capitalization on equity or total assets increases, resulting in a higher ROE and ROA under expensing than under capitalization. The inflection point lies close to the point where the growth rate of intangible investment equals the firm’s ROE under expensing. From that point on, ROE (ROA) based on immediate expensing of intangible investments will be larger than ROE (ROA) based on capitalization. Similar reasoning applies to the level of reported earnings:
early on, capitalization enhances reported earnings, whereas during the mature phase of operations, the increasing amortization charges of the capitalized asset largely offset the income-enhancing effect of capitalization, rendering software capitalization less attractive than full expensing in terms of maximizing reported earnings: thus, the difference between earnings under capitalization and expensing changes over the life cycle of the firm.

Many software companies have experienced a decreasing growth rate of software development costs and the consequent diminishing appeal of capitalization. Sample firms with eight years of data had in 1989 an average annual growth rate of software development costs (deflated by total assets) of 16.8%, declining to 5.6% in 1995. Obviously, capitalization of development costs in the mid-1990s was less attractive to these firms in terms of reported earnings than it was a decade earlier, which would provide incentives to lobby for the abolition of SFAS No. 86.

To examine our conjecture about the diminished appeal of software capitalization in the 1990s, we computed for each sample firm and year the impact of development cost capitalization on reported earnings (i.e., annually capitalized amount divided by operating earnings before software development expense) and the impact of amortization of the software asset on reported earnings (i.e., annual amortization divided by operating earnings before software development expense). The former (capitalization) factor increases reported earnings, while the latter (amortization) factor decreases earnings. Figure 1 presents the median yearly impacts of capitalization and amortization on operating earnings of the sample firms.

It is clear from Figure 1 that until 1993, the application of SFAS No. 86 substantially enhanced reported earnings. In 1993 and 1994 the gap between the income-enhancing effect of capitalization and the detracting effect of amortization diminished substantially, and it vanished in 1995. Thus, since 1993, software capitalization has become progressively less attractive in terms of reported earnings.\textsuperscript{28} Similar inferences are drawn from an analysis of sample firms' ROE (not reported).

Our analysis, which is based on individual firms, does not explain why the industry petitioned the FASB for abolition of SFAS No. 86, rather than individual firms ceasing to capitalize development costs when capitalization no longer served their purposes. We conjecture that abolition of the standard is preferred over individual changes of accounting practice because the latter may be interpreted as an indication that the com-

\textsuperscript{28} The decreasing bars for 1993–95 in Figure 1 may convey the impression of a fast-falling rate of software capitalization and amortization. This, however, is not the case. As indicated by the bottom numbers in parentheses (to the right of the year), the decreasing capitalization and amortization impact on earnings during 1993–95 was mainly due to the increasing denominator—operating income before development costs expensing. Operating income increased at the median from $11.02 million in 1992 to $15.11 million 1995.
company's development process faltered. Specifically, abandoning capitalization may signal that projects under development failed to reach the technological feasibility required by SFAS No. 86 for capitalization (see Appendix A). In contrast, when all firms stop capitalizing because of a change in accounting standard, such negative inferences are avoided.29

8. Analysts' Motives

Analysts' skepticism toward the capitalization of software development costs is even more intriguing than managers'.30 A priori, capitalization

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29 We do not claim that our conjecture about the diminishing appeal of capitalization in the 1990s is the only motive of software companies to abolish SFAS No. 86. There may be, for example, validity to the SPA arguments that "the time permitted for a successful software development cycle has been significantly shortened . . . [and] the technical complexity of the software being developed today have significantly increased the uncertainty of successful completion of development projects" (SPA Letter, March 14, 1996). However, we have no way to empirically examine these arguments, nor did the SPA provide support for them.

30 For a summary of analysts' opposition to SFAS No. 86, see the Financial Analysts Federation's letter of May 13, 1985 to the FASB (the Public Record, pp. 776–77). Currently, such opposition is expressed in the AIMR report [1993, pp. 50–51]: "We are not enamoured of recording self-developed intangible assets unless their values are readily apparent."
allows managers to inform investors about the progress and success of the software development program. In the worst case, if concerns about manipulation are overwhelming, software capitalization can be easily undone by subtracting the periodic capitalized amount from earnings. Of course, if well-connected analysts obtain private operating information on products under development, their success rate, and expected market share, then analysts’ objection to the public disclosure of such information (partially provided via the capitalization and amortization of software development costs) is understandable.

