Matching Capital and Labor*

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Abstract

We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. At least 30% of the value mutual fund managers add can be attributed to the firm’s role in efficiently allocating capital amongst its mutual fund managers. We hypothesize that an important reason why firms exist is the private information that derives from the firm’s ability to better assess the skill of its own employees. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find no evidence that a firm adds value when it hires a manager from another firm and little evidence that publicly available information predicts the firm’s capital reallocation decisions. Investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm’s funds.

JEL classification: G30, J24, D22

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We demonstrate, empirically, that an important role of a firm in the mutual fund sector is to efficiently match capital to skill. In a world with perfectly rational players, no information asymmetries and no other frictions, the role of a mutual fund firm would be irrelevant because investors themselves would efficiently allocate their own capital amongst managers. In reality, what we find, is that mutual fund executives play a very important role in capital allocation. Mutual fund firms appear to add substantial value by intermediating between investors and managers and thereby efficiently matching capital to skill.

A decision to increase a portfolio manager’s responsibility by assigning an additional fund to that manager (that is, a decision to increase the manager’s assets under management, hereafter AUM), leads to an increase in the manager’s productivity as measured by the subsequent increase in the money the manager extracts from financial markets, what we term the *value added* of the manager. Similarly, we find that decisions to reduce managers’ responsibilities by taking away a fund also lead to increases in subsequent value added. We find that at a minimum, the decision to reallocate capital to a manager adds, on average, $715,000 per manager per month, implying that the firm is responsible for at least 30% of the total value added of the average manager.

We show that investors are unable to match the firm’s capital reallocation decision themselves. We hypothesize that the reason why derives from the significant informational advantage mutual fund executives have relative to investors. We provide supporting evidence in favor of this hypothesis: (1) external hires that involve a change in AUM do not lead to a detectable change in future value added, (2) while past performance does explain investor flows, it has very little explanatory power for firm capital reallocation decisions and (3) investors respond to these capital reallocation decisions by investing additional capital in the firm’s funds. We also find that the capital reallocation decisions add more value for young managers, supporting the hypothesis that the firm’s advantage derives from its access to better information about managerial ability. These facts are consistent with the hypothesis, first theorized by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), that firm executives use factors that are not easily observable to people outside the firm to make personnel decisions. They are also consistent with the hypothesis in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) that investors trust mutual fund firms to make sound financial decisions on their behalf, and so when they see these firms making a managerial change they respond by investing additional capital.

Many of the questions pertaining to the economics of organizations are difficult to
study because it is often hard to measure employee output directly. The advantage of the mutual fund sector is that because the performance of a mutual fund is public information, employee output is directly observable. That is, a mutual fund manager has one task — to invest capital on behalf of investors. The return he generates, as well as the amount of capital invested, is public information. So is the investor’s next best alternative investment opportunity, an investment in passively managed index funds. By comparing the manager’s performance against this alternative, we can directly calculate an individual manager’s productivity, that is, the value she adds. We are then able to infer at least part of the firm’s role in creating value by looking at how firm decisions affect the manager’s value added.

The mutual fund sector is comprised of firms that own little physical capital. Consequently, it provides an ideal place to study the importance of theories of the firm. Although in some sense the industry is actually very capital intensive (the business is, after all, about investing financial capital), what distinguishes this industry from other capital intensive industries is that the firm does not own its capital. Instead, the customers of mutual fund companies, that is, mutual fund investors, retain all ownership rights to their capital and in most cases can call it back at any time. Consequently, ownership rights to capital cannot play an important role in why mutual fund companies exist or are valuable. What our results imply is that other factors, such as the informational role of the firm, potentially play just as important a role in firm value as ownership rights to capital.

Because we are able to measure individual employee productivity, the mutual fund dataset allows us to study a particular aspect of internal labor markets that is otherwise very difficult to study: how the firm uses its specialized information about its employees to increase employee productivity. Although there is a large body of evidence demonstrating the importance of the firm’s informational advantage in assigning workers to jobs and thereby determining compensation, there is little evidence demonstrating that firms also use this knowledge to determine the job scope of the employee. Our results imply that by correctly determining how much responsibility to give an employee in a particular job, firms add considerable value. Consequently, the documented wage gains that result from internal job assignments likely not only result from the productivity gains from correctly matching jobs to workers, but also from correctly assigning worker responsibility within a job.
1 Background

The literature on the economics of organizations has raised several important questions related to the role of firms. What makes a firm successful? Is it a characteristic of the firm itself, or is it simply that a successful firm is a collection of particularly talented employees? Why do people choose to work for firms rather than for themselves? Do personnel decisions within the firm add to overall firm value?

There is now a large theoretical literature designed to answer these questions (see Hart and Moore (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Hart (1995) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)). A key aspect of modern theories of the firm is the concept of ownership. In a world with incomplete contracting, incomplete information and bounded rationality, ex post bargaining power is affected by ownership. Asset owners, because they retain the rights of control, have inherently more bargaining power. An important insight of this literature is that firms exist to ensure that ex ante ownership is concentrated to allow for efficient ex post outcomes. Although these theories undoubtedly explain an important component of why modern firms exist, they cannot explain a particular, and increasingly important, type of firm — a firm that consists almost exclusively of human capital. These firms have little physical capital other than perhaps some intangible capital such as the firm’s brand name. Hence, a primary reason for the existence of these types of firms cannot be the assignment of ex post bargaining rights through asset ownership.

Our paper is part of the expanding literature that seeks to isolate the role of the worker (manager) from that of the firm. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) find worker fixed effects to be more important than firm fixed effects in driving heterogeneity in workers’ wages. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study persistence in CEO characteristics (or styles) and its connection to performance and pay. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) decompose variation in CEO compensation and show that most of this difference is explained by manager heterogeneity rather than firm heterogeneity. Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) separate the value added in venture capital projects into a manager component and a firm component and argue that human capital, rather than organizational capital, accounts for most of the skill in the venture capital world. This research relies on the fact that workers move between firms to identify the separate roles of workers and firms. However, because switching firms is an endogeneous decision, the methodology is generally unable to put a quantitative bound on the contribution of the firm independent of those working for it. Instead of focusing on external moves as the identification strategy, we rely on the firm’s internal decision to promote and demote its workers and thus we are able to derive
a lower bound on the firm’s contribution to productivity.

Our paper also relates to the labor literature studying personnel economics and the internal labor market of the firm pioneered by Doeringer and Piore (1971). That literature focuses on how firms establish and end employment relationships and how firms provide incentives to workers through the wage contract. Our focus is different. We do not observe mutual fund manager wage data, but instead observe the productivity (value added) of the managers. That allows us to study how firm decisions regarding the scope of the managers’ job (the size of their AUM) affects their productivity. We argue that the firm uses its private information about employee skill to efficiently allocate capital and thereby determine the scope of responsibility of the employee.

Finally, our paper is also part of the literature that studies how the intra-firm allocation of capital and labor affects productivity and drives heterogeneity in the quality of firms. Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) model the costs and benefits of internal capital allocation versus external capital allocation in the form of bank lending. Stein (1994) studies the comparative advantages of decentralized versus hierarchical firms in efficiently allocating capital to projects. Tate and Yang (2014) show that diversified firms have higher labor productivity and actively redeploy their human capital to business areas with better prospects. Giroud and Mueller (2014) find that firms take resources away from less productive plants and reallocate them to plants with better investment opportunities. Resource allocation (or misallocation) across firms and across industries has also been identified as a major determinant of economic productivity at the macroeconomic level.

A key determinant of a firm’s productivity is its management. Bloom, Sadun, and van Reenen (2013) find significant differences in management quality across firms both in the U.S. and abroad. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) show, based on randomized experiments in India, that management practices have a significant impact on firm productivity. Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2014) find that hiring better supervisors make workers more productive. Finally, most mutual funds are owned and marketed as part of a fund family, so a number of studies have looked into how the family structure affects the mutual fund industry.

