The Boom, the Bust, and the Future of Homeownership

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Abstract

This paper investigates the boom and bust in U.S. homeownership rates over the 2000-2010 period. Using individual-level census data, we first estimate 204 homeownership regressions stratified by household age (21, 22,…, 89) and survey year (2000, 2005, and 2009). Shift-share methods confirm that changes in the model coefficients that reflect household attitudes, lending standards, and other market conditions – but not population socioeconomics – were the primary driver of the boom and bust in homeownership over the decade. This pattern holds for nearly all age groups and is more pronounced for recent movers. Results also suggest that homeownership rates may have come close to bottoming out in early 2013 at 65 percent after falling roughly 4 percentage points from their peak in 2006. This suggests little lasting effect of the grand homeownership policy experiment of recent decades.
1. Introduction

It is widely appreciated that the boom and bust in U.S. house prices of the last decade served as a catalyst for the 2007 meltdown in mortgage and capital markets and the downturn in the global economy. Less well known is that the decade from 2000 to 2010 also experienced a dramatic boom and bust in homeownership. As seen in Figure 1, from 1970 through the mid-1990s, US homeownership rates varied between 64 and 65 percent and were essentially flat at 64 percent between 1985 and 1995. Homeownership rates then rose sharply to an historic high of just over 69 percent in late 2006. In the wake of the housing and financial crisis in 2007, homeownership rates imploded, falling all the way back to 65 percent in early 2013.¹

Homeownership is deeply embedded in American culture and is viewed as a symbol of economic achievement.² Partly for that reason, homeownership is encouraged through numerous federal and state policies. At the household level, homeownership traditionally has been viewed as an important mechanism for wealth accumulation. Homeownership also contributes directly to the economic health of communities. Homeowners are invested in their communities and have incentives to enhance their neighborhoods. Studies by DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999), Rosenthal (2008), Coulson and Li (2013), and Harding and Rosenthal (2013) find evidence of such behavior.³

¹ For additional detail on historical homeownership rates for the entire U.S. and by region see the following chart at the U.S. Census Bureau website: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/charts/files/fig05.pdf.

² This is implicit in the title of the federal “American Dream Act,” which provided incentives to promote homeownership in the early 2000s.

³ DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) show that homeowners are more likely to behave in ways that enhance the local community. Rosenthal (2008) offers evidence that the presence of homeowners sets in motion a dynamic effect that elevates a neighborhood’s future economic status as measured by the income of local residents. Coulson and Li (2013) use neighborhood clusters in the American Housing Survey in conjunction with panel and other econometric methods. They estimate that converting a rental unit to owner-occupied would increase nearby property values. Harding and Rosenthal (2013) show that housing capital gains encourages homeowners to establish new businesses.
There is also a tight link between homeownership and the macro economy. Previous studies have emphasized the propensity of homeowners to consume out of housing capital gains (Canner et al (2002), Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005), and Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009)). Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that home equity spending helped to bolster economic activity during the 2001 recession, softening the downturn at that time. The great recession that began in 2007 was exacerbated by massive reductions in housing wealth that contributed to declines in spending out of home equity. Homeownership is also often associated with new home construction because homeowners are typically of higher income and tend to favor new as opposed to older homes. For all of these reasons, federal and state governments have long promoted homeownership through a range of policy mechanisms.

With the above as backdrop, this paper seeks to address a set of interrelated questions about the drivers of homeownership in the U.S., the experience of the 2000-2010 decade, and what may lie ahead. We begin by revisiting the theoretical model of Henderson and Ioannides

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See also Coulson and Fisher (2009), Engelhardt et al (2010), and Holupka and Newman (2012) for related discussion and evidence.

4 In testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress (November 13, 2002), Chairman Greenspan stated “…the extraction of equity from homes has been a significant support to consumption during a period when other asset prices were declining sharply. Were it not for this phenomenon, economic activity would have been notably weaker in the wake of the decline in the value of household financial assets.”


6 Such policies include post-World War II Federal Housing Administration (FHA) creation of the fully-amortizing, long-term fixed rate mortgage, longstanding federal tax policies that subsidize homeownership (e.g. Rosen (1979), Rosenthal (1988)), and mortgage lending policies that required the GSEs to make special efforts to expand the supply of mortgage credit for lower income and minority neighborhoods (e.g. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010)). In some instances, these policy initiatives have also been prompted by concerns about a legacy of discrimination in housing and mortgage markets and stubbornly persistent and large disparities in homeownership rates between white and minority households (e.g. Gabriel (2001), Painter, Gabriel and Myers (2001), Gabriel and Painter (2003, 2009), Haurin and Rosenthal (2009), Haurin, Herbert, and Rosenthal (2007)). While racial disparities in access to homeownership are important, that is not the focus of this study.
(1983) in which they argue that demand for homeownership increases with the divergence between the investment versus consumption (or “shelter”) demand for housing. Details of this model will be highlighted later. For now it is sufficient to indicate that the Henderson-Ioannides model implies that any factor that contributes to a household’s investment or consumption demand for housing belongs as a control variable in a regression designed to evaluate the propensity of a family to own their own home. Moreover, the coefficients on those control measures are reduced form in nature and reflect the combined influence of investment and consumption demands for housing.\(^7\)

We conduct our analysis using household-level data from the 2000 U.S. Census and the 2005 and 2009 American Community Surveys. For each sample year, separate regressions of household homeownership status are run for sixty-eight groups of individuals stratified by age for ages 21, 21, 22, and so on all the way up to age 89. Stratifying the sample in this manner greatly enriches the analysis as it provides a clear indication of how the drivers of homeownership vary over the lifecycle. That stratification is feasible because of the very large sample sizes in the 2000 Census and the ACS, details of which are provided later in the paper.