This self-serving motive is very difficult to substantiate empirically. We therefore focus on another, perhaps equally compelling, explanation for analysts’ opposition to capitalization, which is related to the effect of software capitalization on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Software development costs typically account for 20–30% of revenues; capitalization of an unknown portion of such a large cost component increases the difficulty of predicting the development expense (total development cost minus capitalization) and consequently predicting earnings, since the amount capitalized each period is determined by the largely unpredictable success rate and profit potential of the products under development. Analysts concerned with the size of their earnings forecast errors can therefore be expected to view capitalization negatively.31

To examine this conjecture, we computed analysts’ relative earnings forecast errors for the sample firms (reported annual earnings per share minus Zacks analysts’ forecasts, divided by stock price at year-end). We expect a positive association between the absolute size of analysts’ forecast errors and the extent of software capitalization.32 We measure the extent of software capitalization by the annual amount capitalized, scaled

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31 The sample data on the relative volatility of software development expenses with and without capitalization are consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, we computed for capitalizing firms with at least six years of data in the sample the firm-specific variance of total annual development costs and the part of the cost that was expensed. By our conjecture, the former (which is analogous to the software expense of full expensing firms) should be smaller than the latter. This indeed is the case; the sample mean (median) of the variances is 0.0957 (0.0630) for total developments costs and 0.1319 (0.0804) for the expensed part of development costs (i.e., total cost minus capitalization). The difference in the means (medians) is significant at the 0.07 (0.01) level. Capitalization is thus associated with an increased variance of the portion of software development cost which is expensed.

32 As a first cut, we computed the sample mean and median of analyst forecast errors for software capitalizing and full expensing firms. The mean (median) errors for “capitalizers” are 0.010 (0.0017) and for “expensers” 0.0079 (0.0006). Thus, consistent with our conjecture, the forecast errors for “capitalizers” are larger than those of full expensers (the difference in the means is not significant at conventional levels, while that of the medians is significant at the 0.01 level). The above unconditional differences in the quality of forecasts may, of course, be due to factors unrelated to capitalization (e.g., firm size), hence we perform the regression analysis reported in table 7.
by beginning-of-year market value (CAP in expression (5)).\footnote{Other capitalization intensity measures—annual capitalization to total development costs and the ratio of the capitalized asset to equity—yield results similar to those reported in table 7.} We also control for factors related to forecast accuracy: the age (horizon) of the forecast, the number of analysts following the firm, and firm size.\footnote{See Mikhail, Walther, and Willis [1997] for the use of these control variables and references to original studies.} Expression (5) presents our regression model:

\[ FE_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_{0Y} YR_{it} + \beta_1 CAP_{it} + \beta_2 NUMANA_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 MV_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \]  

where \( FE_{it} \) is, alternatively, absolute value of individual analysts' relative forecast errors, firm-specific average forecast error, or the firm's standard deviation of the forecast error. The forecast error is measured as the absolute value of reported annual EPS minus the forecast, scaled by end-of-year stock price. \( YR_{it} \) are year dummies, \( CAP_{it} \) is the annual amount of software development cost which was capitalized by the firm, scaled by beginning-of-year market value, \( NUMANA_{it} \) is the number of analysts following the firm, \( AGE_{it} \) is the interval (in days) between the forecast date and the earnings announcement date, and \( MV_{it} \) is the log of the firm's market value of equity at year-end.

Table 7 presents estimates from the three regression versions of (5). In a regression of absolute value of individual forecast errors on capitalization intensity and market value, \( CAP \) is positively associated with the absolute size of forecast errors, and size (\( MV \)) is negatively related to the forecast error. The second regression in table 7 reports firm-specific absolute mean forecast errors regressed on capitalization intensity and all three control variables. Capitalized development costs (\( CAP \)) are positively associated with analysts' mean forecast error. Forecast age and firm size are significantly associated with the mean forecast error in the expected direction. Finally, in the third regression, capitalization intensity is also significantly and positively associated with the firm-specific standard deviation of analysts' forecasts.

Our findings are thus consistent with the conjecture that analysts' objection to software capitalization may be related to the adverse effect of capitalization on the quality of their earnings forecasts. This conclusion seems to run counter to our previous conclusion (section 5.2) that capitalization improves the prediction of earnings. In fact, these findings are not inconsistent because the findings in section 5.2 (and table 5) are for earnings before the software expense. The analyst forecast results relate to reported earnings after the expensing of software development costs and indicate that capitalization introduces noise to these earnings.
TABLE 7