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1 Oyer and Schaefer (2011) and Waldman (2013) are recent surveys of this literature.
2 For example, see Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2009) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013).
3 Massa (2003) argues that having fund families reduces investors’ cost of switching between funds. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006) and Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013) find evidence that mutual fund families transfer performance from one group of funds to another group of funds through coordinated trades. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) show that intra-firm competition has important effects on managers’
2 The Mutual Fund Industry

In the last 50 years there has been a secular trend away from direct investment in the stock market. Individual investors used to make up more than 50% of the market, today they are responsible for barely 20% of the total capital investment in U.S. markets. During that time there has been a concomitant rise in indirect investment, principally in mutual funds. Rather than invest directly in stocks, a mutual fund investor invests his money in a fund that buys stocks on his behalf. Historically, mutual funds made up less than 5% of the market, today they make up a third of total investment. The industry itself has also changed. Initially made up of only actively managed funds, funds where the fund manager claims to provide an expected return in excess of the expected return of a well-diversified portfolio of equivalent risk, today 13% of the industry consists of index funds — funds that simply provide diversification services.

For our purposes the rise of the index fund industry is fortuitous because these funds allow us to measure something that usually proves elusive to economists — what would have happened if the firm had not used its resources to generate value. Because index funds provide the lowest cost way for any investor to own a well-diversified portfolio, the value added of a mutual fund can be measured by comparing its performance against what would have happened had the fund’s assets been invested in an index fund of similar risk. The difference is the profits that accrue to the firm because of a skill in short supply, what we will call value added.

The definition of value added that we use in this paper was introduced by Berk and van Binsbergen (2013). It is the total value in dollars of what a fund manager extracts from financial markets by, for example, picking stocks or timing the market. It is calculated by first determining the fund’s realized gross alpha — the difference between the return the fund generated on its underlying investments (before any fees or expenses), and the return that would have transpired had the assets been invested in a set of index funds of comparable risk. The realized gross alpha is then multiplied by the total amount of capital under management to provide the total value added of the fund.

We will follow Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) and use, as the alternative investment opportunity set, the set of index funds offered by The Vanguard Group (see Table 1 for appetite for risk. Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013) find that funds outsourced to advisory firms underperform funds managed in-house. Fang, Kempf, and Trapp (2014) show that a firm allocates its skilled managers to funds targeting inefficient markets.

the specific funds used). There are good reasons to use these index funds. First, Vanguard is the firm that pioneered index funds and so we can be sure that the funds in our set represent a set of alternative opportunities that were available at the time. Second, Vanguard is the largest, and is widely regarded as the best, provider of diversification services. Finally, Berk and van Binsbergen (2013) show that Vanguard funds have added value relative to other index funds, that is, Vanguard provides these services at a lower cost than its average competitor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Name</th>
<th>Ticker</th>
<th>Asset Class</th>
<th>Inception Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;P 500 Index</td>
<td>VFINX</td>
<td>Large-Cap Blend</td>
<td>08/31/1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Market Index</td>
<td>VEXMX</td>
<td>Mid-Cap Blend</td>
<td>12/21/1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-Cap Index</td>
<td>NAESX</td>
<td>Small-Cap Blend</td>
<td>01/01/1990*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Stock Index</td>
<td>VEURX</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>06/18/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Stock Index</td>
<td>VPACX</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>06/18/1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Index</td>
<td>VVIAAX</td>
<td>Large-Cap Value</td>
<td>11/02/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Index</td>
<td>VBINX</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>11/02/1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging Markets Stock Index</td>
<td>VEIEX</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>05/04/1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Cap Index</td>
<td>VIMSX</td>
<td>Mid-Cap Blend</td>
<td>05/21/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-Cap Growth Index</td>
<td>VISGX</td>
<td>Small-Cap Growth</td>
<td>05/21/1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-Cap Value Index</td>
<td>VISVX</td>
<td>Small-Cap Value</td>
<td>05/21/1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Benchmark Vanguard Index Funds: This table lists the set of Vanguard Index Funds used to calculate the Vanguard benchmark. The listed ticker is for the Investor class shares which we use until Vanguard introduced an Admiral class for the fund, and thereafter we use the return on the Admiral class shares (Admiral class shares have lower fees but require a higher minimum investment.)

*NAESX was introduced earlier but was originally not an index fund. It was converted to an index fund in late 1989, so the date in the table reflects the first date we included the fund in the benchmark set.

If $R^j_t$ is the excess return (the realized return minus the risk free rate) earned by investors in the $j$’th Vanguard index fund at time $t$, then the benchmark return for fund $i$ is given by:

$$R^B_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{n(t)} \beta^j_i R^j_t,$$

where $n(t)$ is the total number of index funds offered by Vanguard at time $t$ and $\beta^j_i$ is obtained from the appropriate linear projection, as described in Berk and van Binsbergen (2013), of the $i$’th active mutual fund onto the set of orthogonalized Vanguard index funds.
By using Vanguard index funds as benchmarks, we can be certain that these portfolios include transaction costs and reflect the dynamic evolution of active strategies.

The industry is characterized by a large number of firms that market multiple funds to investors. Funds are managed by individual managers. Managers can manage multiple funds within a firm and funds can be managed by more than one manager. Because of SEC reporting requirements, we are able to observe detailed information on each fund. For our purposes we know the fund’s performance (i.e., realized returns), fees charged, total assets under management and importantly, the identity of its manager(s).

Customers provide the capital to mutual fund firms by investing in the firms’ funds. That is, investors invest in funds, not firms. A firm cannot arbitrarily move capital from one of its funds to another fund. However, what firms can, and do, do is decide which manager gets to manage which fund. For that reason, the amount of capital a particular manager has under her control is affected by two things: (1) investors’ decisions to put capital in or take capital out of the funds the manager manages, and (2) the firm’s decisions to either give the manager responsibility for managing an additional fund or taking away that responsibility. By observing the second mechanism we will be able to infer whether the firm adds value by assigning capital to labor.

3 Data

We use the dataset in Berk and van Binsbergen (2013). This dataset, which is comprised of monthly observations of all mutual funds since 1977 is compiled from combining two databases, the CRSP survivorship bias free mutual fund database and the Morningstar Principia database.

We augment that data with the manager information provided by both data sources. Although both CRSP and Principia have information on fund managers and firms, this information is not consistently recorded in both databases. In many cases, individual manager names are replaced with the words “Team Managed” and often manager names are not consistently recorded.\(^5\) For this reason, we make use of a third data source: Morningstar Direct. The Morningstar Direct database supposedly contains a clean and complete list of managers and firms for each fund in Principia that is still in existence,

\(^5\)In addition to examples of inconsistent spelling of a manager’s name, there are other inconsistencies that we need to address. For example, sometimes the full name is spelled out, sometimes only the manager’s initials are used, and sometimes his/her middle name is included.
merged, or closed. However, there are examples of funds in Principia that are not in Morningstar Direct, especially early in the sample. This suggests that the Morningstar Direct database is not survivorship bias free. To make sure that we do not inadvertently introduce a survivorship bias into our data, we only use Morningstar Direct to augment our existing database. That is, we update the manager names on our existing database with information from Morningstar Direct, but, importantly, still keep and use the data in the original database that we could not update. For those funds for which we cannot identify a match in Morningstar Direct, we employ an automated algorithm as well as manual screening to clean up the manager information.\textsuperscript{6}

We drop all observations without an identifier, as well as observations with missing returns, AUMs, expense ratios or information on holding composition. We also remove all bond and money market funds\textsuperscript{7} as well as index funds, by using the Principia \textit{special criteria} indicator and screening fund names. To adjust for the effect of inflation, we restate all AUM observations in January 1, 2000 dollars. We aggregate different share classes of the same fund into one fund, resulting in a database consisting of 5542 funds. The final sample covers the period from January 1977 to March 2011.