A further feature of the analysis is motivated by the fact that homeownership rates depend on past decisions since a family’s housing tenure status is determined only at the time of a move. For that reason, we estimate all of our models twice, once for all families including those who may have been in their homes for many years, and then again for a subset of

\(^7\) Brueckner (1997) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002) both emphasize that because owning and renting are not perfect substitutes, families with a large demand for shelter relative to investment demand for housing may own their own homes and “overinvest” in housing in order to satisfy their consumption needs. The Brueckner and Flavin-Yamashita models provide valuable insights but do not change the fundamental points we derive from the Henderson-Ioannides model. Specifically, when estimating a reduced form homeownership regression, (i) any factor that contributes to investment and consumption demand for housing belongs as a control variable in the model, and (ii), the model coefficients reflect the combined influence of shelter demand and portfolio considerations.
households that only just recently moved into their homes. Findings from the two samples complement and enrich our assessment of the drivers of homeownership.

All of the homeownership regressions include thirty-five control variables designed to highlight the underlying drivers of homeownership. As suggested above, these include a broad set of household socioeconomic and local market controls. Other drivers of homeownership are more difficult to observe, including mortgage underwriting standards and household tastes for investing in housing. Mortgage underwriting standards experienced significant easing during the 2000-2006 period followed by a pronounced tightening later in the decade.\(^8\) Tastes for investing in housing also likely changed over the 2000-2010 period. These factors are reflected in changes in the model coefficients.

To illustrate, we highlight three of our control measures here that are especially relevant for the empirical work to follow (the other controls are described later in the paper). The first of these is the median owner-assessed value of owner-occupied homes in the public use micro area (PUMA) in which the individual resides, an area about fifty percent larger than a typical county.\(^9\) Higher house prices require higher downpayment and/or higher mortgage carrying costs. This increases the tendency for families to bump into lender imposed downpayment and other constraints (e.g. debt-to-income ratios) that limit the extent to which households can invest in housing. In the context of the Henderson-Ioannides (1983) model, such restrictions effectively

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\(^8\) The broad-based easing in credit standards in the mid-2000s was manifested in part in the widespread proliferation of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. While we do not model those terms directly in our reduced-form specification, we do anticipate that such credit easing would have improved access to homeownership, the effect of which is reflected in the model coefficients.

\(^9\) As constructed by the U.S. Census Bureau, there are roughly 2,000 PUMAs covering the entire United States. In comparison, there are roughly 3,100 counties in the United States, so a given PUMA is about fifty percent larger than a typical county.
reduce the household’s investment demand for housing and thereby reduce the tendency for the household to own their own home.\textsuperscript{10}

We also control for the 1-year ahead expected percent change in quality adjusted house prices in the metropolitan area in which a family resides.\textsuperscript{11} In the Henderson-Ioannides model, expected housing capital gains should increase the investment demand for housing. In the context of user cost measures that appear in many studies of homeownership (e.g. Rosen (1979)), housing capital gains lowers the relative cost of owning to renting. In both instances expectations of rising housing prices should encourage homeownership.

A third control of special note is the tendency for a given metro area to experience periods of significant house price volatility. Conditional on the other model controls, it seems unlikely that the consumption demand for housing, as driven by the need for shelter, is particularly sensitive to anticipated house price volatility. Investment demand for housing, however, surely is sensitive to house price volatility since that would expose housing investors to a greater degree of risk.\textsuperscript{12} Although volatility is not typically taken into account in standard user cost measures of the relative cost of owning to renting, it has a natural role in the investment-consumption model of Henderson and Ioannides (1983). With risk-averse households, house price volatility should reduce the investment demand for housing and discourage homeownership.

\textsuperscript{10} Note that there is no easy analogue to express the influence of borrowing constraints on user cost measures of owner-occupied housing (e.g. Rosen (1979)) which in part is why we focus on the Henderson-Ioannides model.

\textsuperscript{11} To do this, we first generate a metro-level 1-year ahead house price forecast by regressing the 4-quarter change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) MSA index on five 4-quarter lags of the dependent variable.

\textsuperscript{12} Inclusion of the volatility variable is motivated in part by recent work by Case, Cotter, and Gabriel (2011) and Davidoff (2005). Davidoff (2005) demonstrates that house price volatility affects family housing decisions, and more so if their labor income is correlated with movements in housing values. Case, Cotter, and Gabriel (2011) show that localized house price volatility is often priced into metropolitan house price returns.
It is worth emphasizing that our modeling strategy yields a panel of coefficients that characterize reduced-form drivers of homeownership over the decade and across the life cycle. Drawing on that panel of estimates, we conduct a shift-share analysis that decomposes changes in aggregate homeownership rates over time into the contributions from changes in model controls (e.g. household socio-demographic and house price terms) versus changes in the model coefficients.\(^{13}\) We first perform this analysis based on the entire sample of households and then again using just those households that moved in the last twelve months. Although inertia associated with non-movers affects the full-sample shift-share results, that influence is largely absent in the recent mover sample. Together, findings from the two samples provide a more complete picture than if only one of the samples was used.

Bearing the above points in mind, the deterrent effect of house price volatility on homeownership diminished between 2000 and 2005 and then increased following the crash. We argue that this yields suggestive evidence that households may have become more risk loving during the boom and more risk averse during the subsequent market downturn.\(^{14}\) Shifts in primary and secondary mortgage market lending standards in response to house price volatility

\(^{13}\) Our shift-share analysis is similar in design to Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) and Haurin and Rosenthal (2007). In Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) our focus was on the 1990s, the role of borrowing constraints, and racial gaps in homeownership. In Haurin and Rosenthal (2007), the time horizon spanned 1970-2000 with a primary focus on the influence of headship decisions on homeownership rates. Relative to these studies, the innovation in this paper is to focus on the dramatic boom and bust in homeownership over the 2000 to 2010 period as highlighted above. Although large racial gaps in homeownership still persist, that will not be our focus even though race and ethnicity are included as controls in the homeownership regressions. Similarly, Haurin and Rosenthal (2007) show that headship and homeownership decisions are not independent, and that rising headship rates in the 1990s contributed to an increase in homeownership rates among younger households. Lee and Painter (2013) and Paciorek (2013) also document that headship rates increase during a boom and decrease markedly during a recession. Nevertheless, we do not directly address the role of headship in this study. This simplifies our analysis considerably. We will comment on possible biases arising from not having directly modeled headship rates later in the paper.