Capitalization Intensity and the Quality of Analysts’ Forecasts

Regressions of Analysts’ Forecast Errors of Earnings on Capitalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable and Controls (t-values in parentheses)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[ AFE_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 YR_{it} + \beta_1 CAP_{it} + \beta_2 MV_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ MAFE_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 YR_{it} + \beta_1 CAP_{it} + \beta_2 NUMANA_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 MV_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ STDEFE_{it} = \sum_{Y=87}^{95} \beta_0 YR_{it} + \beta_1 CAP_{it} + \beta_2 NUMANA_{it} + \beta_3 AGE_{it} + \beta_4 MV_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>CAP_{it}</th>
<th>NUMANA_{it}</th>
<th>AGE_{it}</th>
<th>MV_{it}</th>
<th>Adjusted ( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( AFE_{it} )</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36.51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( MAFE_{it} )</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.77)</td>
<td>(-0.34)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>(-7.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( STDEFE_{it} )</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>(-10.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first regression is based on 28,447 analysts forecast errors (157 independent firms). The second and third regressions are based on 538 firm-years (130 independent firms). The regressions are for the 1987–95 period and include year intercept dummies (not reported). Reported t-statistics are based on White (1980) standard errors.

The dependent variables are: \( AFE_{it} \) is the absolute value of analyst forecast errors defined as reported EPS minus analyst forecast, deflated by price; \( MAFE_{it} \) is the firm-specific mean absolute forecast error (to be included in the regression at least three analyst forecasts per firm are required); and \( STDEFE_{it} \) is the standard deviation of the individual analyst forecasts around the consensus (to be included in the regression at least three analyst forecasts per firm are required). The independent variables are: \( CAP_{it} \) is the annual capitalized software costs divided by market value at beginning of year; \( NUMANA_{it} \) is the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm; \( AGE_{it} \) is the age of the forecast (in days), defined as the earnings announcement date minus the forecast date; and \( MV_{it} \) is the log of the firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year \( t \).

9. Concluding Remarks

We examine both the ten-year record of \textit{SFAS No. 86}, the major exception in the United States to the immediate expensing of \( R&D \), and the validity of arguments advanced in the March 1996 petition of the Software Publishers Association (\textit{SPA}) to abolish \textit{SFAS No. 86}. Our contemporaneous (stock prices and returns) as well as intertemporal (subsequent earnings) analyses indicate that capitalization-related variables (annual amount capitalized and the value of the software asset and its amortization) are significantly associated with capital market variables and future earnings. We conclude that software capitalization summarizes information relevant to investors. In generalizing our findings to the capitalization of intangibles, such as \( R&D \), we should point out again that software capitalization reflects only the postfeasibility portion of the development cost component of \( R&D \).
Regarding the motives underlying the SPA petition, we provide evidence that during the 1990s the appeal of software capitalization in terms of enhancing reported earnings continually diminished. As for financial analysts’ skepticism about capitalization, we provide evidence that software capitalization is associated with larger errors in analysts’ forecasts of earnings, due to the random element introduced to earnings by capitalization. This adverse effect of capitalization on the quality of forecasts may help explain the objections of some analysts to software capitalization in particular, and to the capitalization of intangible investments (e.g., R&D) in general.

APPENDIX A

Summary of SFAS No. 86: Accounting for the Costs of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed

This statement covers only software developed for sale, and not (1) software developed or purchased for internal use, or (2) software developed for other entities, based on a contractual agreement.

The first stage of a software development program starts with the initiation of the software project and ends when technological feasibility is achieved. All costs incurred during this stage are expensed as research and development costs, according to SFAS No. 2 [1974].

The conditions specified by SFAS No. 86 for the establishment of technological feasibility are essentially:

1. The detail program design has been completed, and all the technical requirements are met to produce the software.

2. The enterprise has confirmed completion of the program design and that there are no technological uncertainties concerning development issues.

All development costs incurred during the second stage—from the establishment of technological feasibility to the date when the software is ready to be released to customers—should be capitalized as an asset (to be presented on the balance sheet as a long-term asset) and subsequently amortized. This capitalization lies at the core of the current study.

During the third stage—from ready-to-be-sold to the date of sale—the enterprise incurs “inventory costs,” such as duplicating software masters and developing training materials and packaging. These costs are capitalized as inventory on a unit-specific basis and are charged to cost of sales as the products are sold.

The fourth and last stage of software project development starts with the software sale. All costs subsequently incurred (e.g., for maintenance and support) are immediately expensed.

The cumulative capitalized production costs (during stage 2), namely, the software asset, are amortized on a product-by-product basis. The greater of the

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35 SFAS No. 86 appeared in August 1985. This appendix is based on Jarnagin [1993].
amounts computed by the following two methods should be used: (1) straight-line amortization over the expected useful life of the software product, or (2) the "gross revenue ratio" method, where the ratio of actual software revenues during the year to total estimated revenues in the current and future years determines the annual amortization.

Finally, at the end of each year, the unamortized software asset has to be written down (if applicable) to the net realizable value of the project, defined as the future estimated gross revenues from the sale of the software product minus costs to complete and dispose of it.

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