Table 2 reports summary statistics of our resulting database of mutual funds. The total number of firms, managers and funds has grown, although both managers and funds have grown proportionately faster than firms, so the average number of managers and funds per firm grew during our sample. The total number of funds grew by a factor of 56, while the average size of a fund only grew by a factor of 2.5, implying that most of the growth in this industry is attributable to the creation of new funds rather than growth in existing funds.

## 4 Definitions

Let $R_{it}^g$ be the gross excess return of fund $i$ at time $t$, that is, the return in excess of the risk free rate before management fees and expenses are taken out. The value added of fund $i$ is:

$$V_{it} \equiv q_{it-1}(R_{it}^g - R_{it}^B)$$

\textsuperscript{6}For a detailed description, see the Online Appendix to this paper.

\textsuperscript{7}Consistent with Berk and van Binsbergen (2013), a money market fund is defined to be a fund with, on average, over 20\% of its assets in cash. A bond fund is defined as a fund with, on average, over 50\% of its assets in either bonds or cash.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Firms</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Funds</th>
<th>Average Number of Managers per Firm</th>
<th>Funds per Fund</th>
<th>Average AUM per Firm (Y2000 $ Billion)</th>
<th>Average AUM per Manager (Y2000 $ Billion)</th>
<th>Average AUM per Fund (Y2000 $ Billion)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1083</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>3.80</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>1789</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>1.77</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>2739</td>
<td>2124</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>3436</td>
<td>2672</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>3651</td>
<td>2883</td>
<td>9.17</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>6.27</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>4388</td>
<td>3621</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>4455</td>
<td>3880</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Characteristics of Mutual Fund Firms and Managers: This table reports characteristics of mutual fund firms and managers for selected years in our dataset. When a fund is co-managed by $N$ managers, we attribute $\frac{1}{N}$th of the fund’s AUM to each of its managers.

where $q_{it-1}$ is the amount of assets under management of fund $i$ at $t-1$. $V_{it}$ is the value, in dollars, the fund adds over and above what would have been earned if the capital was invested in an appropriate passive benchmark.

It is worth spending some time here reviewing the intuition behind this measure of value added. Note that the expected gross return over the benchmark is the sum of the fund’s net alpha, $\alpha_{it}$, and the fee charged, $\phi_{it}$, so that

$$E_t[V_{it+1}] = q_{it}E_t[R^g_{it+1} - R^B_{it+1}] = q_{it}(\alpha_{it} + \phi_{it}).$$

Notice that if the manager managing the fund has no skill, on average, the fund cannot make more than the benchmark return before fees. Thus, after fees, the fund must underperform the benchmark by at least the amount of the fee charged. That is, when the manager has no skill, $\alpha_{it} \leq -\phi_{it}$, so the value added measure is zero or less. For this measure to be positive, the fund’s manager must have some skill, that is, the fund must outperform the benchmark before fees. To properly account for the scale of the investment, it is important to multiply the gross excess return over the benchmark by the fund’s AUM. Another way to think about value added is that the total amount of money collected in fees by the fund can only come from one of two places — investors’ pockets.
or financial markets. The total value the manager extracts from markets is therefore equal to the amount of money the fund charges in fees, minus (plus) any money it takes from (gives to) investors through underperformance (outperformance). Therefore, if a manager is assigned additional capital to manage, the only way the value added of a fund can increase is if those funds are put to productive use by extracting more money from markets. When they are not, the value added of the fund or manager will remain the same.

The value added by firm $f$ at time $t$ is the sum of all value created by its funds:

$$V_{ft} = \sum_{i \in \Omega_{ft-1}} V_{it}$$

(3)

where $\Omega_{ft}$ is the set of all funds in firm $f$ at time $t$. Funds are managed by at least one manager in the firm and managers can manage multiple funds. So we define the value added by manager $m$ at time $t$ as the sum of the value added of all the funds he manages. When a fund is managed by multiple managers, we divide the fund’s value added equally across its managers. Let $n_{it}$ be the number of managers managing fund $i$ at time $t$. Then manager $m$’s value added is,

$$V_{mt} = \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt-1}} \frac{V_{it}}{n_{it-1}}$$

(4)

where $\Omega_{mt}$ is the set of all funds managed by $m$ at time $t$. Using the same logic, the manager’s AUM is:

$$q_{mt} = \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt}} \frac{q_{it}}{n_{it}}$$

(5)

To differentiate superior past performance from poor past performance we need a measure to select firms. We use the firm’s skill ratio, as defined in Berk and van Binsbergen (2013):

$$SKR_f^\tau \equiv \frac{\bar{V}_f^\tau}{\sigma(\bar{V}_f^\tau)}$$

(6)

where $\bar{V}_f^\tau = \sum_{t=t_0}^{\tau} \frac{V_{ft}}{\tau-t_0}$ is average firm value added up to time $\tau$, $\sigma(\bar{V}_f^\tau) = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{t=t_0}^{\tau}(V_{ft} - \bar{V}_f^\tau)^2}{\tau-t_0}}$ is the standard error of firm value added up to time $\tau$ and $t_0$ is the start date of the firm. Note that the skill ratio is essentially the t-statistic of the mean value added up until time $\tau$. 


Figure 1: **Capital and Human Resources Controlled by the Five Largest Firms**: This figure reports the fraction of assets controlled by and the fraction of managers working for the 5 largest firms in January of each calendar year, for every year between 1977 and 2011. As a point of comparison we also provide the 5 firms as a fraction of the total number of firms.

5 The Importance of Firms

The mutual fund industry is dominated by a few large firms. As of January 2011, the 5 largest mutual fund firms, which make up less than 1% of the total number of firms, hire 13% of all mutual fund managers and manage 46% of all assets in the industry (see Figure 1). That 13% of managers manage 46% of the assets is suggestive that larger firms are able to hire better managers. To establish this fact, we begin by showing that firm performance is persistent, that is, firms that have added value in the past keep adding value in the future. We then show that the future performance of a manager is predictable by the past performance of other managers at the same firm. These two results establish that, for whatever reason, better managers work with each other.

5.1 Persistence in Firm Value Added

We demonstrate firm persistence by sorting funds into quantiles based on the skill ratio of their firms and showing that funds that belong to firms with high skill ratios have higher future value added. Using the firm skill ratio measured at each time $t$, we sort funds into two quantiles, the top and bottom 50%. We then count the fraction of times, over a
specified future time horizon, that a fund of each quantile outperforms the median fund.

For a fund to be included in this sort, we require its firm to have at least three years of historical data. We estimate the fund’s future value added over a measurement horizon of \( h \) months. Because we need a minimum number of months to estimate the fund’s betas, we drop all funds with less than 18 observations in the measurement horizon. To remove the obvious selection bias, for the remaining funds we drop the first 18 observations as well, leaving the remaining observations exclusively in the horizon \( \{ t + 19, \ldots, t + h \} \). At each future time \( \tau \in \{ t + 19, \ldots, t + h \} \) we compare the value added of every fund to the value added of the median fund, and count the number of times the fund’s value added exceeds the median value added. At the end of the horizon, funds are again sorted on the firm’s skill ratio at that time, and the process is repeated as many times as the data allows. At the end of the process we add up the total number of times funds in each half of the sample beat the median fund. To convert this number into a percentage, we divide it by the total number of observations in that half of the sample.\(^8\) The first column of Table 3 reports the results. At the 3, 4 and 5 year horizon, funds of firms with above median skill ratios significantly outperform (at the 99% confidence level) funds of firms with below median skill ratios.