\(^{14}\) Equivalently, household *perceptions* of exposure to risk may have diminished during the boom and then increased during the bust. In the present context, shifts in risk aversion versus perception are observationally equivalent and both point to reduced household sensitivity to house price risk.
also likely contributed to these patterns. Consistent with these interpretations, findings from the shift-share analysis indicate that the boom and bust in homeownership between 2000 and 2010 was largely driven by changes in the model coefficients that reflect shifts in preferences for homeownership, changes in lending standards, and other market conditions that are not directly modeled (e.g. loan rates). This stands in marked contrast to findings for the 1990s. Using data from different years of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), in earlier work (Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005)) we show that changes in population socioeconomic characteristics – not market conditions – account for most of the roughly 4 percentage point increase in homeownership between 1989 and 2001 (see Figure 1). Using census data, Haurin and Rosenthal (2007) further demonstrate that shifts in the age distribution of the population drive most of the change in aggregate homeownership rates in the 1990s.

Looking ahead, the shift-share analysis also suggests that homeownership rates may have come close to bottoming out in early 2013 at roughly 65 percent, similar to rates that prevailed throughout much of the 1970-1995 period. This suggests little lasting effect of the grand homeownership policy experiment of recent decades.

To clarify these findings, the following section defines the demand for homeownership based on the divergence between consumption and investment motives for owning real estate. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 discusses our regression results, and Section 5 presents results of the shift-share analysis. We conclude in Section 6.

2. The Demand for Homeownership

It is not uncommon to see references to the demand for homeownership in the popular press, academic articles, and policy discussions. Nevertheless, the sense in which there is a
demand for homeownership is ambiguous because households consume housing services, not homeownership. This section offers an explicit definition of the demand for homeownership that helps to specify and interpret the empirical models to follow. The discussion draws closely on previous work by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994).

Henderson and Ioannides (1983) emphasize that if a family’s consumption (shelter) demand for housing exceeds its investment demand then the family is likely to rent. That is because if the family purchased a home that met its consumption demand it would be overinvested in real estate from a portfolio perspective. As investment demand rises up above consumption demand, the family becomes increasingly likely to own their primary home. That is because the family could purchase a level of housing equal to investment demand and then occupy more housing than needed for consumption purposes or rent out the extra space.

To illustrate, in Figure 2, \( H_C \) and \( H_I \) are the consumption and investment demands for housing and increase along the vertical axis. Household income is on the horizontal axis and is assumed to have a more positive impact on \( H_I \) than on \( H_C \) with the slope of \( H_I \) exceeding that of \( H_C \). This causes the two lines to cross at an income level of \( I_{own} \), beyond which families choose to own. As drawn, the demand for homeownership increases with income and is measured by the divergence between investment and consumption demand for housing, \( H_I - H_C \).

Consider now the role of lending standards. To simplify, these are expressed as a constraint on the maximum amount of housing a family can purchase. In the figure, this is represented by the lower horizontal dashed line and limits housing investment to \( H_a \). If income equals \( I_b > I_{own} \), the household would want to own but as drawn the downpayment constraint would be binding. In this instance, the family would be better able to accommodate its consumption demand of \( H_b > H_a \) by choosing to rent.
An implication of the model is that the coefficients in the homeownership regressions to follow are reduced form in nature and reflect the combined influence of three factors: consumption demand for housing, investment demand for housing, and the presence of possibly binding borrowing constraints. This makes it difficult to use changes in the homeownership coefficients across sample years to identify the role of borrowing constraints or infer shifts in attitudes about investing in housing. We return to this issue at various points later in the paper.

3. Data

The primary data for the study include individual-level records from the public use micro samples (PUMS) of the 2000 census and the 2005 and 2009 American Community Surveys (ACS).\(^\text{15}\) It is worth noting that the 2000 data are based on a 5 percent sample of the U.S. population while the ACS is a 1 percent sample. Each of the surveys provides an extensive array of variables that are common across sample years. Each of the surveys are also cross-sections of the population in a given sample year and do not follow households over time.\(^\text{16}\) The samples were limited to non-institutional, civilian household heads not living in group quarters.\(^\text{17}\) In all cases, there is one observation per family in the survey, and socioeconomic attributes are those of the household head.

The data contain information on the family’s housing tenure status, the primary variable of interest. Also reported in the surveys is the number of years the family has been in the home;

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\(^\text{15}\) Geography of the individual person records in the 2000 census and the ACS PUMS data is identified down to the PUMA (public use micro area) level. By definition, a PUMA contains at least 100,000 people in residence.

\(^\text{16}\) PUMS data from both data sets are available from the Census website (www.census.gov) and also in a more user-friendly form from the IPUMS website (www.ipums.org).

\(^\text{17}\) Further excluded were observations where the unit was unoccupied, individuals for which ownership status was non-applicable, and renters for which there was no cash rent.
this variable is used to identify families that moved into their homes in the previous year for the recent mover sample. Control variables include a wide range of information and are of four broad types: (1) Demographic control variables: marital status (single female, currently married, married at one time, other), race (black, Asian, Hispanic, other), income (in year-2009 dollars), educational attainment (less than high school, high school degree, other), various types of disability status (restricted to a wheel chair, unable to care for self, impaired hearing or sight), years in US (0 to 10 years, 11 to 20 years, other including natural born citizen), and veteran status. (2) Labor-related control variables: occupation type (professionals, managers, and others), current employment status, self-employment status, and hours worked. (3) Geographic control variables: central city, suburban, non-MSA, and region of the country (dummies for the nine census regions).

The fourth group of controls includes the three local housing market attributes highlighted in the Introduction and requires further comment. The first of these is the median value of owner-occupied homes in the family’s PUMA of residence. As with income, this measure is expressed in year-2009 dollars.

The second housing market variable is the 1-year ahead forecast of the percent change in quality adjusted house price in the household’s metropolitan area. This was obtained based on an AR(5) specification using 1980-2009 MSA-level house price indexes from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The dependent variable in the model was the nominal 4-quarter change in the FHFA house price index. Control variables included five annual lags of

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18 The census and ACS data report household location at the MSA level while FHFA reports house price indexes at the CBSA level. In most instances we were able to match the FHFA indexes to the MSA in which a household resides. In other instances we matched the household’s state of residence to the state-level FHFA index.
the dependent variable. The model was estimated separately for each MSA and the estimated coefficients used to forecast 1-year ahead changes in the FHFA index.

