George Georgiadis

 

Faculty Candidate George Georgiadis [Kellogg School of Management] 
Title Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision: Real versus Formal Authority
Date & Time Friday, April 15, 2016 at 1:30pm
Place UCLA Anderson School of Management 
Room D310

 

Abstract
Two heterogeneous agents exert effort over time to complete a project and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. To study the scope under collective choice, we derive the agents' preferences over scopes. The efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient agent's preferred scope shrinks, whereas the inefficient agent's preferred scope expands. In equilibrium without commitment, the efficient agent obtains his ideal project scope with either agent as dictator and under unanimity. In this sense, the efficient agent always has real authority.

George Georgiadis