We repeat the above analysis sorting funds into the top quintile and bottom quintile based on their firm’s skill ratio, as well as top decile and bottom decile. That is, in the measurement horizon we restrict attention to top and bottom quintile/decile funds and record the fraction of times funds in each quintile/decile outperform the median fund in the restricted sample. The second and third column of Table 3 report these results. At all horizons, and for both quintile and decile sorts, the results show that funds from firms with higher skill ratios statistically outperform funds from firms with lower skill ratios.

\(^8\)The main difficulty with implementing this strategy is uncertainty in the estimate of the fund’s betas. When estimation error in the periods before the sort is positively correlated to the error in the measurement horizon, a researcher could falsely conclude that evidence of persistence exists when there is no persistence. To avoid this bias we do not use information from the periods before the sort to estimate the betas in the periods after the sort. This means that we require a future horizon of sufficient length to produce reliable beta estimates, so the shortest horizon we use to measure future performance is three years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top $q%$ Outperforms Bottom $q%$</th>
<th>$q=50$</th>
<th>$q=20$</th>
<th>$q=10$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>50.57**</td>
<td>51.13**</td>
<td>51.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>50.55**</td>
<td>50.93**</td>
<td>51.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Years</td>
<td>50.51**</td>
<td>50.87*</td>
<td>50.98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Predicting Fund Performance Using Firm Skill:* We report the fraction of times (in percentages) a fund sorted into the top $q\%$ quantile (based on its firm’s skill ratio) has higher realized value added than the median fund over the next 3, 4, or 5 years. Standard errors, clustered by yearmonth, are given in parentheses. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly greater than 50% at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

5.2 Predicting a Manager’s Performance by the Past Performance of His Colleagues

We next establish that a manager’s future performance can be predicted by the past performance of other managers at the same firm. To do this test, we complete the following three steps for every fund $i$: (1) we identify the set of managers managing fund $i$, (2) we identify all funds in the firm managed by any member of this set of managers, and (3) we recalculate the firm’s skill ratio excluding those funds, hereafter, the *adjusted skill ratio*. We then sort funds using the adjusted skill ratio, thus ensuring that the sort excludes any manager of the fund itself and proceed with the same test as described in the previous section. Table 4 tabulates the resulting statistics using 2, 5 and 10 quantiles. The table shows that funds sorted into the top quantile consistently outperform the bottom quantile for all 3 sorts and over all 3 measurement horizons.

Taken together, these results establish that better managers work together. However, they do not provide additional insight into what the exact role of the firm is. Do better managers choose to work at better firms because they are more productive hanging out with each other, or do firms provide extra services that these managers value? The next section answers this question.

6 Matching Capital with Skill

At first glance, it might seem that the most direct way to study the role of the firm would be to estimate an attribution model. Managers move frequently enough between firms to
Top $q\%$ Outperforms Bottom $q\%$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$q=50$</th>
<th>$q=20$</th>
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<tr>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>50.31*</td>
<td>50.73**</td>
<td>50.86**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>50.30*</td>
<td>50.58*</td>
<td>50.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Years</td>
<td>50.44**</td>
<td>50.70**</td>
<td>50.91**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Predicting Managers’ Performance Using Their Peers: We report the fraction of times (in percentages) a fund sorted into the top $q\%$ quantile (based on skill ratio of other managers belonging to the same firm but not managing this fund) has higher realized value added than the median fund over the next 3, 4, or 5 years. Standard errors, clustered by yearmonth, are given in parentheses. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly greater than 50% at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

form a very well-connected network. So the most obvious approach to studying the role of the firm is to estimate a panel regression that includes fixed effects for firms and managers. Unfortunately, the results of such an approach would be difficult to interpret because manager moves are endogenous. Conceivably, the firm could merely be a coordination device for managers to work together. We avoid the aforementioned endogeneity problem by concentrating on promotions and demotions within the firm, because these internal firm decisions cannot be driven by managers self-selecting into firms.

We take as the Null hypothesis the Coasian benchmark, a neoclassical world with no frictions and informational asymmetries. In this world investors already invest the optimal amount of capital in funds and therefore there is no role for the firm to assign more or less capital to its fund managers. To test this Null, we study changes in value added after a firm reassigns capital to its managers. Firms make these reallocation decisions when they either give a fund to a manager to manage and thereby increase the manager’s AUM, hereafter a promotion, or take away a fund from a manager and thereby decrease the manager’s AUM, hereafter a demotion. Because we need to observe the manager’s value added after the demotion decision, we are forced to exclude demotions that are also termination decisions.\(^9\)

We begin our analysis by asking whether firms’ reallocation decisions create value, that is, we run the following panel regression:

$$V_{mt} = \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \beta \cdot \mathbb{1}_{reallocated} + \epsilon_{mt},$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

\(^9\)In cases in which a firm both adds and takes away a fund at the same time, we use the net change in assets due to the capital reallocation decision to determine whether the decision was a promotion or demotion.
where $V_{mt}$ is the estimated value added of manager $m$ at time $t$ (defined in (4)); $\mathbbm{1}_{\text{reallocated}}$ is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if manager $m$ is internally promoted or demoted before time $t$; $\lambda_m$ are manager fixed effects; and $\lambda_t$ are time fixed effects. The results are reported in the first column of Table 5.\(^{10}\) The firm adds $715,000 per month when it makes a decision to either promote or demote one of its managers which is statistically different from zero at the 99% confidence level.

Estimates of (7) may be biased if the capital reallocation decisions are correlated with past performance. If a manager is promoted (demoted) after superior (poor) performance, and if past performance has a component that is due to good (bad) luck, then in expectation the manager’s future performance will mean revert. Consequently, past bad luck will be measured as future value added and past good luck will be measured as value destroyed by the manager. To examine the importance of this issue, we split the reallocation dummy $\mathbbm{1}_{\text{reallocated}}$ into two dummies, one for a promotion $\mathbbm{1}_{\text{promoted}}$, and one for a demotion $\mathbbm{1}_{\text{demoted}}$. The promotion dummy takes on a value of 1 if the most recent capital reallocation decision resulted in a net increase in the manager’s AUM and zero otherwise. Similarly, the demotion dummy takes on the value of 1 if the most recent capital reallocation decision resulted in a net decrease in the manager’s AUM and zero otherwise. So, for example, if for a particular manager, the first capital reallocation decision is a promotion at time $t_1$ and the second decision is a demotion at time $t_2$, then both dummies will be zero up to time $t_1$, the promotion dummy will be 1 until time $t_2$ and zero afterwards and the demotion dummy will be zero up to time $t_2$ and 1 afterwards. We then run the following panel regression:

$$V_{mt} = \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \beta_p \cdot \mathbbm{1}_{\text{promoted}} + \beta_d \cdot \mathbbm{1}_{\text{demoted}} + \epsilon_{mt}$$ (8)

where the definitions of all other variables are consistent with those from (7). The second column of Table 5 reports the results. The coefficients on the promotion and demotion dummies are positive, and importantly, the promotion dummy is $817,000 dollars per

\(^{10}\)Standard errors of (7) estimates are two-way clustered by manager and comanagement block. Recall that if a fund is comanaged we assign equal shares of the fund’s value added to all of its managers, so two managers have correlated value added by construction if there exists a fund managed by both managers. Consequently, we cluster standard errors by comanagement block, which is defined so that two observations of the same year are assigned to the same block if their managers comanage a fund during that year. Standard errors do not further increase if we instead assume all observations of the same year belong to the same comanagement block (i.e. we find no correlation across comanagement blocks). See Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006), Thompson (2011) and Petersen (2009) for details on multi-way clustering.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Reallocation</th>
<th>0.715**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Promotion**
  - 0.817**
  - (0.290)

- **Demotion**
  - 0.477
  - (0.432)

- Comanager
  - 0.576**
  - (0.221)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>AUM</th>
<th>-0.474</th>
<th>-0.470</th>
<th>-0.466</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(0.452)</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manager Tenure</th>
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<th>-0.129</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fixed Effects**