The third housing market variable is house price volatility for the MSA in which the household resides. This was also calculated using the nominal house price indexes obtained from the FHFA. A multi-step procedure was used to create the volatility measures. In the first step, we calculated the nominal percentage change in the house price index over the previous twenty quarters for the MSA in question. This was done for each quarter from 1985 to 2007. In the second step, for each location we calculate the variance of the 5-year percentage change in the price index across thirteen years of quarterly values or fifty-two quarters.\(^\text{19}\) For the 2000 census data, variance is calculated over the 1985 to 1998 period; for the 2005 ACS data, variance is calculated over the 1990 to 2003 period; for the 2009 ACS data, variance is calculated over the 1994 to 2007 period. This ensures that our measure of local house price volatility is based on historical levels of volatility up to two years prior to the census/ACS sample year. Given the important role of house price volatility in the discussion to follow as a proxy for risk, Appendix A reports summary measures for the variable across MSAs.

4. Regression results

4.1 Homeownership regressions

Our empirical analysis begins with 68 age-stratified regressions for individuals age 21 to 89 for sample years 2000, 2005, and 2009. The regressions are of the following form,

\[
Own_{t,a,y} = x_h b_{a,y} + \epsilon_i
\]  

\(^{(4.1)}\)

\(^{19}\) This is the longest history that will still allow us to retain all MSAs in the US in the sample.
where \( i \) indexes the individual observation for a given age group \( a \) (21, 22, ..., 89) in a given sample year \( y \) (2000, 2005, and 2009). \( Own \) equals 1 if family \( i \) owns their home and zero otherwise. \( x \) is a vector of model controls as described earlier while \( b \) are the corresponding coefficients. To facilitate estimation and presentation, the model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Accordingly, the model coefficients should be interpreted as follows: for a one-unit change in the value of a given control variable (e.g. income), the corresponding coefficient indicates the percentage point change in the probability of homeownership holding all other control variables in the model constant.\(^{20}\)

As discussed above, (4.1) is estimated twice for each age group and sample year, first using the full sample and then using only those households that moved into their homes in the previous twelve months. With 35 control variables in \( x \), this procedure results in 14,280 regression coefficients: 35 coefficients per regression for 68 age groups for 3 survey years for both the full sample and the sample of recent movers.

### 4.2 Coefficient plots

To present this vast amount of information, we plotted the coefficients by age of the household head for each variable for each survey year, and for both the full sample and the sample of recent movers. In earlier versions of the paper, over 30 different figures were reported for the full-sample estimates and then repeated for the recent mover sample estimates. Each figure corresponded to a single control variable (e.g. family income, employment, etc.) and each contained plots from all three survey years (2000, 2005, and 2009). Organizing the coefficients in this fashion facilitated comparisons across the survey years but still produced too many figures

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\(^{20}\) Estimating by Probit did not change the results after adjusting for the non-linearity of the probit function.
to be discussed in detail or presented in a parsimonious manner. For that reason, we present coefficient plots for just four variables that are especially instructive of what may have driven the boom and bust in homeownership over the 2000s: family income, the median value of owner-occupied homes in the family’s PUMA of residence, the 1-year ahead forecast of the percent change in the family’s MSA house price, and the historical level of house price volatility in the family’s MSA. To increase precision, the plots report 3-year moving averages of the coefficient in question based on coefficient estimates that correspond to three adjacent age groups (e.g. ages 21-23).\(^2\) In all cases, age of the sampled individuals is plotted along the horizontal axis, while the 3-year moving average of the estimated coefficients is on the vertical axis.

Consider first the influence of family income as plotted in Figure 3, panels A and B for the full sample and recent mover sample, respectively. Income is measured in $1,000 units (in year-2009 dollars). Focusing on the full sample estimates in Panel A and using the coefficient on income in the age-26 regression for the 2005 sample as an example, notice that the coefficient is roughly 0.003. This indicates that for each $10,000 of additional income (in year-2009 dollars), the typical twenty-six year old household head would be 3 percentage points more likely to own a home holding the other model controls constant. From our model in Figure 2, this suggests that housing investment demand rises more rapidly with income in comparison to consumption demand, and for that reason, higher income families are more likely to own. This is true for all age groups and sample years given the positive coefficients throughout the figure.

On the other hand, the influence of income declines sharply with age until leveling off once

\(^2\) We do not report the standard errors on any of our estimates since to do so would become unwieldy given the extensive number of model coefficients. Instead, we note here that sample sizes for the age-specific regressions ranged from about 15,000 observations for some of the younger and older age cohorts to approximately 200,000 observations for middle-aged cohorts. These sample sizes are large enough to ensure quite precise estimates of most of the model coefficients. Plotting 3-year moving averages of the estimated coefficients as noted above also has the effect of effectively tripling sample size and further enhances precision.
individuals reach their mid-40s. For individuals beyond that age, $10,000 additional income increases the propensity for homeownership by just one-half percentage point. The much larger influence of income among younger individuals is consistent with widely appreciated stylized facts that younger families are often wealth constrained when purchasing a home and take on higher loan-to-value ratios for that reason. That increases the mortgage debt burden to income ratio for younger families making it more difficult to purchase a home. Additional income alleviates this situation but is not as influential for older families who tend to be less wealth constrained relative to their preferred housing purchase.22

It is also instructive to compare the income coefficients across the survey years. For most individuals beyond their mid-30’s there is little difference in the income coefficients between 2000, 2005, and 2009. However, for households in their 20s, the coefficients increased in magnitude from 2000 to 2005, and then fell back somewhat between 2005 and 2009. This pattern is reinforced in Panel B which presents plots of the income coefficients for the recent mover sample. In that figure, the influence of income increased from 2000 to 2005 for individuals up to age 55, and then dropped back most of the way to the year-2000 pattern in 2009. The elevated plot for 2005 is consistent with the issuance during that period of many nonconforming, low-downpayment loans that required higher income, all else equal. The shifting back towards a pattern more similar to that of 2000 may reflect in part the disappearance of such low-downpayment loans following the implosion of credit markets.23

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22 In the context of the model in Figure 2, this suggests that income has a relatively larger impact on investment demand for housing relative to consumption demand among young versus older households.