- **Manager**
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes

- **Yearmonth**
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes
  - Yes

Table 5: **Internal Reallocation of Capital**: The first column of the table reports the panel regression specification that uses the capital reallocation dummy from (7). The next three columns report the specification where we split reallocations into promotions and demotions, that is, the estimates from (8) along with AUM and manager tenure (measured in years since entry into the database) as additional regressors. The fifth column includes, as an additional regressor, a dummy variable that equals one after a comanager is added to a fund that that manager under consideration manages and remains on until the manager under consideration is either promoted or demoted. The final column defines promotions and demotions based on the change in the total dollar fees collected, rather than just the change in AUM. Manager and yearmonth fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors, heteroskedastic-robust and two-way clustered by manager and by comanagement block, are provided in parentheses. All numbers are reported in $ millions/month. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

One might be concerned that, in a world with constant returns to scale, one would expect to see a positive coefficient on the promotion dummy. That is, if a manager’s gross alpha is independent of the amount of money under management, then an increase

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11There is a growing body of empirical evidence documenting decreasing returns to scale in the mutual fund industry, see Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Pollet and Wilson (2011), and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015).
in AUM necessarily implies an increase in value added. Although it is unclear how the mutual fund market would equilibrate in such a world, to rule out this possibility, we include last month’s AUM as an additional explanatory variable and report the results in the third column of Table 4. Were this explanation of our results correct, the coefficient on AUM would be positive and it would better explain variation in value added than the promotion dummy. In fact, the coefficient is insignificant and the point estimate has the wrong sign, while the promotion dummy remains highly significant.

It is likely that a manager’s value added rises with experience and so the firm’s promotion decisions will be partially based on manager tenure. To decompose the capital reallocation decision into the portion that is driven by experience and the portion driven by other factors, we control for managerial experience by including the number of prior years the manager has managed money (at the current firm as well as any prior firms she might have worked for). As reported in the fourth column of Table 5, the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero and including tenure does not change the magnitude of the coefficient on the promotion dummy. Firms use factors other than just tenure to make promotion decisions.

The fifth column of Table 5 examines the effect of a promotion decision on existing managers. This is, what happens to the value added of an existing manager when another manager is added to one of his funds? To answer this question, we include a new dummy (termed “comanager”) that switches on whenever a new comanager is added to a fund that the manager under consideration manages, and remains on until the manager under consideration experiences a capital reallocation decision. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant, implying that the addition of the new manager has positive spillovers. Either the new manager’s value added is above the average value added of existing managers, or there are positive synergistic effects, so the addition of a new manager increases the value added of existing managers. In either case, the implication is that the coefficient on the promotion dummy underestimates the value of the firm’s decision to increase its manager’s AUM.

We have defined promotions (and demotions) based on the change in AUM. But from the firm’s perspective, what is arguably more important is the dollar fees the manager generates for the firm. To address this issue, we redefine promotion and demotion based on the change in the manager’s revenue. That is, a promotion is a capital reallocation.

\footnote{See Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) for analysis on the relationship between skill and manager tenure.}
decision that increases the dollar fees collected (AUM × expense ratio), and a demotion decreases the dollar fees collected. We then re-estimate (8) using this definition in the sixth column of Table 5. A comparison between the second and sixth columns reveals that using this alternative definition of a promotion and a demotion does not change our results.

The point estimate of the coefficient on the demotion dummy is positive, as one would expect if the decision to demote is optimal. If the manager was managing too much money and thereby destroying value (perhaps by trading too much) the decision to demote will increase the manager’s value added. The estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero. The power to reject is lower for demotions than for promotions because our data set is censored. When a manager is demoted and fired at the same time we do not observe his subsequent value added. One way to address this issue is to explicitly recognize that once a manager leaves a firm his contribution to the firm’s value added is zero. The problem with this approach is that the decision to leave is not necessarily the firm’s decision, so not all separations are also demotions. To distinguish voluntary separations (retirement decisions) from firings (demotions), we infer whether the manager was fired based on the firm’s earlier capital reallocation decisions and the manager’s subsequent actions. We assume that if the most recent capital reallocation decision was a demotion and the manager does not get another job with a different firm, then the separation decision was a firing. That is, we set all subsequent value added observations to zero when a manager leaves the database and his demotion dummy is on at the time of the separation. Table 6 presents the results of rerunning the above analysis in this augmented database. The demotion dummy remains positive and is now statistically significantly different from zero in all specifications, consistent with the hypothesis that the decision to demote is optimal. Managers who are dismissed were destroying value prior to the dismissal. However, caution in interpreting these results is still in order. First, our decision rule separating voluntary separations from firings is unlikely to work perfectly, and second, the coefficient on the dismissal dummy is potentially upward biased because of the aforementioned tendency for value added to mean revert. We will provide further evidence on the second concern in Section 8.

The value added numbers reported in Table 5 indicate that the value created from a capital reallocation decision is large. However, it is important to appreciate that we don’t know what would have happened had the firm not reassigned the capital. That is, these numbers quantify the total value created, but do not necessarily quantify the value created
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Reallocation</th>
<th>0.720**</th>
<th>(0.223)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>0.723**</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demotion</td>
<td>0.717*</td>
<td>(0.334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearmonth</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: **Internal Reallocation of Capital (Adjusted for Firings):** If a manager drops off the database when his demotion dummy is on we fill in a value added of zero for that manager for all subsequent firm observations. The first column of the table reports the panel regression specification that uses the capital reallocation dummy from (7). The next column report the specification where we split reallocations into promotions and demotions, that is, the estimates from (8). The final column defines promotions and demotions based on the change in the total dollar fees collected, rather than just the change in AUM. Manager and yearmonth fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors, heteroskedastic-robust and two-way clustered by manager and by comanagement block, are provided in parentheses. All numbers are reported in $ millions/month. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

by the firm. Had the firm not reassigned the capital, potentially, investors could have done the reassignment themselves. That is, to interpret our estimates as solely the value created by the firm, one has to assume that no capital adjustment would have occurred through the flow of funds. In the short term, this implicit assumption is not unrealistic; the magnitude of the firm’s capital allocation decisions dwarfs the magnitude of inflows and outflows. However, over longer periods of time, inflows and outflows could, in principle, accumulate and eventually lead to an overall change in AUM that is commensurate with the magnitude of promotions and demotions. So to quantitatively assess the magnitude of the additional value added of the firm, we must construct a counterfactual. To be conservative, we will focus on promotions because, as we argued above, our estimate of the value added of a promotion is an underestimate whereas the estimate of value added for a demotion is an overestimate because of the aforementioned mean reversion effect.

To construct a realistic counterfactual, we assume that the manager’s subsequent inflows would match the inflows, over the same time period, of a comparable set of managers. Rather than construct a single counterfactual from one set of comparables, we construct a range of counterfactuals. We construct the first counterfactual by assuming the promoted manager would have experienced the same percentage increase in her AUM due to flows as
the weighted average percentage increase due to flows of all managers in that month. We then construct the other counterfactuals by narrowing the set of comparable managers. We eliminate all managers whose past two-year net return over the benchmark was below a particular quantile and then assume that the manager’s percentage inflow would have been the same as the weighted average percentage inflow of the remaining managers in the counterfactual. For example, the second counterfactual eliminates managers whose two-year return over the benchmark is in the bottom 1% and computes the flow of funds by taking the weighted average of the remaining 99%. The third counterfactual eliminates the bottom 2% and we continue this process up to the extreme counterfactual which eliminates the bottom 99%, and thus computes the flows by taking the weighted average flows of managers with performance in the top 1%.

Using the percentage increases computed under the counterfactual flows, we recompute what the AUM of the manager would have been. We do this until the counterfactual AUM either grows to the manager’s actual AUM or the manager is demoted. Once either event occurs, we use the actual AUM from then onwards. We then re-estimate the value added of a promotion using the counterfactual AUM.

To formally define how we calculate the counterfactuals, first define the manager’s gross return as follows:

$$R_{mt}^\theta = \frac{1}{q_{mt-1}} \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt-1}} \frac{q_{it-1}}{n_{it-1}} R_{it}^\theta.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

Next define fund $i$’s net return (the return after fees are taken out) as $R_{it}^n = R_{it}^\theta - \phi_{it-1}$. Then the manager’s net return, $R_{mt}^n$, is calculated by weighting the net return across the funds he manages:

$$R_{mt}^n = \frac{1}{q_{mt-1}} \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt-1}} \frac{q_{it-1}}{n_{it-1}} R_{it}^n.$$ \hspace{1cm} (10)

Similarly, the manager’s benchmark return is constructed from the benchmark returns of the funds he manages:

$$R_{mt}^B = \frac{1}{q_{mt-1}} \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt-1}} \frac{q_{it-1}}{n_{it-1}} R_{it}^B.$$ \hspace{1cm} (11)

Next, let $q_{st}$ and $\hat{R}_{st}^n$ be the weighted average AUM and net return of the comparable managers under the counterfactual. Then, for a promotion that occurs at time $\tau$, we...
define $q^C_{mt}$ for $t \geq \tau$ (the manager’s AUM under the counterfactual) as follows:

$$q^C_{mt} = \begin{cases} 
q_{mt-1} \left( 1 + \frac{q_{t-1} - q_{mt-1} \left( 1 + R^g_{mt} \right)}{q_{t-1} \left( 1 + R^g_{mt} \right)} \right) \left( 1 + R^a_{mt} \right) & \text{if } t = \tau \\
q^C_{mt-1} \left( 1 + \frac{q_{t-1} - q_{mt-1} \left( 1 + R^g_{mt} \right)}{q_{t-1} \left( 1 + R^g_{mt} \right)} \right) & \text{if } t > \tau
\end{cases}$$

Now, after a promotion at time $\tau$, the value added of the manager can be expressed as follows:

$$V_{mt} = (q_{m\tau-1} + (q^C_{mt-1} - q_{m\tau-1}) + (q_{mt-1} - q^C_{mt-1})) \left( R^g_{mt} - R^B_{mt} \right)$$

$$= q_{m\tau-1} \left( R^g_{mt} - R^B_{mt} \right) + (q_{mt-1} - q_{m\tau-1}) \left( R^g_{mt} - R^B_{mt} \right) + (q^C_{mt-1} - q_{m\tau-1}) \left( R^g_{mt} - R^B_{mt} \right).$$

The first term, \{1\}, measures the manager’s value added without the promotion and without future inflows or outflows. The second term, \{2\}, measures the contribution to the manager’s value added of the promotion. The last term, \{3\}, measures the contribution to value added through investor flows under the counterfactual. To measure just the contribution of the promotion, we need to drop the third term. Thus, define the adjusted value added as:

$$\hat{V}_{mt} \equiv (q_{m\tau-1} + (q_{mt-1} - q^C_{mt-1})) \left( R^g_{mt} - R^B_{mt} \right)$$

$$= V_{mt} \cdot \frac{q_{m\tau-1} + q_{mt-1} - q^C_{mt-1}}{q_{mt-1}}.$$

To estimate the magnitude of the value added of just the promotion, we replace $V_{mt}$ with $\hat{V}_{mt}$ over the time period from the promotion until the first time $q^C_{mt} > q_{mt}$ or the manager is demoted (whichever comes first). We then repeat the previous test, that is, we estimate (8), using the counterfactually computed value added. Figure 2 plots the coefficient on the promotion dummy over the range of counterfactuals discussed above. Even under the extreme assumption that the counterfactual is computed solely from managers in the top 1% of the performance distribution, the firm’s contribution to value added is still very large ($537,000 per month).

We can interpret the values in Figure 2 as a lower bound on the average value a firm adds to its manager upon promotion. From these numbers we can also compute a lower bound on the fraction of value added that is attributable to the existence of mutual fund firms. Taking the estimate for the value added of a promotion reported in Figure 2, we
Figure 2: **Firm Value Added Under a Range of Counterfactuals**: We construct the counterfactual by excluding all funds with performance below the indicated percentile and then assume that under the counterfactual a manager would have experienced the same inflow of funds as the weighted average inflow of all remaining managers in that month.

multiply by the fraction of months in which the promotion dummy is equal to one (17%) to get the average value of a promotion decision. Figure 3 reports this number, for all the counterfactuals, as a fraction of the total value added by an average manager (which is $274,000 per month).\(^{14}\) Even for the extreme counterfactual where flows are assumed to be equivalent to the flows of the top 1% of managers, the firm still contributes more than 30% of total value added.

Another way to assess the overall impact of promotions (demotions) is to ask how long it would have taken for investors to achieve the reallocation of funds the promotion (demotion) decision achieved. To answer this question for promotions, under each counterfactual, we compute how many years it would have taken for investors to provide the equivalent amount of additional AUM through the flow of funds alone. If this date does not occur by the last date of our sample, we assume that capital will continue to flow at a rate equal to the flow of funds, under the counterfactual, in the average month of our entire sample. That is, fund flow after March 2011 is assumed to be equal to the average historical fund flow under the counterfactual. We then average the time taken across all promotions for a given counterfactual. We conduct a similar exercise for demotions,
Figure 3: Firm Contribution as Fraction of Total Value Added: We compute a lower bound on firm’s contribution as a fraction of total value added by multiplying the value of a promotion under each counterfactual by the fraction of periods in which the promotion dummy is equal to one. We then divide this estimate by the average value added per manager per month. We plot this fraction for each of the 100 counterfactuals considered.

except that we redefine the counterfactuals. In this case instead of dropping the worst performing managers, we drop the best performing managers. That is, we eliminate all managers whose monthly net return over the benchmark was above a particular quantile and then assume that the manager’s percentage inflow would have been the same as the weighted average percentage inflow in that month of the remaining managers. For example, the most extreme counterfactual eliminates the top 99% of funds and computes the flow of funds by taking the weighted average of the remaining 1%.

Figure 4 plots the the average time it would have taken for investors to achieve the same change in AUM, for each counterfactual, for both promotions and demotions. For promotions, even under the most extreme counterfactual, it would have taken 6 years for investors to achieve what the firm achieved in a single month. For demotions the effect is less extreme. Under the most extreme counterfactual, it would take 2 years for investor outflows to achieve the same effect as the demotion decision. However, in this case, the fact that we ignore demotions that are associated with firings is likely to materially impact our estimates. The reason is that when a manager is fired, the magnitude of the demotion is large (the manager loses all of his funds). Thus, by ignoring those observations we are
restricting attention to the smaller demotion decisions, and so it is not surprising that investors can match the firm’s demotion decision in a shorter amount of time than for promotions.

Figure 4: **Time Taken to Reach Same AUM Under a Range of Counterfactuals**: Under each counterfactual, we compute the number of years it would have taken for investors (through the flow of funds) to match the equivalent change in AUM as the promotion (demotion) decision.

### 7 Investor Response to Capital Reallocation

In the previous section we demonstrated that the firm’s capital reallocation decisions add significant value. But for firms to capture this value, it is important that investors are aware of this, and respond to capital reallocation decisions by investing additional capital with the firm. In this section we show that, indeed, this is the case.