23 To the extent that FHA lending remains a viable source of low-downpayment loans, the post-2005 downward shift in the income coefficient plots noted above could also reflect a decline in household taste for investing in real estate.
Figure 4 presents plots of the impact of PUMA median house value on the propensity to own a home (with house values measured in year-2009, $100,000 units). As before, Panel A corresponds to the full sample while Panel B is based on the sample of recent movers. Focusing on Panel A, notice that the coefficient for individuals in their late 20s in 2009 is roughly -0.05. This suggests that a late-20s household would be roughly 5 percentage points less likely to own a home for every $100,000 increase in local house prices, all else equal. More generally, it is clear that higher house prices deter homeownership for all age groups but most for individuals in their early 30’s. For individuals beyond their early 30’s, the deterrent effect of higher house prices diminishes (becoming less negative) until reaching a plateau for individuals in their early 40s. While this pattern is remarkably robust across survey years, there is an obvious upward shift in the age-specific coefficients from 2000 to 2005 all across the age spectrum. This indicates that the deterrent effect of higher house prices diminished between 2000 and 2005, coinciding with the easing of credit standards that allowed for higher levels of nominal mortgage debt qualification. The pattern reverses as one shifts from 2005 to 2009, consistent with the tightening of credit standards following the crash. These patterns are especially pronounced among recent movers (Panel B) and younger households.

Figure 5, Panels A and B display plots for the coefficients on the 1-year ahead forecast of the percent change in MSA-level house prices for the full sample and recent movers, respectively. The year-2000 estimated coefficients are largely positive, consistent with the expectation that higher expected housing capital gains increase the investment demand for housing and encourage homeownership. Further, coefficient values trend higher among households in their 30s and remain at those elevated levels over the remainder of the age
spectrum. The patterns for 2005 and 2009 are different: for both sample years, the coefficient plots are downward shifted and, for 2009, slightly negative for most age groups.

The coefficient plots for recent movers in Panel B of Figure 5 hint at a possible explanation for these patterns. For individuals under age 50, the coefficients are similar across sample years and display a pronounced upward trend from roughly 0 to a plateau at 0.45 for individuals in their 40s. For a typical 45 year old that is moving to a new home, this suggests that a 10 percent anticipated increase in house prices over the coming year would increase the likelihood of purchasing a home by roughly 4.5 percentage points. The patterns for individuals over age 50 are dramatically different. Notice that the positive influence of expected house price appreciation on homeownership becomes even more pronounced for older individuals in 2000 and 2005. For older individuals in 2009, however, the positive influence of expected capital gains on homeownership largely disappears. This pattern is suggestive that in the aftermath of the financial crisis older individuals adopted a more conservative posture with respect to investing in real estate.

Figure 6, Panels A and B, display analogous plots of the coefficients on historical patterns of local (MSA or state level) house price volatility. As expected, higher local rates of house price volatility typically discourage homeownership: this is evident from the largely negative coefficients in both panels for 2000 and 2009. Also, the deterrent effect of volatility is most pronounced for relatively young families, as seen by the largely rising pattern of coefficients in Panel A beyond the youngest households. Finally, the deterrent effect of local house price volatility diminished between 2000 and 2005. Indeed, that shift was so pronounced that for many age groups, the volatility coefficients were actually positive in 2005, and especially
among recent movers (Panel B). With the financial crash, the volatility plots shifted back
towards year-2000 levels.

A number of factors likely contributed to the changing influence house price volatility
over the decade. As discussed earlier, lenders relaxed underwriting standards between 2000 and
2005. To the extent that easing of credit standards was indicative of reduced lender concerns
about default risk, this would have contributed to an upward shift in the volatility coefficient
plots. Further, households may have adopted a more risk-loving attitude towards housing
investment and homeownership during the mid-decade bubble period. That too would have
contributed to an upward shift in the volatility coefficient plots, reducing the deterrent effect of
house price volatility on the propensity for homeownership.  

5. Homeownership rates

5.1 Overview

We turn now to the primary question of this study: to what extent did changes in market
conditions and attitudes as embodied in the estimated coefficient vectors versus changes in
population socioeconomic and demographic attributes drive the boom and bust in
homeownership over the 2000-2010 period? As noted earlier, we use a shift-share analysis to
address this question. Specifically, we combine coefficient estimates from a given sample year
\(Y_1\) (2000, 2005, or 2009) with data from another sample year \(Y_2\) (also 2000, 2005, or 2009).
Results predict homeownership rates that would have prevailed in year 2 if individuals had faced
year-1 market conditions as embodied in the year-1 coefficients. Those conditions include
household preferences for investing in real estate, lending standards, and other broader

\[24\] Findings by Sinai and Souleles (2005) are suggestive of an alternate possible interpretation, that risk averse
households might seek to protect themselves from possible future rent increases by becoming homeowners.
macroeconomic conditions (e.g. loan rates). This is the same approach we used in prior work (Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005)) to evaluate what drove the roughly 3 percentage point increase in homeownership rates in the 1990s (see Figure 1).\footnote{In Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005) we drew upon six years of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1983 to 2001.} Findings from that study indicated that changes in population socioeconomic and demographic attributes drove nearly all of the increase in homeownership in the 1990s with changes in market conditions having little effect. As noted in the Introduction and will become apparent, market conditions play a much larger role as a driver of the boom and bust in homeownership between 2000 and 2010.

Our analysis is divided into three parts. We first compute homeownership rates for each age group for each of our sample years. Next, we decompose changes in age-specific homeownership rates across survey years using the shift-share approach described above. In the third portion of the analysis we pool estimates across age groups and decompose changes in aggregate U.S. homeownership rates across years into contributions from population attributes versus market conditions.

5.2 Age-specific homeownership rates

This section describes the computation of age-specific homeownership rates for each survey year, both for the full population and for recent movers. We do this by first forming the predicted probability of homeownership for each individual in the sample using the estimated coefficients corresponding to that individual’s age, sample, and survey year. Homeownership probabilities are then averaged across individuals applying household sampling weights in the census and ACS to ensure that the results are representative of the U.S.\footnote{Unweighted data are used when estimating the regressions given the assumption that the controls are exogenous.} Plots of the full sample
age-specific homeownership rates are provided in Figure 7 while plots for the recent mover sample are in Figure 8. In both cases, homeownership rate levels are plotted in Panel A, while differences in ownership rates between survey years are plotted in Panel B.

For the full sample (Figure 7), the estimated age-specific homeownership rates in Panel A rise for households under age 50, plateau at a level between 80 to 85 percent for households in their 50s to mid-70s, and decline thereafter. This pattern is similar to findings in Haurin and Rosenthal (2007) for earlier decades. Also notable, for all age groups and especially individuals under 35, homeownership rates were higher in 2005 than in 2000 (see Panel B). Homeownership rates fell between 2005 to 2009 and especially so for younger families. As a result, among individuals under age 60, homeownership rates in 2009 were notably lower than in 2000 while the reverse is true for individuals over age 60: this is evident from the solid line in Panel B.

Among recent movers (see Figure 8), there is relatively little difference in age-adjusted homeownership rates between 2000 and 2005: this is clear from the dotted line in Panel B of Figure 8 which varies between -0.02 and 0.02 across age groups. In contrast, there is a pronounced decline in the propensity of recent movers to purchase a home between 2005 and 2009. As shown by the dotted line in Panel B, that decline increases sharply with age of the household until leveling off for individuals in their 40’s at roughly 13 percentage points below that of homeownership rates for comparably aged individuals in 2005. The following sections help to explain these patterns.

5.3 Decomposition of age-specific homeownership rates

This section decomposes changes in the age-specific homeownership rates between 2000 and 2009 into contributions arising from shifts in the value of the control variables versus shifts
in the estimated model coefficients. Full sample results are reported in Figure 9 while recent mover results are in Figure 10. In each case, Panel A compares 2000 to 2005 while Panel B compares 2005 to 2009.

In Panel A of Figure 9, notice that combining year-2000 coefficients with year-2005 data lowers homeownership rates for all age groups relative to year-2000 rates (based on year-2000 coefficients combined with year-2000 data). This is evident from the downward-shifted position of the dotted line and indicates that socioeconomic and demographic changes over this portion of the decade worked in the direction of reducing homeownership. On the other hand, replacing the year-2000 coefficients with year-2005 coefficients increases homeownership rates for all age groups. This confirms that market conditions pushed homeownership rates higher between 2000 and 2005.

A different set of patterns emerges when comparing 2005 to 2009 in Panel B. For the second half of the decade, population socioeconomic traits have little further influence on changes in homeownership rates while changes in market conditions, as embodied in changes in the model coefficients, reduce homeownership for all age groups.

Figure 10 repeats this shift-share analysis using recent movers. Although the qualitative patterns are mostly similar to those for the full sample, the magnitude of the effect of changes in the model coefficients is much larger. This is especially easy to see in Panel B where it is evident that adverse post-crash market conditions dramatically reduced the tendency of recent movers to purchase their homes and especially so for individuals under age 50.

Summarizing, the patterns in Figures 9 and 10 indicate that changes in population socioeconomic attributes tended to lower homeownership rates between 2000 and 2005 but had little influence on changes in homeownership rates thereafter. As such, shifts in population attributes over the decade cannot explain the boom and bust in homeownership. In contrast,
changes in market conditions as embodied in estimated coefficient vectors pushed
homeownership rates higher between 2000 and 2005 and reduced homeownership rates
thereafter. This confirms that shifts in market conditions were the primary driver of the boom
and bust in homeownership over the decade. Moreover, this was the case for most age groups.

5.4 Decomposition of aggregate U.S. homeownership rates

This section repeats the shift-share analysis but this time pools individuals across age
groups in order to assess the influence of population attributes and market conditions on
aggregate U.S. homeownership rates. We begin with Table 1 which displays results for the full
sample. Notice that the table is organized as a three-by-three matrix corresponding to the
different combinations of survey year data and model coefficients for 2000, 2005, and 2009. As
such, the main diagonal terms are estimates of the actual homeownership rates for the different
survey years while the off diagonal terms combine data and coefficients from different years. 27

As is evident from the main diagonal entries in the table, between 2000 and 2005, the
estimated aggregate homeownership rate increased from 68.1 percent to 70.3 percent. Between
2005 and 2009, the homeownership rate then declined to 68.8 percent. Suppose now that the
model covariate values (e.g. income, employment, volatility, etc.) remained constant at year-
2000 values. Applying year-2005 coefficients the homeownership rate would have been 5.6
percentage points higher than in 2000 or 73.7 percent. This confirms that the change in market

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27 It is worth noting that the estimated homeownership rate for 2000 (seen in the upper left corner of the table) differs somewhat from values often noted in the media for U.S. aggregate homeownership rates as reported in Figure 1. In part this is because our sample is comprised only of households with heads age 21 to 89 as opposed to the entire U.S. population. In addition, homeownership rates in Figure 1 and as typically reported in the media are derived from the current population survey (CPS). Conversations with analysts at the U.S. Census Bureau confirmed that the CPS sample is known to yield slightly different values for U.S. homeownership rates as compared to values obtained from 2000 census. Our homeownership values for 2005 and 2009 are obtained from the ACS data and are nearly identical to those reported by HUD.
conditions between 2000 and 2005 greatly contributed to the jump in homeownership rates over that period. Applying the year-2009 coefficients pushes the simulated homeownership rate back down to 70.3 percent, indicative of deteriorating market conditions including increased risk aversion among both households and lenders. The incomplete adjustment back to year-2000 homeownership levels is also likely indicative of inertia since many of the families that chose to become homeowners in the boom years were still in their homes in 2009.

Suppose now that the year-2000 data is replaced with the year-2009 data while retaining the year-2009 coefficients. This would reduce the simulated homeownership rate by another 1.5 percentage points – from 70.3 to 68.8 percent – back to the actual year-2009 value. That shift confirms that changes in household attributes between 2000 and 2009 served to reduce homeownership rates. In contrast, the effect of changes in market conditions over the entire decade as embodied in the model coefficients served to elevate homeownership. On net, the two effects increased homeownership over the 2000-2009 period by 0.7 percentage points.