Investors pay firms a fixed fraction (the expense ratio) of assets under management. Because firms rarely change the expense ratios of their funds, what drives changes in firm compensation is changes in AUM. Thus, if investors understand the importance of capital reallocation decisions, in response to observing a reallocation of capital, one would expect them to invest additional capital in the firm, thereby increasing the firm’s overall compensation.
To determine whether or not investors react in this way, we first define firm compensation as the sum of the total compensation it receives managing its funds, that is,

\[ \Pi_{ft} \equiv \sum_{i \in \Omega_{ft}} q_{it} \phi_{it}, \]  

(12)

where \( \phi_{it} \) is the expense ratio fund \( i \) charges between time \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). We then collapse our data into quarterly observations and run the following regression:

\[ \Delta \Pi_{ft} = \lambda_f + \lambda_t + \beta \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\text{reallocate}} + \delta \cdot \text{tenure}_{ft} + \sum_{s=0}^{1} \gamma_s \cdot (R^n_{ft-s} - R^B_{ft-s}) + \epsilon_{ft} \]  

(13)

where \( \Delta \Pi_{ft} \equiv \Pi_{ft} - \Pi_{ft-1} \) denotes the change in firm \( f \)'s overall compensation in quarter \( t \); the dummy \( \mathbb{1}_{\text{reallocate}} \) equals one if firm \( f \) promotes or demotes (or both) at least one of its managers during quarter \( t \), and zero otherwise; \( \lambda_f \) and \( \lambda_t \) are firm and time fixed effects; \( \text{tenure}_{ft} \) denotes the number of years firm \( f \) has been in our database; and \( (R^n_{ft} - R^B_{ft}) \) is the firm's overall abnormal return in quarter \( t \), that is, \( R^n_{ft} \equiv \sum_{i \in \Omega_{ft-1}} q_{it-1} R^n_{it} \) and \( R^B_{ft} \equiv \sum_{i \in \Omega_{ft-1}} q_{it-1} R^B_{it} \). Current and one-quarter lagged abnormal returns are included in the regression to ensure that our results are not driven by the firm and investors responding simultaneously to superior (or poor) performance of managers.

We report estimated coefficients of (13) in the first two columns of Table 7. Results from the table show that the total fees a firm is able to collect from investors increase significantly when it makes a capital reallocation. Interestingly the coefficient on the capital reallocation dummy is not affected by whether abnormal returns are included in the regression, even though abnormal returns do explain changes in firm compensation. What the table implies is that investors do not only use returns to infer future fund performance. They also use capital reallocation decisions. By comparing the coefficients in Table 7 it is possible to assess the relative importance of the information contained in a capital allocation decision versus a realized abnormal return. To generate an equivalent flow of funds of a capital reallocation decision, the abnormal return over the quarter would have to exceed 24% on an annualized basis.

We also examine investors’ response to promotions and demotions at the firm level separately. To do so, we replace the firm reallocation dummy \( \mathbb{1}_{\text{reallocate}} \) with a dummy that equals one whenever the firm promotes (demotes) at least one of its managers during quarter \( t \), and zero otherwise. The regressions are re-run and estimated coefficients are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 7. We find that investors react to both
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change In Compensation</th>
<th>Expense Ratio</th>
<th>AUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital Reallocation</td>
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<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promotion</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demotion</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.189**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Tenure</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abnormal Return</td>
<td>1.920**</td>
<td>1.900**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Abnormal Return</td>
<td>0.610*</td>
<td>0.641*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Fixed Effects
- Firm: Yes
- Yearmonth: Yes

Table 7: **Change in Firm Compensation from Capital Reallocation Decisions:** The first two columns of the table report the panel regression specification described in (13). The next two columns replace the reallocation dummy with a promotion (demotion) dummy that equals one if the firm has promoted (demoted) at least one manager during the time period. For the fifth and sixth columns, the dependent variable is the change in the firm’s weighted average expense ratio and overall AUM respectively. Standard errors, heteroskedastic-robust and two-way clustered by firm and by date, are provided in parentheses. All numbers are reported in $ millions/month. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level.
promotion and demotion decisions by investing more capital in the firm’s funds.\textsuperscript{15}

Next, we decompose change in total fees into two components: (1) change in the firm’s weighted average expense ratio, and (2) change in the firm’s overall AUM (i.e. flow of funds). We then re-run (13) replacing the change in compensation on the left-hand-side of the equation with each of these components. Estimated coefficients are reported in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 7. We find no noticeable change in expense ratio accompanying a reallocation decision. Instead, the change in firm compensation derives almost exclusively from investors providing the firm with additional capital whenever it reallocates funds to managers.

The results in Table 7 paint a remarkable picture of labor market efficiency. By correctly allocating managers, firms increase managerial productivity. Investors recognize this important role of the firm, and so they react to capital reallocations by investing additional capital in the firm. These additional capital inflows allow firms (using the logic outlined in Berk and Green (2004)) to capture the additional rents associated with the capital reallocation decision.

These results are also consistent with the model in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) that identifies an important role of financial intermediaries as providing advice to ignorant investors on how to invest their capital. In this case, investors trust firms to identify the good manager for them, and so when they see the firm making a managerial change, they act on this trust and invest additional capital with the firm.

8 Source of Firm Skill

The results in Section 6 imply that the amount of capital under management affects a manager’s ability to generate value. Although such a result might seem obvious, it is in fact not consistent with the standard neoclassical assumptions in Berk and Green (2004). In that model, investor fund flows are always sufficient to ensure that managers have enough capital to extract the maximum amount of value from markets. If, in fact, the manager was managing the optimal amount of capital before being promoted, she would not be able to put the new capital to productive use, resulting in no increase in value added. The fact that adding capital creates value implies that, for whatever reason, the manager was not managing the optimal amount of capital prior to the promotion, and,\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15}These results are consistent with the model derived in Gervais, Lynch, and Musto (2005) that shows how the firm’s decision to fire managers in a fund family communicates information to investors.
more importantly, this misallocation was corrected by a decision made by the firm (rather than by investors).

A key assumption in Berk and Green (2004) is that investors and managers have the same information about the manager’s ability. Thus, one possible explanation for our results is an asymmetry of information between investors, managers and firms. As a consequence of this asymmetry, firms have a role intermediating between managers and investors. Capital reallocation decisions add value because firms have more information than investors about managerial ability and firm executives use this information to direct capital away from overfunded managers and towards underfunded managers. For example, firm executives know every trade a manager makes, and in addition, trades that the manager chooses not to make. Note that if managers know their own ability and are able to borrow (or go short) the firm would not need to intermediate. This explanation for our results therefore requires that one or both of these conditions are also violated.

A concern that one might have interpreting the value added by the firm as rents for private information, is that investors might rationally anticipate the firm’s capital reallocation decisions in determining their own investment decisions. That is, it is conceivable that investors have the same information as the firm, but knowing that firms will reallocate capital for them, investors rationally choose not to reallocate capital amongst the firm’s funds themselves. In this case our estimate of value added by the firm measures a transfer of duty from investors to firms, but does not represent additional value creation by the firm that would not otherwise occur. Of course, since it is costly to run a firm, this hypothesis begs the question of why an investor would pay somebody else to do something they could do themselves. Nevertheless, we can use the existence of single manager firms (hereafter, self-employed managers) to test the plausibility of this hypothesis. For such managers, the only mechanism that adjusts AUM is investor flows. Thus, if investors are letting firms do something they could do themselves, we should observe a much stronger flow of funds relation for self-employed managers than for those that work for firms.

The percentage change in AUM for a manager due to the flow of funds from investors is:

\[
flow_{mt} = \frac{1}{q_{mt-1} (1 + R_{m}^{m})} \sum_{i \in \Omega_{mt-1}} \frac{q_{it} - q_{it-1} (1 + R_{it})}{n_{it-1}}.
\]

Using this measure, we test for differences in the flow of fund performance relation between self-employed managers and other managers by running the following regression over
Table 8: Sensitivity of Fund Flow to Performance: This table reports the coefficient estimates of (15) over the past 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months. Yearmonth fixed effects are included for all regression specifications. Adjusted R² values are also reported. Standard errors, in parentheses, are two-way clustered by manager and by comanagement block. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

$$flow_{mt} = \lambda_t + \delta \cdot tenure_{mt} + \left( \beta + \gamma \cdot 1_{self-employed} \right) \sum_{s=0}^{\tau-1} \frac{1}{\tau} \left( R^n_{mt-s} - R^B_{mt-s} \right) + \epsilon_{mt}, \quad (15)$$

where \(\lambda_t\) are time fixed effects and \(tenure_{mt}\) is the number of years the manager has been in the database at time \(t\). The dummy variable \(1_{self-employed} \) takes on the value of 1 if manager \(m\) is self-employed at time \(t\) and 0 otherwise, so the coefficient \(\gamma\) in (15) compares the sensitivity of the flow performance relation of self-employed managers with all other managers. In line with the existing literature, we winsorize the flow of funds at the 1st and 99th percentiles.\(^\text{16}\) Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates.

For both types of managers, investor fund flow responds significantly to performance. But more importantly, for our purposes, the estimated \(\gamma\) is never significantly positive and the point estimate is almost always negative. There is no evidence that the flow of funds performance relation is stronger for self-employed managers than for other managers. Therefore, we find no evidence that investors transfer capital reallocation decisions to

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\(^\text{16}\)See Chen, Hong, Jiang, and Kubik (2013), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), and Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011).
firms that they could do themselves.

Presumably the firm’s informational advantage results from its unique ability to observe its own employees. Consequently, if private information plays an important role in the firm’s decisions, we should expect internal capital allocation decisions to add more value than capital reallocations that result from managers changing firms. To test this hypothesis, we define an external promotion as a change in jobs that is also accompanied by an increase in the manager’s AUM. Similarly, an external demotion is a job change that is accompanied by a decrease in the manager’s AUM. We repeat the same tests as we did for internal capital changes using these two definitions. The results are reported in Table 9. None of the coefficients are significantly different from zero.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Reallocation</th>
<th>0.051</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promotion</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demotion</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.403)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed Effects
- Manager: Yes
- Yearmonth: Yes

Table 9: **External Reallocation of Capital:** This table reports statistics on the value added (in $ millions/month) to an average manager through external capital reallocations by the firm. The first column of the table reports the panel regression specification that uses the capital reallocation dummy from (7). The next column report the specification where we split reallocations into promotions and demotions, that is, the estimates from (8). The final column defines promotions and demotions based on the change in the total dollar fees collected, rather than just the change in AUM. Manager and yearmonth fixed effects are included in all regression specifications. Standard errors, heteroskedastic-robust and two-way clustered by manager and conmanagement block, are provided in parentheses. * (***) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level.

If one were willing to assume that the investors information set contains no more information than what is available in past returns, then an alternative way to measure the importance of the firm’s informational advantage, is to measure how much of the capital reallocation decision can be explained by past performance alone. To do this, we run a probit model where we regress the promotion (or demotion) event, expressed as a dummy in that period, on the manager’s net return in excess of the benchmark over the previous 6 months, 7-18 months and the entire history, T. Writing this out formally, first
where managers with fewer than 24 months of experience are excluded so that all three performance measures are meaningful. We then run the following probit panel regression:

\[
\Pr[1_{\text{reallocate \ event}}^m_t = 1] = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_6 \hat{\alpha}^6_{mt} + \beta_{18} \hat{\alpha}^{18}_{mt} + \beta_T \hat{\alpha}^T_{mt}),
\]

where the indicator function \(1_{\text{reallocate \ event}}^m_t\) equals one if the reallocation event under consideration (i.e., either a promotion or a demotion) occurs to manager \(m\) at time \(t\).

Estimates of the coefficients of (16) and pseudo-R² values are reported in Table 10. The pseudo-R² of the regressions are 0.20% for promotions and 0.11% for demotions.

Because the pseudo-R² values are difficult to interpret, we repeat the same analysis for investor flows, and use the relative difference in the pseudo-R²'s to infer the importance of past performance in capital reallocations. Consequently, we define an investor promotion (demotion) dummy which takes on the value 1 in months when a manager receives a net inflow (outflow) of funds from investors, and 0 otherwise and report the results in Table 10. The pseudo-R² is 3.70% for investor promotions and demotions. The pseudo-R² values for firm reallocations of capital are an order of magnitude smaller, consistent with the hypothesis that firm executives use factors other than past performance in making their decisions. This result explains why the coefficient estimate on capital reallocation in Table 7 is not affected by the inclusion of abnormal returns and also implies that the mean reversion bias mentioned in Section 6 is likely to be small.

Another way to assess the relative importance of firms’ capital reallocation decisions and investor fund flows, is to use the estimates of the beta coefficients reported in Table 10 and (16) to compute the marginal effect of observing a change of one percentage point to the regressors. Panel B of Table 10 reports the results. Observing a 1% increase in the estimated alpha has a large effect on the flow of investor funds, but hardly changes the probability of being promoted. For example, observing an 1% increase in the estimated alpha in the past 6 months, increases the probability of an inflow of funds by 8.9%, from 48.1% to 57.0%. The same event does not change the probability of a promotion.

The longer a manager stays in the mutual fund industry, the more accurately her skill can be assessed. Thus, if the firm’s ability to assign capital to labor derives from private
Table 10: Predictability of Promotions and Demotions: We consider two types of promotions and demotions. A “Firm” promotion (demotion) is the standard definition we have used throughout the paper, the addition (subtraction) of a fund to a manager. An “Investor” promotion (demotion) is an inflow (outflow) of investor funds. Panel A of this table reports estimated coefficients and the pseudo-$R^2$ value for a probit regression of a promotion (or demotion) dummy on historical realized alpha (over the past 1-6 months, 7-18 months, and the remaining history (19+)). Provided in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by comanagement block. * (**) indicates that the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 95% (99%) confidence level. The first column of Panel B of this table reports the unconditional probability of a promotion (or demotion). The other columns use the estimates in Panel A and (16) to compute the effect on the unconditional probability of a 0.01 (1%) increase in each regressor while keeping the other regressors fixed.
Figure 5: **Capital Reallocation and Manager Tenure**: Starting in 1987, we sort managers into quintiles based on their tenure. Within each quintile, we sum the absolute value of the dollar change in AUM that results from firms’ capital reallocation decisions across months and managers. We then divide by the sum across months and managers of the AUM in the quintile.

To see whether this is true in the data, we define manager tenure as the length of time (in months) since the manager first entered our data sample. We then sort managers into quintiles based on their tenure. Because our data sample begins in 1977, tenure is censored from above. We address this issue by starting the analysis in January 1987. Within each quintile, we sum the absolute value of the change in AUM that results from firms’ capital reallocation decisions across months and managers. We then divide by the sum across months and managers of the AUM in the quintile. Figure 5 plots this ratio for managers for each of the five age groups. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm plays a more important role in capital allocation for newer employees.

Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms use additional information not available to investors to make capital reallocation decisions.

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Both the numerator and the denominator are winsorized below at the 1% level and winsorized above at the 99% level to reduce the effect of extreme outliers.
9 Conclusion

Arguably one of the most important questions in economics is why firms exist. A large literature has addressed this question both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. That literature has identified the important role of capital in determining the boundary of the firm. In recent years, however, the importance of firms with little or no capital has increased. This growth raises the question of why such firms exist. In this paper we identify another important role of the firm — the efficient allocation of capital to labor.

To identify reasons for firm existence that do not rely on the ownership of capital, we study the mutual fund industry because firms in this industry do not own most of their capital. Another advantage of this industry is that we can directly measure employee output. Furthermore, we can accurately predict what the return on capital would be were it not invested in the firm. Using this information, we are able to bound the value added by a mutual fund firm by reallocating capital. We find that the role of the firm is important. At least 30% of the value added of a manager can be attributed to the firm’s decision to efficiently allocate capital to managers.
References


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