Table 2 revisits the aggregate shift-share analysis using the sample of recent movers and related coefficients. Notice first that only about one-third of the recent movers choose to own a home in a typical year (e.g. 36.8 percent in 2000). That is roughly half the share of households in the population that live in owner-occupied housing and is as anticipated given previous arguments from Rosenthal (1988). Also evident in Table 2 is that the aggregate homeownership rate among recent movers held steady in 2005 at about 36 percent. That rate fell dramatically in 2009, however, to 26.1 percent.

Following a procedure similar to that of above, suppose now that we hold the data constant at its year-2000 levels. Applying the year-2005 coefficients would increase recent

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28 Rosenthal (1988) demonstrates that this difference arises because length-of-stay in the home among owner-occupiers is substantially greater than that for renters.
mover homeownership rates from the actual year-2000 rate of 36.8 percent to 39.9 percent, a change of 3.1 percentage points. Applying the year-2009 coefficients lowers the homeownership rate to roughly 32.3 percent, a change from year-2005 market conditions of nearly 7.6 percentage points. The change in ownership rates resulting from the shift from year-2005 coefficients to year-2009 coefficients is much larger in the recent mover sample than in the full sample models of Table 1. That difference reflects the absence of inertia in the recent mover analysis. Further replacing the year-2000 data with year-2009 data reduces the recent mover homeownership rate from 32.3 percent to the actual rate for 2009 of 26.1 percent.

Summarizing, the share of recent movers that purchase a home was 36.8 percent in 2000 and 26.1 percent in 2009. Roughly 4.5 percentage points of that decline can be attributed to changes in attitudes and market conditions as embodied in the model coefficients. The remaining 6.2 percentage points derive from a change in the attributes of the population.

5.5 Homeownership going forward and caveats

The shift-share analysis described above helps to clarify what drove the boom and bust in homeownership of the previous decade and also allows us to look ahead if one is willing to make some assumptions. It seems unlikely, for example, that market conditions and attitudes towards risk will return to year-2005 patterns as embodied in the year-2005 model coefficients. Instead, a more plausible scenario is that market conditions and attitudes towards investing in housing will settle back to something much closer to pre-boom year-2000 levels, as reflected in the year-2000 coefficients. Further, the 2009 data likely approximate near-term future values for many of the covariates in the model.
Given these two assumptions, consider Table 1 once again. Combining year-2000 coefficients and year-2009 data yields a homeownership rate of 63.4 percent. This is on the lower end of the range of homeownership rates observed between 1970 and 1995 which mostly varied between 64 and 65 percent (see Figure 1). Moreover, 63.4 percent is 5.4 percentage points below our estimated homeownership rate for 2009, of 68.8 percent (see Table 1), and roughly 1-1/2 percentage points below the 65 percent rate recorded for the first quarter of 2013 (see Figure 1).

Taken at face value, the numbers above suggest that although U.S. homeownership rates could fall somewhat further we are likely close to the nadir in homeownership. Prudence, however, requires that we acknowledge the limitations of our research design and related uncertainties associated with our forecast. It should be emphasized, for example, that future values for the model control variables may diverge from year-2009 values. Similarly, the actual evolution of market conditions may differ from those embodied in the year-2000 coefficients. Although in principle, omitted variables from the homeownership regressions could also bias results from the shift-share analysis, the extensive parameterization of the homeownership models makes that unlikely.29 On the other hand, the forecast above may be sensitive to future shifts in household formation as such shifts could cause the attributes of the population of household heads to differ from that of 2009 or the implicit homeownership coefficients to differ from that of year-2000.

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29 Recall from section 4.1 that the full-sample and recent-mover homeownership models both include 7,140 separate controls. The extensive parameterization of the homeownership regressions goes a long way towards addressing the influence of any omitted variables that might affect a family’s housing tenure status. This includes transformations model controls that could be used to produce other variables as would be the case for user cost measures and marginal income tax rates. This also includes household wealth which is not observed in the data. For these reasons, we believe that our shift-share results – which are the primary contribution of our study – are robust to any concerns about omitted variables in the homeownership regressions.
To clarify, Haurin and Rosenthal (2007) estimate a bivariate probit model with sample selection and show that individual homeownership and headship decisions are not independent. They further demonstrate that rising headship rates contributed to rising homeownership rates in the 1990s, and that this was especially true for households in their twenties. Lee and Painter (2013) and Paciorek (2013) both also demonstrate that headship rates rise with the economy and fall during a recession. In the context of our current analysis, rising headship rates during the 2000-2005 boom likely contributed to the dramatic increase in homeownership rates among household heads in their 20s while declines in headship rates may have contributed to the reversal during the bust. If headship rates should increase as the economy recovers further from the great recession, findings from Haurin and Rosenthal (2007) suggest that such shifts would elevate homeownership rates causing our forecast above to understate future homeownership rates.

None of these caveats should take away from the core implications of the shift-share analysis. These are that: (i) changes in population socioeconomic and demographic attributes lowered homeownership rates over the decade; (ii) shifts in market conditions – as embodied in the model coefficients – account for most of the boom-bust pattern over the decade, and (iii) if market conditions settle back to something closer to that of year-2000, homeownership rates are not likely to fall much further if at all.

6. Conclusions

The dramatic boom and bust in U.S. homeownership between 2000 and 2010 mirrored the broader boom and bust in housing and financial markets, and followed a decade of aggressive policy efforts to increase homeownership in the United States. This paper utilizes individual-
level census data to assess the role of changes in market conditions versus population socioeconomic in determination of the boom and bust in U.S. homeownership rates over the 2000-2010 period. To do so, we estimate richly specified homeownership regressions that are stratified by age of the household head and for 2000, 2005, and 2009 survey years. This is followed by shift-share analyses that decompose changes in age-specific homeownership rates over the decade into contributions from shifts in market conditions – as embodied in the model coefficients – versus changes in population socioeconomic and demographic attributes.

Model coefficients from the homeownership regressions yield evidence of dramatic shifts in the drivers of homeownership over the life cycle and over the course of the decade. Of special importance, the deterrent effect of local house price volatility on homeownership diminished between 2000 and 2005 and then increased following the crash. We argue that this is suggestive that households may have become more risk loving during the boom and more risk averse during the subsequent market downturn. The sensitivity of lender underwriting standards to local house price risk may also have contributed to this pattern. Together, these and other findings complement results from the shift-share analyses: for nearly all age groups, the shift-share simulations confirm that changes in market conditions – not population socioeconomic – were the primary driver of the boom and bust in homeownership over the decade.

Looking ahead, our results suggest that homeownership rates may have come close to bottoming out in early 2013 at 65 percent, down roughly 4 percentage points from their peak in 2006. This puts current homeownership rates at levels close to those that prevailed in most years between 1970 and the mid-1990s and implies little lasting effect of the grand homeownership policy experiment of recent decades. As suggested above, in the context of more cautionary owner attitudes toward housing risk and the re-emergence of prudent mortgage underwriting, we
see little likelihood that homeownership rates will return to prior peaks observed in 2005-2006 anytime soon. On the other hand, our model estimates also suggest that homeownership rates are not likely to fall much further if at all.
References


### Table 1: Estimated Homeownership Rates From Shift-Share Analysis
**All Individuals Age 21 to 89**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Model-Year Coeff^a</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a Regression coefficients were taken from the estimated models discussed in the text and were estimated using unweighted data under the assumption that the control variables are exogenous. The homeownership rates reported above were then constructed using household sampling weights to ensure that results are representative of the target population of households in the United States.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Model-Year Coeff&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Survey Year From Which Sample Characteristics are Drawn</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2000 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2005 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009 Coefficients</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>The recent mover sample includes only individuals who moved into their homes in the previous twelve months.

<sup>b</sup>Regression coefficients were taken from the estimated models discussed in the text and were estimated using unweighted data under the assumption that the control variables are exogenous. The homeownership rates reported above were then constructed using household sampling weights to ensure that results are representative of the target population of households in the United States.
Figure 1: US Homeownership Rates in the First Quarter by Year
(Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey,
Series H-111 Reports, Bureau of the Census)
Figure 2: Demand for Homeownership

Limit on housing investment imposed by borrowing constraints
Figure 3: Homeownership Model Coefficients
Family Income (2009 Constant Dollar $1,000 units)

Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Recent Movers
Figure 4: Homeownership Model Coefficients
PUMA Median House Value (2009 Constant Dollar $100,000 units)

Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Recent Movers
Figure 5: Homeownership Model Coefficients
1-Year Ahead Forecast of the Percent Change in House Price

Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Recent Movers
Figure 6: Homeownership Model Coefficients
Historical House Price Volatility

Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Recent Movers
Figure 7: Full Sample Homeownership Rates by Year

Panel A: Homeownership Rate Levels

Panel B: Changes in Homeownership Rates
Figure 8: Recent Mover Sample Homeownership Rates by Year

Panel A: Homeownership Rate Levels

Panel B: Changes in Homeownership Rates
Figure 9: Homeownership Rate 2009-2000 Decomposition Using Different Model-Year Coefficients and Data

Panel A: Full Sample

Panel B: Recent Movers
Figure 9: Full Sample Homeownership Rate Decomposition Using Different Model-Year Coefficients and Data

Panel A: 2000 to 2005

Panel B: 2005 to 2009
Figure 10: Recent Movers Homeownership Rate Decomposition Using Different Model-Year Coefficients and Data

Panel A: 2000 to 2005

Panel B: 2005 to 2009
Appendix A: House Price Volatility Summary Measures

Figure A1: Distribution of House Price Volatility Across Locations (MSA or State) (Based on Year-2005 Quality Adjusted House Price Measure)

Historical Volatility of Quality Adjusted House Prices as of 2005
Table A1a: High House Price Volatility Locations
(Based on year-2005 volatility measures described in the text; MSA names are truncated to conserve space)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility as of 2005</th>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility as of 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
<td>5.183</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>New Haven-Meriden, CT</td>
<td>3.549</td>
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<td>Los Angeles-Long B., CA</td>
<td>5.652</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>Stockton, CA</td>
<td>4.031</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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<td>San Luis Obispo, CA</td>
<td>7.199</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>Pensacola, FL</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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<td>Manchester, NH</td>
<td>2.592</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>Boston, MA-NH</td>
<td>4.277</td>
<td>0.175</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nashua, NH</td>
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<td>0.209</td>
<td>Worcester, MA</td>
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<td>Barnstable, MA</td>
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<td>0.208</td>
<td>Salinas, CA</td>
<td>5.183</td>
<td>0.171</td>
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<td>Ventura-Oxnard, CA</td>
<td>7.199</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>Danbury, CT</td>
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<td>0.170</td>
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<td>Waterbury, CT</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco-Oakland, CA</td>
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<td>Brockton, MA</td>
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<td>Santa Cruz, CA</td>
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<td>4.031</td>
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<td>Santa Rosa, CA</td>
<td>7.199</td>
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<td>Newburgh, NY</td>
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<td>0.164</td>
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<td>Yolo, CA</td>
<td>5.183</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>Bridgeport, CT</td>
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<td>Sacramento, CA</td>
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<td>Austin, TX</td>
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<td>Hartford-Bristol, CT</td>
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<td>0.184</td>
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Table A1b: Medium House Price Volatility Locations  
(Based on year-2005 volatility measures described in the text;  
MSA names are truncated to conserve space)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility of 2005</th>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility of 2005</th>
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<td>0.146 Bakersfield, CA</td>
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<td>Portland, ME</td>
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<td>0.144 Reading, PA</td>
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<td>Binghamton, NY</td>
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<td>Denver-Boulder, CO</td>
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<td>Yuba City, CA</td>
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<td>0.139 Punta Gorda, FL</td>
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<td>Albany, NY</td>
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<td>0.133 Phoenix, AZ</td>
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46
**Table A1c: Low House Price Volatility Locations**
*(Based on year-2005 volatility measures described in the text; MSA names are truncated to conserve space)*

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<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility as of 2005</th>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
<th>Historical House Price Volatility as of 2005</th>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Median House Value (year-2009 $100,000)</th>
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